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Speech Acts and Silencing: A Social Account of Speech Action and Restrictions on Speech 
Casey Rebecca Johnson, PhD 
University of Connecticut, 2015 
 
In Speech Acts and Silencing, I develop a new, socially sensitive, account of conversation in general, and 
of assertion in particular.  According to traditional speech act theory, an utterance is a particular 
conversational move, like a question or a promise, when it has the kind of force associated with that 
move.  Traditionally, this force – called illocutionary force – has been understood in terms of various 
conditions, norms, and constraints that utterances either meet or fail to meet.  My new account rejects two 
main assumptions involving illocutionary force: first, that illocutionary forces are constituted by norms, 
and second, that each utterance has, as an objective matter of fact, a single illocutionary force. In my first 
two chapters, I argue that our theories of conversation and assertion can do without the constitutive norm 
of assertion – indeed, I argue, there is no such norm.  
In the third chapter, I reject the assumption of objective illocutionary force.  Objectivism about a 
particular subject matter can come in various strengths and flavors, and I argue that none of the candidate 
objectivist positions about illocutionary force are satisfactory. 
The fourth chapter outlines my new position.  Illocutionary force, I argue, is relative to perspective.  As 
participants in conversations perceive and register social changes made by speech, they form expectations 
and assign one another obligations. These expectations and obligations are the hallmarks of illocutionary 
force. Of course, participants may not all agree on the expectations and obligations generated by an 
utterance.  So, the force that an utterance has is relative to the expectations it generates in each participant 
in the conversation. 
While this account of illocutionary force is new, it has applications to extant debates.  In particular, it has 
applications to our understanding of communicative justice.  In my last two chapters I apply my new 
account of illocutionary force to the debates over unjust restrictions on speech and testimony.  Social and 
political factors influence the ways in which participants perceive utterances.  Because these perceptions 
are central to my account of illocutionary force, this account is well placed to help us understand the ways 
in which speakers are restricted unjustly in their ability to act with speech. 
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Introduction 
While trying to come up with a title for my dissertation, I found myself wishing 
that, “How To Do Things with Words” hadn’t been taken.  Doing things with words, after 
all, is my focus – though, to be honest, what I’ve attempted here is less of a “how to” and 
more of a “what’s done”.  What is it that speakers do, when they act with their speech?  
And what kinds of restrictions on speech actions do speakers face?  I’ve attempted to 
understand and explain in this dissertation what speakers do when they manage to act 
with their speech.   
Austin, in his influential (and well titled) text makes what I take to be a key 
observation about the philosophical analysis of language use (Austin, 1975).  He observes 
that, “It [has been] for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a 
‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’, which it 
must do either truly or falsely” (Austin, 1975, p. 1).  Philosophers have been devoted to 
the declarative utterances, what Austin calls the “constatives”.  These, according to 
philosophical lore, are the serious, important, and worthy utterances.  The rest, the 
assumption goes, is nonsense.  This assumption, however, drove philosophers to overlook 
many of the important actions that speakers take with their words.  Austin demonstrates 
this by his examination of the performative class of utterances (i.e. “I pronounce thee 
man and wife” when spoken by a minister), but the lesson is much deeper than a 
performative/constative divide.  
The lesson, from Austin and from Searle, who followed him, is that language is a 
tool that speakers use in myriad ways (Searle, 1969).  Like the rock that can be a 
hammer, a doorstop, or a paperweight (to borrow an example from Agustin Rayo (Rayo, 
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2013)), language can be used for an evolving cluster of related tasks.  If we only analyze 
the “serious”, “important”, or “worthy” declarative utterances, we impoverish our 
analysis, and render our theory too weak and myopic to account for actual language use.   
Speech act theory broadened our theoretical horizons and captured the fact that 
speakers do many and creative things with their words.  But the work is far from 
complete.  While I believe that Austin’s observation is a vital one, and while I believe 
that Searle’s steps toward a taxonomy of speech acts is important and enlightening, I also 
believe that there is work to be done to supplement, adjust, and develop speech act theory 
to account for what speakers do with words.   Despite having broad horizons, speech act 
theory is still out of touch with some social facts (Pratt, 1986), (Strawson, 1964), (Sbisà, 
2002).   I will bring these social facts to the fore.  It also suffers from some deficiency of 
detail (Green, 2010).  I will go some way toward addressing this deficiency. And further, 
it is not clear that speech act theory captures all of the aspects of our linguistic practices 
in which we’re interested (Williamson, 1996).  I will improve upon speech act theory by 
de-idealizing, and by demonstrating that de-idealization does not preclude a careful and 
detailed analysis of speech action.   
In some ways, I slip back into the comfortable assumption of the philosophers 
before me – I focus, in the dissertation, largely on the constative act of assertion.  Indeed, 
three of the six chapters are directly concerned with understanding and explaining that 
speech act.  I focus on assertion for two reasons: first, the literature has focused most on 
assertion.  Second, and more importantly, assertion figures in questions of testimony and 
knowledge transmission.  And these are some of the most interesting and important 
things that speakers do with their words.   
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The chapters proceed as follows.  In the first chapter I engage with some of the 
literature on the nature of assertion.  Assertion’s nature, it is argued, is defined by a 
particular norm to which assertions are all subject (Williamson, 1996), (Lackey, 2007), 
(Rescorla, 2009a), (Bach, 2010), (J. Brown, 2010), (McKinnon, 2013).  This norm, the 
so-called constitutive norm of assertion, is meant to range over all and only the utterances 
with the force of an assertion, thereby delineating assertion from other forces.  Assertions 
are subject to a norm that conjectures, questions, and commands are not.  And like other 
norms, this specifies one way of being proper.  Politeness norms specify proper manners, 
moral norms pick out moral propriety, and the constitutive norm of assertion is supposed 
to pick out a specifically assertoric way of being proper.  In this first chapter I argue there 
is no reason to believe in such a norm, or such a way of being proper.  The usual reasons 
brought to support the norm are confused, and the benefits it promises are available from 
other sources.  There is, I argue, no constitutive norm of assertion.  This, however, does 
not mean that assertion isn’t a distinct type of speech act. 
In the second chapter I address one lingering reason we might have to believe in 
such a norm: the relationship between assertion and testimony.  Testimonial knowledge 
transmission is important, both as a crucial way we acquire knowledge, and as a 
(relatively recent) question for research in epistemology.  Because of this importance, the 
speech used to give testimony receives quite a bit of attention.  There is a tendency, in the 
literature on testimony, to assume that the constitutive norm of assertion plays a crucial 
role in our analyses of testimony.  In chapter 2, I argue that this is not the case.  It is not 
compulsory to include the constitutive norm of assertion in our analysis of testimonial 
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knowledge transmission – indeed, other explanations of our testimonial behavior are 
simpler and more informative than those that include the constitutive norm of assertion.   
The debates over the constitutive norm of assertion make a key assumption: they 
assume that each utterance has, at most, a single illocutionary force.  They further assume 
that there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether or not a particular utterance is 
one kind of illocution rather than another.  In chapter 3, I examine this assumption, 
exploring whether illocutionary force is objective, and in what such an objective force 
could be grounded.  I conclude that objective illocutionary force faces many challenges, 
and raise several alternative positions, including illocutionary nihilism, illocutionary 
expressivism, and illocutionary relativism. 
If these arguments are even partially successful, we’re left with a bit of a lacuna:  
if assertion is a distinct type of speech act, and the members of this type are not grouped 
by being subject to a constitutive norm, then, what makes an utterance an assertion?  In 
chapter 4, I attempt to fill in the details of a new account of assertion.  To do this, I use 
some of the tools from Austin and Searle – in particular the category of illocutionary 
forces, and the conditions on having some force or other.  These conditions offer only an 
incomplete account of having an illocutionary force, so I work to complete the account.   
In doing so, however, it becomes clear just how much having some force depends on the 
reactions of participants in a conversation.  These reactions, however, can differ from 
participant to participant.  We are left, then, in a position of having perspective-relative 
illocutionary forces.  Or, so I argue in chapter 4.   
In chapter 5, I put this new account of illocutionary force to work.  Rae Langton, 
in her work on free speech, and illocutionary force, puts classic tools of speech act theory 
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to work (Langton, 1993).  Langton’s influential account locates one kind of unjust 
restrictions that subordinated speakers face – restrictions on making conversational 
moves.  Her account has been influential, but it has also been criticized, (Jacobson, 
1995), (Bird, 2002), (Maitra & McGowan, 2007), (M. K. Mcgowan, Adelman, Helmers, 
& Stolzenberg, 2011).  In this chapter I address some of these criticisms.  Doing so brings 
to light one key feature of our discursive practice – what matters for what speakers can do 
with their utterances has less to do with objective facts about those utterances, and more 
to do with how those utterances are perceived.  This becomes key in this chapter, and the 
next. 
Chapter 6 again engages with work on speech-related justice, this time focusing 
on epistemic justice.  Miranda Fricker’s influential work on the topic is helpful and 
elucidating, however, she views her account as conflicting and in competition with 
Langton’s account.  In chapter 6, I argue that these two counts are complementary rather 
than competitive.   Indeed, by focusing on the ways in which utterances are perceived, we 
are able to take advantage of the complementary tools from both Langton and Fricker’s 
account.  This, in turn, gives us a more nuanced and complete understanding of 
discursive behavior in general, and of particular restrictions on that behavior. 
The goal, in the dissertation, is to make the first steps toward an account of what 
speakers do with words that is both precise and realistic – one that captures both what 
utterances with particular forces have in common, and what creative and surprising ways 
speakers have of using their words.  The key to making these steps is to say, precisely, 
what is done when a speaker’s utterance has a certain force, and what is done when a 
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speaker cannot make an utterance with a certain force.  So, it is an account of what is 
done with words.   
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Chapter 1: There’s No Norm of Assertion, And That’s Okay 
Abstract: There is considerable debate, in the philosophical literature, over which norm 
constitutes assertion.  These debates are all misguided because there is no such norm.  In 
this chapter I offer some evidence for this claim by challenging the three main 
motivations we seem to have for a constitutive norm of assertion.  First, some are 
motivated by analogies between language and games.  Second, some are motivated by the 
intuition that some assertions are worthy of criticism.  Third, some are motivated by the 
discursive responsibilities incurred by asserting.  I demonstrate that none of these offer 
good reasons to believe in a constitutive norm of assertion, as such a norm is understood 
in the literature.  Others who have made similar arguments conclude that, because 
assertion is not normatively constituted, it does not exist at all – in other words, that there 
is no such thing as assertion.  I disagree, and offer some reassurance: we do not have to 
relinquish the category of assertion just because it is not normatively constituted.  I close 
the chapter with a sketch of an alternative understanding of assertion that has its roots in 
traditional speech act theory.  
 
§1. Norms and Norms 
The philosophical debates over which norm constitutes assertion are misguided 
because there is no such norm.  Assertion is not normatively constituted.  I don’t mean, 
by this, that there are no norms to which our assertions are subject.  Just like our other 
behavior, assertions can be evaluated in myriad ways.  Just as we can evaluate a person’s 
eating behavior as polite, graceful, ill mannered, irrational, or well advised, we can also 
so evaluate their assertions.  Insofar as the norms according to which we judge an 
assertion as polite, beautiful, inefficient, etc., are norms for assertions, then certainly 
assertion has norms.  However, just as a person’s eating habits are not defined or 
constituted by the norms that allow us to make these evaluations, neither are our 
assertoric practices.   
 I also don’t mean that there is no accurate description of a normal assertion.  
Assertions are normally spoken or written.  If spoken, they’re normally within some 
range of volumes.  It would be unusual to assert in some language not shared by one’s 
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interlocutors – speaking the shared language is more normal.  Insofar as some assertions 
can meet “the norm” by being normal in these ways, assertion has a norm.  This kind of 
norm, however, does not constitute the speech act type.  If the statistically normal 
assertions were something different, assertion as we know it would still be possible.  
Assertions would just tend to be louder, or longer, etc.  These kinds of norms do not 
constitute assertion; they merely describe a subset of that category. 
 The constitutive norm of assertion is different from these other kinds of measures. 
According to the most influential accounts, there is a norm that constitutes assertion by 
doing two related things: first it sets assertion apart from other kinds of speech acts that 
are subject to other constitutive norms.  And second, it sets the conditions for being a 
proper assertion (Lackey, 2007; Williamson, 1996).   If we could discover the details of 
this constitutive norm, we would discover something important about the speech act itself 
– the norm is supposed to capture something intrinsic to and important about assertion 
(Rescorla, 2009a).   
 With this promising pay off, it is easy to see why philosophers have found it 
worthwhile to debate and investigate the nature of the constitutive norm of assertion.  
Unfortunately, the debate is based on the questionable premise that there is some such 
norm.  I will not attempt to demonstrate that such a norm does not exist (demonstrating 
non-existence being fairly difficult).  Instead I will argue that there is no compelling 
reason to think that there is a norm of assertion.  Further, there’s an equally good 
explanation of assertion, and its place in our discursive habits, that does not require this 
norm. 
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First, some details about my target: proponents of the normative constitution of 
assertion take the constitutive norm to have one of two forms.  First, it is quite popular to 
defend norms of the form XN.   
XN: it is assertorically proper to assert that p if and only if the asserter 
stands in relation X to p. 
 
There are various candidate substitutions for X – a proper assertion might be known, or 
believed, or reasonably believed, or reasonable to believe etc.  (DeRose, 2002), (Turri, 
2013), (Kvanvig, 2011), (Bach, 2010), (Lackey, 2007).  Timothy Williamson famously 
defends a knowledge norm according to which it is proper to assert that p only if one 
knows that p (Williamson, 1996, 2000). 
As stated, XN is a necessary and sufficient condition for assertoric propriety.  
Meeting XN is a necessary condition for an assertion to be proper all things considered – 
if an assertion was morally, legally, and practically proper, but failed to meet XN, the 
assertion would not be proper.  And, an assertion might meet XN, but fail to be moral, 
and so would fail to be proper all things considered.  So meeting XN is insufficient for an 
assertion to be proper according to all measures.  XN specifies a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the kind of propriety that constitutive norm is supposed to pick out – 
assertoric propriety. 
 For an assertion to be assertorically proper is for it to meet requirements for 
asserting, even if other requirements are not met.  So, an impolite assertion might not be 
proper all things considered, but it could still be assertorically proper by meeting the 
constitutive norm.  Assertorically proper assertions have a kind of propriety internal or 
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intrinsic to the act of assertion.  Call theories of assertion that hold that the constitutive 
norm is of the form XN Normative theories, (N-theories).1   
 The alternative form of the constitutive norm defines assertion according to the 
behavior a speaker must perform to be proper once she’s asserted.  Because the 
requirement comes after the assertion, we will call the alternative form of the constitutive 
norm Ex-Post-N.2  Ex-Post-N has this form: 
Ex-Post-N: When faced with a legitimate challenge to defend an asserted 
proposition, it is proper to take further action X. 
 
Michael Rescorla argues for this sort of view – he defends a norm whereby speech acts 
are assertions just in case the speaker is required to either rebut or retract in the face of a 
legitimate challenge (Rescorla, 2009j).   For a challenge to be legitimate, in this sense, is 
for it to be of a particular sort.  And this sort will help pick our assertions.  A challenge 
that is legitimate for assertions would not be legitimate as a challenge to a question or a 
command, etc.  In this way, the Ex-Post-N and XN are similar.  Ex-Post-N, however 
differs in that it explicitly specifies a constitutive norm that individuates and sets 
propriety conditions for assertion by way of assertion’s place in reasoned discourse.   
I will argue, in this chapter, that there is no need for a constitutive norm of 
assertion, or for a special kind of propriety as described by any instance of either XN or 
Ex-Post-N that is particular to or individuates assertion.  I will also argue that this fact 
should not convince us that there is no rich or substantive work to be done on assertion 
and the norms that govern assertion.  I will stage my argument in two parts: I will begin 
by sketching and challenging the three major reasons that have motivated belief in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Following (Cappelen, 2011). 
2 Following (Turri, 2013). 
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constitutive norm of assertion: first, the ubiquitous analogies between assertion and 
games are taken as evidence for a constitutive norm of assertion. Second, some argue for 
a constitutive norm on the basis of intuitions about criticism.   Finally, some claim that 
asserters incur some assertion-specific responsibility.  Failing to meet this responsibility 
is failing to meet the constitutive norm.  By challenging the motivation to believe in the 
constitutive norm of assertion, I may appear to be challenging the category itself.  
However, I will close by offering some reassurance: we need not worry about the state or 
status of assertion without a constitutive norm.  We can still account for and individuate 
assertion.  Even without a constitutive norm, assertion is secure.   
 
§2. Support for the Constitutive Norm 
§2.1 Language Games 
 Philosophers often talk about language games – the idea that using language is 
like playing or making a move in a game.  We talk about rules and about moves being in 
or out of bounds (M. Mcgowan, 2003),3 of adding to the conversational scoreboard 
(Lewis, 1979).  The descriptions we use in our analyses of conversation are fraught with 
talk of games.4  The combination of this analogy to games, and the idea that games are 
“normatively constituted” offers one motivation for the view that assertion is also so 
constituted.   
One way to individuate games is by way of their rules.  An activity is an instance 
of soccer playing just in case the people involved are subject to the rules of soccer.  If 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Some philosophers even specify details about this language game – the game of giving 
and asking for reasons, for example (Brandom, 1998; R. Kukla & Lance, 2009).   
4 See (Wittgenstein, 2010), (Sellars, 1954c), (Searle, 1969), (Austin, 1975), (Brandom, 
1998), (Lackey, 2007), (Turri, 2013)  
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there is a penalty when players other than the goalie pick up the ball, if putting the ball 
into the net during game play results in a change in the score, then soccer is, more or less, 
being played.5  
Some rules of the game are indispensible.  If a player violates these sorts of rules 
(with sufficient frequency, or with clear intent to do so) they are simply not playing the 
game.  Some violations are so extreme, that a single occurrence is sufficient to rule-out 
soccer playing. If, for example, a player came onto the field wielding a racquet, she is not 
playing soccer, even if the context is casual.  These central rules, taken together, make 
soccer soccer, rather than tennis or cribbage.  They individuate one game from the others 
and so are constitutive rules of the game.  If we discovered that another game had the 
same central rules, but was called something else, we’d say, “Oh, we call that, ‘soccer’” – 
the central rules individuate the game.  This is what the constitutive norm of assertion is 
supposed to do for that illocution.  Even if the speech act were called something else, if it 
were subject to the same constitutive norm, it would be the act we call assertion. 
That games are individuated by their central rules is taken as evidence that they 
are normatively constituted – this is why games are supposed to be helpful analogs for 
explaining the normative constitution of assertion.  So, what does it take to be 
normatively constituted?  The defenders of various constitutive norms of assertion 
suggest that assertion is the sort of thing that is individuated by being subject to some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I say “more or less”, because there are instances in which some rules – even rules that 
seem central to the game – are ignored, and soccer is still being played.  Take, for 
example, the rule that game play ceases momentarily when the ball goes out of bounds.  
In many casual contexts, that rule is suspended.  Players can play soccer even without 
observing strict sidelines.  In fact, too strict adherence to some rules in casual contexts is 
frowned upon.  In other contexts, though, no such suspension is acceptable.  In 
professional play, all of the rules apply. 
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particular standard for propriety (Williamson, 1996), (Lackey, 2007), (Bach, 2010), 
(Turri, 2013).  A meaningful utterance is an assertion, rather than a question or a promise, 
depending on what it takes for that utterance to be proper.  In other words, normative 
constitution requires that the thing constituted has, as part of its individuation conditions, 
some standards of propriety and impropriety.  To be a member of the type is to be proper 
when the standards or are met, and so the standards must apply to all and only the 
members.  And importantly, something can be of a type without being proper.  An 
utterance that fails to meet the standards of assertion does not necessarily to fail to be an 
assertion.  That utterance is an assertion if it is subject to the norm.  An utterance that is 
subject to the norm but fails to meet it is an improper assertion.    
Just how alike are the constitutive rules of a game like soccer and the constitutive 
norms defended for assertion?  It’s clear that they’re alike in at least one way – they are 
both meant to individuate activities.  However, they’re also different in an important way.  
The central constitutive rules of games are not normative in the same way constitutive 
norms are.  Constitutive norms specify propriety conditions – constitutive rules of games 
do not.  Notice that in our example of a central or constitutive rule, we do not have a case 
where our racquet-wielding player is playing soccer in a way that makes her subject to 
criticism.  Its not that she is playing soccer badly, instead she is simply not playing 
soccer.  To motivate the normative constitution of assertion in the desired way, the 
constitutive rules of soccer would have to determine what it takes to be proper soccer 
playing.  But they don’t.  Instead, these rules determine what it takes to play soccer at all.   
Perhaps the lesson from this is that games are a helpful analogy for language use 
generally, rather than for assertion in particular.  This is, after all, what is suggested by 
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“the language game”, and by “the game of giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom, 
1998).  It is also suggested by John Searle’s analogy between castling and assertion – 
both are merely moves in games, not games themselves (Searle, 1969).  Can we use this 
version of the analogy to motivate the view that assertion is normatively constituted?   
Sticking to our soccer example, the rules that individuate particular moves, like 
goal kicks, specify the conditions under which such a move can be executed.  It is only 
permissible to execute a goal kick if the ball has gone out of bounds, over the goal line, 
off the body of an offensive team member.  In the absence of these conditions, it is 
improper to pick up the ball, place it in the goal area and kick it off.  So, the rules that 
individuate goal kicks do specify propriety conditions of a sort.  But notice, if a player 
doesn’t meet these conditions, their action doesn’t just fail to be proper – it also fails to 
be a goal kick.  So, changing the analog for assertion from games to moves in games does 
not help elucidate the analogy.   
Neither of the available analogs, games or the moves therein, provides motivation 
to think that assertion is normatively constituted.  Even if assertion is analogous to one or 
the other of these, neither of them are constituted normatively, at least not if that requires 
that the norm in question individuate by way of propriety conditions.6   
 
§2.2 Critical Intuitions 
 Another motivation for the normative constitution of assertion is the intuition we 
have that some assertions are subject to a unique kind of criticism (J. Brown, 2010; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 (Sellars, 1954c) who employed the idea of a language game, didn’t even take assertion 
to be the appropriate analog for moves in a game. Sellars, instead, takes the analog to be 
something like meaning or content, rather than speech acts.    
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Kvanvig, 2011; Lackey, 2007; MacFarlane, 2011; Maitra & Weatherson, 2010; 
Williamson, 2000).  Our intuitions that an asserter is subject to criticism are taken as 
evidence that a norm has been violated.  Sometimes these critical intuitions are due to 
violations of familiar and general norms on behavior – if we assert impolitely, or too 
verbosely, or at an unusual volume, we are intuitively subject to some kind of criticism.   
Sometimes, though, our critical intuitions are taken to be evidence that a central or 
constitutive norm of assertion has been violated.  Many philosophers use these critical 
intuitions in their investigations of assertion, and quite a bit of work has been done using 
various cases to prompt intuitions of criticism (J. Brown, 2010; Lackey, 2011; Maitra & 
Weatherson, 2010).   
 In some ways, using intuitions of criticism to discover norms makes a lot of sense.  
There is probably no better way to discover some of the norms of a practice like 
assertion.  Assertion is a familiar practice, one that lacks formal rules on almost all 
occasions.  This makes it hard to discover and codify the norms without consulting the 
intuitions of those who produce and consume assertions.  Admittedly, practitioners 
sometimes disagree about whether or not some assertion should count as violating a 
convention (as often happens when one interlocutor takes another’s assertion to be rude), 
so there may be borderline cases.   However, critical intuitions are good indications that 
some norm or other has been violated.   
 While critical intuitions indicate that some norm has been violated, it is not clear 
that critical intuitions are sufficiently fine-grained to give evidence that a constitutive 
norm of assertion has been violated.  Constitutive norms of assertion are supposed to be 
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special, so not just any critical intuition will do.7  Intuitions that an assertion is ill-
mannered or immoral do not indicate that the constitutive norm has been violated.  So, to 
pick out the constitutive norm-violations, we need assertion-specific intuitions. 
  In many cases, however, our critical intuitions are clouded by extra-assertoric 
considerations.  Our critical intuitions do not allow us to discriminate between different 
sorts of violations sufficiently well to warrant inferences from them to conclusions about 
the constitution of assertions.  To see this, we will look at examples of critical intuitions 
as they’re used in the literature.   
 One of the most influential uses of critical intuitions is Williamson’s work 
defending the knowledge norm (Williamson, 1996, 2000).  Williamson bases much of his 
defense on the idea that some assertions are subject to criticism.  In these cases asserters 
are subject to criticism and hearers are “entitled to feel resentment” (Williamson, 2000, p. 
498), because the speaker does not meet the constitutive norm of assertion. The speaker 
does not know the proposition she expresses in her assertion.  She does not meet the 
standard set by the knowledge norm and this explains our critical intuitions.   
 If the criticism is to indicate violation of the constitutive norm, the speakers must 
be subject to criticism qua asserter.  The asserter has to be subject to criticism because 
she failed to meet the constitutive norm of assertion.  Failing to meet the constitutive 
norm of assertion is an assertoric rather than a moral or conversational failing.  As 
Williamson puts it, “the criticism that one has broken a [constitutive] rule of a speech act 
is no more a moral criticism than is the criticism that one has broken a rule of a game or 
language” (Williamson, 1996, p. 492).  An intuition that an assertion is conversationally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lackey (Lackey, 2007) has a nice discussion of this.   
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or morally appropriate (or inappropriate) is not going to count in favor or against an 
account of a constitutive norm.    
Let’s look at Williamson’s discussion of critical intuitions.  He focuses on a 
conversation about a lottery ticket.  Consider a case in which I say, “Your lottery ticket 
did not win”.  If I have no information other than the very low probability that you hold 
the winning ticket, then I am subject to criticism.  I don’t know the outcome of the 
lottery, and so there’s something improper about my assertion.8  You are entitled to resent 
my assertion, and intuitively, I am subject to criticism for it. Without other details, it 
seems, there’s little to explain this intuitive criticism other than the constitutive norm of 
assertion.     
 On the other hand, we’re able to imagine conversational contexts in which an 
utterance like this would render a speaker subject to criticism.  Even if we’ve not had a 
conversation precisely like this one, we can imagine how such a situation would go.  You 
purchased a lottery ticket, presumably hoping to win, and I came along and burst your 
bubble.  Given that you’re of legal lottery ticket purchasing age, you are likely already 
aware of your low chances of winning.   
This suggests a different explanation for the intuitive criticism.  You can resent 
my assertion because I’ve asserted rudely.  If I flatly assert that your hopes are about to 
be dashed, I might be rude in at least one of the two following ways.  First, it is typically 
taken to be unkind to dash someone’s hopes in an abrupt or flat-footed way.  Second, my 
assertion is rude precisely because we both know about the overwhelming probability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Perhaps with a large enough lottery I can be certain that you didn't win – perhaps with 
sufficiently small probability my belief that your ticket didn’t win counts as knowledge.  
I want to leave these admittedly interesting complications aside here.   
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that your ticket will lose.  I am stating something so obvious that I am plausibly 
implicating some further content.9  If my implication is “you ought to know this” or “you 
shouldn’t have purchased that ticket”, then plausibly I am violating some convention of 
politeness.  I am plausibly subject to criticism, but of not particularly assertoric sort.  
 In contrast to this lottery case, consider one like the following: As we pass a 
corner store, we see a stranger purchasing a lottery ticket.  If I assert, aside, to you, 
“That’s a losing ticket”, it does not seem like the same kinds of intuitions arise.10  
Because neither of us has a stake in this ticket, the intuitions in the case are less clear.  If I 
assert this to you, it is not clear that you are entitled to feel resentment.  It is hard to say 
why I would be subject to criticism.  If our critical intuitions indicate that a constitutive 
norm has been violated, we would expect this assertion to prompt them.  In this case, 
where no extra-assertoric considerations are weighty, no intuitions of criticism arise.  
Thus, it’s not clear that we can generate the relevant intuitions of criticism if conventions 
of politeness are not violated.11   
 Perhaps we could fill in some of the details of Williamson’s case to isolate the 
epistemic impropriety he notices.  We could hold fix the low stakes, cancel any 
conversational implicatures, and imagine a morally, legally and practically conscientious 
speaker.  Perhaps our intuitions of criticism would remain if such a speaker said, “your 
lottery ticket did not win”.  If the critical intuitions remain, what does this show?  Does it 
demonstrate that there is a constitutive norm of assertion?  Not clearly – what it shows is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 As per Grice (Grice, 1957) 
10 This kinds of cases have motivated philosophers like Jason Stanley and John 
Hawthorne to investigate stakes-sensitive norms of assertion (Stanley, 2008) (Hawthorne 
& Stanley, 2008) 
11 Lackey makes a similar point about Moorean and Lottery sentences (Lackey, 2008). 
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that there is an epistemic norm on assertion that, together with the legal, practical, and 
moral norms, allows us to assess speakers and their speech actions.   
 We can see the same phenomenon in more detail if we consider more elaborate 
cases.  Lackey argues against Williamson’s knowledge norm, and for a justification norm 
(Lackey, 2007).  Lackey claims that agents need not have full-blown knowledge that p to 
properly assert that p.  To demonstrate this she considers conversation situations in which 
an agent properly asserts that p, but does not know that p.  These are cases in which the 
standards for knowledge are not met, and yet we do not take the asserters in question to 
be subject to criticism.  One such case involves a distraught doctor who asserts to his 
patients that vaccines do not cause autism.  The doctor does not believe this, as his 
daughter was diagnosed with autism soon after she was vaccinated.  Nonetheless, the 
doctor is aware of the medical justification for his assertion.  He has justification, and 
speaks truly, but does not know the proposition he expresses.  Here, the intuition is that 
the doctor asserts properly despite not meeting the necessary conditions for knowledge. 
Call this case DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR.12 
 Recall that to offer evidence that the constitutive norm is being violated in a case 
the intuition must be one of assertoric impropriety.  The intuition that something morally 
or conversationally improper has occurred is insufficient to demonstrate that the 
constitutive norm of assertion has been violated. In cases with high stakes, such as those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Lackey’s cases are paradigmatic.  Many philosophers have followed her in 
constructing their cases.  Thus the literature on assertion is peppered with examples with 
similarly weighty stakes.  Other cases involve presidential decisions, exam results, or 
oncologist reports (J. Brown, 2008; Lackey, 2011; Maitra & Weatherson, 2010).  My 
arguments below will extend to these cases as well.  
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typically used in the literature, there is good reason to doubt that our critical intuitions are 
fine-grained enough to provide sufficient evidence for the constitutive norm.  
 In DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR, it is clear that the doctor has behaved 
appropriately.  It is less clear, though, in what way his behavior is appropriate.  It would 
be surprising if our feelings of approbation indicate that his behavior is appropriate in 
every conceivable way.  More plausibly, we have the intuition that the doctor has 
behaved appropriately by meeting some subset of norms on behavior.  It might be, for 
example, that the doctor has a duty, as a doctor, to give his patients and their parents the 
information available from our best science.  He might also have a duty to follow the best 
practices for preventing the spread of disease.  A failure to meet these duties would be 
morally, or at least professionally, improper.  In meeting these duties, then, the doctor 
does as he ought.  Our feelings of approbation might be prompted by these kinds of 
consideration, and not have anything at all to do with assertoric propriety.  So, we have 
an alternative explanation for our intuitions in the case of the DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR.  
Moral intuitions are sufficient to generate the intuitions in question. 
 To test for assertoric intuitions, we need a case that is free from the moral 
connotations of DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR. So, consider a case in which Joe is shopping 
in a drugstore.  Joe is aware of the consumer information offering excellent evidence that 
generic items are just as good as brand names, however his belief is defeated by his love 
of commercial jingles – these catchy tunes have convinced him that one brand in 
particular is the very best.  Nonetheless, he asserts to his friend, “brand names make no 
difference”.  Call this case GENERIC SHOPPER.  
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 The shopper, in GENERIC SHOPPER, asserts something that is true and for 
which he has good reason.  He, however, does not believe it, so does not meet the 
knowledge norm.  He is in precisely the same epistemic position relative to his assertion 
as the doctor in DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR.  So, what are the intuitions in the case of 
GENERIC SHOPPER? 
 It is likely that we do not have intuitions, or do not have clear intuitions in the 
case of GENERIC SHOPPER.  GENERIC SHOPPER doesn't generate intuitions 
precisely because we are insufficiently aware of the stakes and motivations of the 
interlocutors involved.  But, GENERIC SHOPPER is just as rich in conversational detail 
as DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR.  If it is difficult to tell whether or not Joe is subject to 
criticism qua asserter, then our methodology for discovering norms of assertion does not 
help decide this case.  If we have no intuitions about criticism in this case, then it is not 
clear whether or not a norm has been violated. 
 The best explanation for the lack of intuitions is that this case lacks a moral 
dimension.  Without a background set of extra-assertoric norms met or violated, the 
degree to which Joe, or any similar speaker, is subject to criticism is not clear.  In this 
case, in which the situation and motivation for the assertion are morally neutral, the only 
kind of criticism available is qua assertion, precisely as it should be if we are going to be 
sure that the intuitions generated can provide information about the norms of assertion.  If 
we fail to have clear intuitions without high stakes, then this suggests that in the high 
stakes cases, some extra-assertoric factors are playing a role in prompting our intuitions.  
Critical intuitions in response to an utterance are not clear indicators that any particular 
norm has been violated, even if they do indicate that some norm or other has.   
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 There is another way to use our critical intuitions: Williamson also uses our 
intuitions about proper responses to assertion to defend the knowledge norm.  He argues 
that, since “how do you know” is a proper response to assertion, knowledge must be a 
requirement for proper assertion.  According to Williamson’s position we are, when so 
challenged, being asked to demonstrate the propriety of our assertion.  We might say, 
“oh, I don’t know – I was only conjecturing”, and evade the challenge, but then our 
speech is not an assertion.  That, “how do you know” is an appropriate response to any 
assertion is supposed to offer good reason to believe that knowledge is the constitutive 
norm. 
 One problem with this response is that it is not clear in what sense of appropriate 
“how do you know” is always appropriate.  Like our intuitions of criticism, these 
responses depend a great deal on the extra-assertoric features of the conversational 
context.  If my commanding officer asserts something, “how do you know” is an 
improper response.  If a timid student asserts something, “what makes you say so” seems 
more conversationally proper than the challenge “how do you know”.  We can fix this by 
deciding on a particular kind of impropriety but doing so puts Williamson in danger of 
question begging: to fix a particular kind of assertoric propriety seems to be putting the 
constitutive cart before the horse.  Unless we independently think there is a constitutive 
norm of assertion, calling on assertoric impropriety won’t help us.  
There is another popular response to the “how do you know” proof of the 
knowledge norm.  Several philosophers have observed that there are many proper 
responses to assertion (Kvanvig, 2009), (McKinnon, 2012).  To see this, think again of 
Williamson’s defense of the knowledge norm: Williamson notes, ‘you don’t know that!’ 
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is a natural response to the expression of a lottery proposition.  According to Williamson, 
the propriety of ‘you don’t know that!’ or ‘how do you know?’ suggests that participants 
in conversations presuppose the knowledge norm.  If they did not presuppose this, 
Williamson says, the ‘how do you know?’ response would seem inappropriate or a non-
sequitur.  Next, notice that there are many such appropriate questions.  Kvanvig points 
out that, ‘Are you certain?’ and ‘do you have any good reason to believe that?’ are 
conversationally appropriate (Kvanvig, 2009, p. 5).  McKinnon offers, ‘do you believe 
that?’ and ‘why do you believe that?’ as other appropriate options (McKinnon, 2012, p. 
66).  ‘What are you implying?’ and ‘are you serious?’ also seem to work.  From this, 
Kvanvig concludes, “the data about conversationally appropriate questions doesn’t settle 
the matter as to the precise nature of the norm or norms of assertion” (Kvanvig, 2009, p. 
5).   
This conclusion seems right.  We have intuitions that many different responses to 
assertion can be appropriate. If this is the case then neither our responses to assertions nor 
our intuitions about appropriateness should be trusted to pick out a unique norm. The 
inferences about the constitutive norm of assertion from our intuitions about 
conversational propriety are not clearly justified, given that conversations can be proper 
(or improper) in myriad ways. They can, after all, be measured by many norms.   
Perhaps our critical intuitions offer us prima rather than ultima facie evidence for 
a particular norm.  This is, after all, what Kvanvig concludes: our intuitions cannot settle 
the question.  And, just because the evidence that the intuitions offer is defeasible doesn’t 
mean it isn’t evidence.  Kvanvig himself uses intuitions of propriety and criticism in 
support of his favored norm.   
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This response is a mistake.  Our critical intuitions were supposed to motivate us to 
believe that assertion is normatively constituted. If no critical intuitions can be decisive 
because they all depend on extra-assertoric considerations, then in what sense is there 
criticism qua assertion?  Our critical intuitions are too varied to be good evidence for the 
violation of a constitutive norm, and so cannot offer evidence that there is some such 
norm.  Critical intuitions should not motivate us to think that assertion is normatively 
constituted.  Instead, they point us to the various general norms on behavior that also bear 
on assertion.   
 
§2.3 Discursive Responsibilities 
 The above motivations are usually offered in support of constitutive norms of the 
form XN.  The other kind of constitutive norm defended in the literature derives from the 
responsibilities that an asserter incurs by asserting.  The idea is that assertion has a 
particular function in discourse; one that makes asserters subject to criticism if they do 
not respond to challenges in particular ways.  If a speaker asserts that p, and her 
interlocutor challenges her (in a legitimate way), then that speaker must, according to this 
kind of norm, retract or defend her assertion.  This is the ex-post-facto normative 
constitution of assertion.   
 Michael Rescorla defends a view like this (Rescorla, 2009a).  Assertions, 
according to Rescorla, are proper when the speaker meets her discursive responsibilities.  
As part of his defense of this norm Rescorla voices some of the doubts about N-theories 
detailed above.  Unfortunately, some of these doubts apply to Rescorla’s view as well, 
leaving him subject to many of the same criticisms he himself raises.  I will demonstrate 
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this, below.  This, in turn, will make it clear that we do not need assertion to be 
normatively constituted to account for our discursive responsibilities.   
 Rescorla’s norm picks out requirements for proper behavior on the part of the 
speaker after they assert, rather than on how they must be positioned in order to assert 
properly.  This is why they’ve been called ex-post-facto norms (Turri, 2013).  According 
to a view like Rescorla’s, speech acts are assertions when the speaker is required to either 
rebut or retract in the face of a challenge.  If there is no such requirement, if, for example, 
the speaker can remain silent in response to a challenge, then the speech act is not an 
assertion.  This is because assertion is part of reasoned discourse and assertions generate 
discursive responsibilities to defend the asserted proposition.  From this, defenders of the 
ex-post-facto norm infer that assertion is constituted by a normative requirement to 
defend the proposition expressed, or to retract it (Rescorla, 2009a).   
 This inference is a mistake.  The ex-post-facto norm fails to be motivated reasons 
familiar, now, from the discussion above.  First, the norm fails to apply to all and only 
assertions.  Second, the criticism tracked by the norm can be explained by other familiar 
norms on behavior – there is nothing particularly assertoric about it.  These reasons are 
familiar from our discussion of N-theories, but it will be worthwhile to review them for 
ex-post-facto norms.     
 Rescorla acknowledges and attempts to respond to this first worry.  We do not, as 
he notes, defend all of our assertions.  Further, in some contexts challenges would be 
inappropriate.  Rescorla has the following to say in response to this criticism:  
[This] fact is consistent with the dialectical model, which holds that 
asserting a proposition is performing an action that occupies a certain 
normative role within reasoned discourse. Such a view can allow that 
assertion sometimes occurs outside reasoned discourse. Non-dialectical 
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assertoric performances may even statistically outnumber performances 
within reasoned discourse. The model claims only that non-dialectical 
assertoric performances are explanatorily derivative from core 
performances within reasoned discourse… Not all assertions are moves 
within reasoned discourse, but all assertions are potential moves within 
reasoned discourse. (Rescorla, 2009a, p. 105) 
This might seem to help – while not all asserters are required to defend their assertions, 
all asserters are making the sort of move that could make a speaker subject so such a 
requirement.  Assertion is the kind of speech act that could render the speaker subject to 
such a requirement, if that speaker asserted it in the context of reasoned discourse. 
We can account for these observations, however, without a constitutive norm.  
Rescorla’s has only shown that we are sometimes required by conversational norms to 
provide reasons for our assertions.  If this response motivated the kind of constitutive ex-
post-facto norm Rescorla wants, it would be equally open to the N-theorists.  It is not 
convincing in either case. 
 To see why, first notice the shape of Rescorla’s response.  He claims that 
assertion is constituted by being subject to a norm that is only in play in some cases.  He 
also claims that despite this, the norm is still constitutive, because it potentially could. 
Now, imagine we were to substitute an N-theoretic norm (the kind of norm he rejects) for 
Rescorla’s.  For example, suppose that knowledge were the constitutive norm of 
assertion.  We could, if Rescorla’s argument works, account for the cases in which the 
knowledge norm does not apply by pointing out that the assertion in question has the 
potential to be subject to criticism if it is not known.  Rescorla, however, rejects norms of 
the form XN for ranging over only some assertions (Rescorla, 2009a, p. 108).  Given that 
he thinks this is problematic for the N-theorists, it is hard to see how his response to the 
first worry can be satisfying.     
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There is a further similarity between the N-theoretic norms and the ex-post-facto 
norm that Rescorla defends.  As Rescorla points out, the criticism tracked by the N-
theoretic norms can be accounted for and explained by general norms of behavior.  This, 
according to Rescorla, indicates that the N-theoretic norms do not tell us anything 
particular about the nature of assertion.  The same, however, is true for the ex-post-facto 
norm that he defends.  Our non-linguistic acts, our non-verbal communicative acts, and 
our non-assertoric illocutionary acts all seem vulnerable to challenge. 
   According to the ex-post-facto norm, asserters are required to retract or defend 
their illocution if challenged in some contexts.  This won’t individuate assertion, 
however, as much of our behavior is open to challenge in some contexts.  There is non-
linguistic behavior that, if enacted publically, can be challenged.13  In some contexts it is 
appropriate for the people around me to challenge me to explain or apologize for my 
behavior.  So, for example, if I leave my briefcase in the middle of an airport lounge, I 
may be called on to explain my behavior or remove my briefcase.  Behavior, in general, 
can be challenged in ways very like what the ex-post-facto norm requires. 
 A plausible account of assertion would clearly have to restrict the kind of 
challenge that differentiates assertion.  Assertions are public expressions of content, so 
some challenges that might apply to behavior generally, calls to explain, or apologize, are 
too general to be good candidates for the ex-post-facto norm’s challenge.  After all, I can 
be called on to explain or apologize for any number of non-assertoric behaviors – if I cut 
you off in line, I am not asserting, but I may well be required by norms of behavior to 
explain or apologize for my behavior. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 And, if enacted privately it could be challenged if the circumstances were different.   
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 The challenge that seems best suited to distinguish assertion, and so to serve as 
the appropriate challenge for the ex-post-facto norm is the challenge to support or retract 
one’s assertion.  This kind of challenge seems to be what Rescorla has in mind, and it is 
an idea that can trace its roots to work from Brandom (Brandom, 1998), and Price (Price, 
2010).  The idea is that for my speech to be an assertion is for me to be subject to the 
norm that I must justify or retract my assertion in the face of a challenge.   
And this kind of norm would not apply to all behavior – not even to all public 
communicative behavior.  After all, apologizing for a gesture is not the same as retracting 
it.  It’s not even clear what it would mean to retract a gesture.  So, perhaps we can 
distinguish assertion this way: a speaker who asserts is required to explain or retract.   
To see why this won’t work, however, consider questions.  These are non-
assertoric illocutionary acts that can be challenged in some contexts.  “What makes you 
ask?” is an appropriate challenge.  When challenged, the questioner has the option to 
either give her reasons for asking, or to retract.  We can and can be called to take back 
questions, and promises, and commands, and suppositions, as well as assertions.  The 
challenge to explain or retract does not apply only to assertions and so cannot be an 
individuating norm. 
 The best explanation for the similarities in the social expectations generated by 
our behavior is that we have some general behavioral norm or, perhaps, communicative 
social norm that requires of us that we explain ourselves or retract when challenged.  Just 
like the extra-assertoric norms that determine when it is permissible or not for the 
DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR to make his assertions, extra-assertoric norms can explain our 
ex-post-facto required behavior.  General norms on speech action might be moral, 
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practical, or epistemic – they need not be constitutive to bear on our assertoric behavior.   
 To be clear, none of this is to say that these norms do not apply to assertion.  On 
the contrary, these general norms of behavior govern assertions and allow us to evaluate 
them.  The point, here and above, is that these norms do not tell us anything particular 
about the constitution of assertion.  Instead, they tell us about the general measures on 
speech behavior, and our intuitions that speakers are subject to criticms. 
 
§3.  And that’s Okay.   
§3.1 Assertion vs. Declarative Saying 
 I am not alone in claiming that the normative accounts of assertion fail.  Herman 
Cappelen has argued from the failure of N-theories to account for assertion to the 
conclusion that there is no such useful or informative category (Cappelen, 2011).  
Further, he claims, the very notions of assertion and the more general notion of an 
illocution are unhelpful philosopher’s inventions.  I won’t engage with his arguments 
against N-theories; however, I will briefly demonstrate why I do not share his conclusion.   
Cappelen suggests that we do away with talk of illocutions in favor of the 
purportedly less fraught category of declarative sayings.  If we can separate the 
declarative meaningful utterances from the other sorts of behavior, Cappelen argues, we 
have all the taxonomy we need.   
So, we have two options: either declarative sayings can do all the interesting 
taxonomic work, or assertion is a philosophically interesting category.  Cappelen is clear 
that he wants to pick out sayings as distinct from assertions.  He takes the former to be 
helpful and the latter to be unnecessary and obfuscating.  I will argue that the category of 
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declarative sayings either cannot capture the interesting differences and similarities in 
speech acts, or is just identical to the category of assertions (so if one category is 
interesting/useful, both are).  To proceed, however, some details of speech act theory will 
be helpful.   
Speech act theory distinguishes between locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions 
(Austin, 1975; Searle, 1969).  Meaningful utterances are locutions.  I can make a locution 
without making an illocution if I am testing a microphone or practicing my diction.  If my 
locution is a move in a conversation, I’ve also made an illocution.  Promises, commands, 
assertions, and questions are all examples of illocutions.  Perlocutions are the effects of 
my illocution on the behavior of participants in the conversation.  If, because of my 
illocution you answer my question, or close the door, your answering or closing is the 
perlocution.  So, in making a single utterance, I can be said to have uttered meaningful 
noises, asked a question, and prompted an answer.  Speech act theory gives us ways to 
distinguish between these at the level of locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions.  
Cappelen advocates doing away with the notion of illocutions all together.  All the 
interesting work, he claims, takes place at the level of the locution (Cappelen, 2011, p. 
22).  I disagree.     
 Cappelen wants to give up the illocutionary category.  He argues that illocutions 
in general and assertion in particular are useless philosophical inventions.  However, 
notice the following: while Cappelen claims that we only need locutions, he wants to 
specify that he is picking out the declarative meaningful utterances.  It seems to me that 
he can mean one of two things by ‘declarative’.  First, he might mean to be picking out a 
grammatical type.  Declarative sayings, by this understanding, involve a subject, and a 
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verb, and if inscribed, would conclude with a period.  This is what linguists study when 
they look at grammatical mood, and perhaps Cappelen means to appeal to that study.  Or, 
Cappelen could mean to pick out something important about the kind of action taken by 
an agent who produces such a meaningful string of noises, namely that that agent is 
declaring something, or making a statement.   
 Here, then, is the rub for Cappelen:  if he means the first grammatical reading of 
‘declarative’ then he is in a position of being unable to distinguish between the kinds of 
actions that speakers take with declarative sentences.  In many conversations “the 
window is open and the room is too breezy” counts as a request.  But Cappellen, on this 
first reading, has no machinery to account for this.  Our communication, in particular our 
verbal communication, is not typically strictly bound by grammatical conventions, 
making grammatical rules ill-suited to distinguish between the different things we do 
with our meaningful noises.  If, on the other hand, Cappelen means this second reading of 
‘declarative’, then declarative sayings occur when speakers make statements, declare 
things, or put things forward as true.  And this is just what assertions do, according to 
speech act theory.   
 It is not clear to me how to show that a category is philosophically interesting 
apart from showing that it captures some distinction that matters.  If the distinction 
between 1 and 2 matters, then speech act theory does better than Cappelen’s sayings 
account, as it can use illocutionary categories to distinguish between them.  If this is a 
distinction worth capturing, then Cappelen’s declarative sayings won’t serve us well 
unless they are understood in the very way that assertion is.  At that point, we have a 
quarrel over labels, and not over substantive differences in view (I return to Cappelen’s 
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position in Chapter 3).  From this I conclude that we should not abandon assertion, even 
if the N-theories and the ex-post-facto norm fail to individuate that type.  
 
§3.2 Reconstituting Assertion 
 I’ve argued, so far, for two claims: first, that assertion is not normatively 
constituted and second, that it is useful to have illocutionary categories, like assertion, in 
our analytic tool-kit.  In light of these, the remainder of the chapter will be devoted to a 
sketch of an alternative constitution for assertion – one that requires no particularly 
assertoric propriety.  In other words, I’ll sketch what it takes to assert, and how assertions 
differ from other illocutions.  I’ll do this by engaging with some more tools from speech 
act theory.    
Searle distinguishes illocutions by way of a number of different kinds of rules 
(Searle, 1969).  For each illocution there are propositional content rules, preparatory 
rules, sincerity rules, and essential rules.  With the exception of the essential rule, these 
are conventions that determine various sorts of felicity or normalcy.  They are met in 
some central instances of the illocution and set expectations for the speaker’s attitude 
toward the proposition expressed.  An illocution cannot be fully felicitous without 
meeting all of them, but a locution can be that illocution without being felicitous.  These 
kinds of rules can be shared across different illocutions – a promise and an assertion can 
have the same propositional content, for example.  The essential rule, on the other hand, 
must be met for some utterance counts as performing the type of act in question.  This 
rule is supposed to determine the illocutionary status of a locution.  When a speaker 
meets an essential rule, she presents herself as having met the other sorts of rules as well.   
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We should be very careful with this idea of felicity.  It can be easily confused 
with the kind of propriety debated among the N-theorists.  The important thing to note is 
that there are many ways of being felicitous qua assertion – being sincere, being justified, 
expressing a proposition, etc.  Some kinds of infelicities make the locution misfire as an 
assertion – like the essential rule, and the propositional rule.  Other kinds make the 
assertion potentially immoral – violating the sincerity rule is an abuse of the illocution.  
Regarding these kinds of abuses, misfires and infelicities, Austin says, “Do not stress the 
normal connotations of these names!” (Austin, 1975, p. 16).  It might be perfectly proper, 
all things considered, to abuse an illocution in some way or other.  Further, these kinds of 
felicities do not individuate assertion.  Insincerity is an abuse of assertion and of 
promising.  Being conversationally appropriate is a preparatory condition for a large 
number of illocutions (Austin, 1975, pp. 136-138).  The notion of felicity won’t do the 
work that the N-theorists require of assertoric propriety.  
Returning to assertion’s constitution, Searle’s essential rule for assertion is as 
follows:  
Essential Rule: an utterance is an assertion if it counts as an undertaking to 
the effect that the proposition expressed represents an actual state of 
affairs.   
 
The other rules, the preparatory rules, sincerity rules, etc. describe typical or felicitous 
assertions.  These rules are: 
Content Rule: Any proposition, p can be expressed by assertion 
 
Preparatory Rule: an asserting speaker, S, represents herself as having 
evidence (reasons etc) for the truth of p 
 
Sincerity Rule: S represents herself as believing that p. 
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In making such an assertion, a speaker also represents herself (to some extent) as having 
adequate evidence for the truth of proposition expressed, and as having made a 
contribution that is conversationally appropriate.  She also represents herself (to some 
extent) as believing the proposition expressed in her assertion.  None of these 
representations need to be true, or fully met. Regarding these representations, Searle says, 
“in the performance of any illocutionary act, the speaker implies that the preparatory 
conditions of the act are satisfied” (Searle, 1969, p. 65).  From early speech act theory, 
then, we have an alternative way to individuate assertion.  I discuss these tools from early 
speech act theory in detail in Chapter 4. 
There may be a worry that the essential rule does not individuate appropriately.  
Assertions aren’t the only way to put content forward as true.  Conjectures, as 
Williamson tells us, also put propositions forward as true (Williamson, 1996).  So do 
guesses.  However, in conjecturing or guessing, the speaker does not represent herself as 
having the same degree of evidence for the truth of the proposition expressed as she does 
when she asserts.  Thus, given the relationship between meeting the essential rule of 
assertion and the representations an asserter thereby undertakes, this account of assertion 
can individuate assertion from other speech acts.   
 Searle’s essential rule is very different from the constitutive norms discussed 
above.  It does not give conditions for assertoric propriety.  Essential rules give us the 
standard by which something counts as an assertion, not the standards by which we can 
criticize an asserter.  Thus, failing to meet this rule is failing to be an assertion14 – clearly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Just as failing to meet the constitutive rules of soccer is failing to play soccer.  Here, 
perhaps, is an apt analogy with games.   
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not the kind of consideration that the N-theorists had in mind.  The essential rules 
individuate illocutions but do not give propriety conditions.   
 Whatever propriety conditions particular assertions have will be based on other 
extra-assertoric norms available from morality, legality, politeness, efficacy, 
epistemology and/or aesthetics.  What norms are applicable will to vary from context to 
context (and perhaps vary in more fine-grained ways than that).  Assertions will be 
evaluated relative to different norms in different contexts.  And, further, because none of 
these norms constitute assertion, assertions can be proper or improper according to a 
single standard in ways that vary from context to context.  What it takes to assert 
properly, as assessed from the standards of politeness for example, depends a great deal 
on context.  We have the flexibility to account for this variation with a theory of assertion 
that does not require the same standard to individuate the type and set propriety 
conditions.    
 One response on behalf of the N-theorists is to argue that Williamson (and the 
rest) should be seen as spelling out just what it takes to have adequate evidence.  I doubt 
that this is their intention, but perhaps it is one way to understand the project. If that is the 
case, however, it is not clear why we should expect the level of adequate evidence to be 
the same for all assertions.  Different contexts could require different epistemic relations 
to the asserted content.  In some contexts asserters might represent themselves as 
knowing the content, as Williamson suggests.  In others they might represent themselves 
as merely having reason to believe it, as Lackey recommends.  In other words, 
understanding the project in this way renders the debate between the N-theorists 
extraneous. Seen in this light, Williamson etc. would be engaged in a very different 
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project than determining the constitutive norm.  Their investigation would be, instead, 
into the epistemic relationships that proper asserters sincerely represent themselves as 
having to the proposition they express.  And, because this standard does not need be the 
same for all and only assertions, they might all be right about assertions in some contexts.  
The disagreement and the debate between the N-theorists, then, would dissolve.   
 Further, Searle’s requirement is that, in asserting, you present yourself as having a 
particular standing.  We present ourselves as having the epistemic relation to our 
assertions that is required by the context in which we assert it.  In contexts in which 
certainty is required for proper assertions, asserters represent themselves as certain about 
what they assert, even if they do not know it.  The N-theorists purport to pick out which 
relation asserters must actually have in order to be proper, not the relation that they must 
present themselves as having.  This, with the plausibility of context-sensitive propriety 
norms, tells against an interpretation of N-theoretic debates as over adequate justification. 
There is, in other words, not much hope for the N-theorist or the N-theoretic debate to 
recover by pursing these lines of argument.  
We require a variety of things of proper assertions, from justification, to moral 
consideration, to artful expression.  And these requirements vary in their strength across 
contexts.  We can measure the propriety of a particular assertion according to many 
different standards.  In some conversations morals will trump manners.  In others, 
practicality will take the day.  None of these standards, however, constitute assertion.   
Importantly, some of these evaluations help to account for the data raised in favor 
of the N-theoretic norms and the ex-post-facto norms.  In each case raised by defenders 
of those norms, there are extra-assertoric violations or felicities that render the assertion 
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proper or improper in some way.  These extra-assertoric norms influence our intuitions 
about the propriety of particular assertions.  There is no need for assertoric impropriety 
to account for these intuitions when we have other familiar norms already doing that 
work, and an analysis of assertion that individuates the taxon without relying on 
constitutive norms.  So, I conclude, we don’t need the constitutive norm of assertion.  
And, given that there are other ways to tell assertion apart from other illocutions, that’s 
okay.  
 
§3.3 Where Do We Go From Here? 
 With the beginnings of an account of assertion safely in hand, we might still 
wonder, where do we go from here?  Granting that we can distinguish assertoric force 
from other illocutionary forces, what should we do with this distinction?  If we stop 
looking for the constitutive norm of assertion, what kinds of questions and project can we 
pursue?  If the foregoing is correct, we can move forward by focusing on the norms by 
which we do assess assertion, and the uses to which we put these assessments.  In this 
final section, I will identify three philosophically interesting projects have not been 
damaged by the above.  All three projects investigate phenomena related to assertion, and 
none of them require normative constitution thereof.   
 First, we might wonder about the epistemic norms (note the ‘s’) on assertion in 
various contexts.  Patrick Greenough (Greenough, 2011), and Janet Levin (Levin, 2008) 
have argued that assertion’s norm varies from context to context.  If the epistemic norm 
on assertion does not have to distinguish assertion from other illocutionary forces, then 
the norm is free to vary, and our account of testimony can countenance varied 
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requirements.  Theories of testimony that make use of assertion’s constitutive norm, like 
those of Elizabeth Fricker (E. Fricker, 2007), Jonathan Adler (Adler, 2013), Sanford 
Goldberg (Goldberg, 2011), and Jennifer Lackey (Lackey, 2008), can be more focused 
projects without the burden of demonstrating that the norms they’re using govern all and 
only assertions.   
 Freeing the norms in this way means that our account of the epistemic norms on 
testimony can require more in some cases than others.  Some cases, like testifying in 
court, might indeed require knowledge for proper assertion.  In others, like the case of the 
distraught doctor, the testimony need not be believed (and therefore not known) to be 
epistemically proper.  Discovering what about the cases causes these differences in 
epistemic requirements seems like a worthy project – and it is one that is only available if 
we relinquish the idea that is a single epistemic norm on all and only assertions.   
 A second worthy project is on the other norms on assertion.  Epistemic norms 
have been the focus for the literature on the constitutive norm; however other 
philosophical inquiries have focused on other kinds of norms. Work by Miranda Fricker 
(M. Fricker, 2007), Rae Langton (Langton, 1993), Ishani Maitra, and Mary Kate 
McGowan (Maitra & McGowan, 2010), and others, brings attention to the moral, legal, 
and practical norms that govern our speech acts and, by extension, our assertions and 
testimony.   
 By focusing on these other kinds of norms, we can see more clearly how and why 
speakers use different kinds of speech acts.  Assertions can, for example, be a powerful 
source of knowledge, but also be a powerful tool for subordination.  An assertion might 
be epistemically proper and still be impractical, immoral, or subordinating.  On the other 
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hand, it might be a matter of justice, or of practical exigency, that we assert without 
justification, say, or belief.  This is made clear in the cases raised by Lackey (Lackey, 
2007), by Weatherson and Maitra (Maitra & Weatherson, 2010), and by Kvanvig 
(Kvanvig, 2009), in their discussions of the constitutive norm.  However, there the 
observations go by the wayside in pursuit of the constitutive norm.  More attention is due 
to the other norms on assertion, as the work from Langton etc, makes clear.   
 A third project, separate from questions of testimonial knowledge transmission, 
and questions of just speech action, is to figure out just how our everyday speech actions, 
and perhaps assertion in particular, are related to our other behavior, both public and 
private.  What norms, if any, are particular to our public action?  For which of these, if 
any, are all and only speakers responsible?  All and only asserters?  What kinds of 
expectations do we have of speakers?  These kinds of questions are closely related to the 
ones that Rescorla asks, as discussed above, but more general, as they are not bound to 
produce a particular norm to constitute assertion. 
 In many ways this project is similar to work on conversations from Brandom 
(Brandom, 1998), Kukla and Lance (R. Kukla & Lance, 2009), Green (Green, 1999, 
2010), and Price (Price, 2013).  To see what kinds of expectations and responsibilities 
asserters and other speakers incur we will have to look at the purposes and kinematics of 
conversation.  We will have to look at assertion’s place in a complex practice.  This is a 
live and important project, and one that need not invoke or inquire about a constitutive 
norm of assertion.   
 The following chapters only make brief contact with most of these projects.  I 
want to flag them here, though, because the positions taken in the rest of the dissertation 
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will be, to the very best of my ability, compatible with a pursuit of these projects.  There 
is work to be done, though, before the projects can be pursued – work on testimony, 
illocutionary force, and assertion itself.  I turn to that work in the next chapters.   
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Chapter 2: Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion 
Abstract: In this chapter I discuss one lingering reason we might think that the 
constitutive norm of assertion is theoretically compulsory.  Despite the arguments in 
chapter 1, there is a long-standing assumption that the constitutive norm of assertion 
plays a vital role in our understanding of testimonial knowledge transmission.  In this 
chapter, I argue that this is not the case.  I do so by demonstrating that for every 
reasonable candidate role the constitutive norm of assertion might play in an explanation, 
there is a better simpler explanation that leaves that norm out.  Indeed, as in chapter 1, 
most of the places where the constitutive norm of assertion seems necessary are, in the 
end, places were other more general norms are in play.   
 
 
§1. The Constitutive Norm and the Epistemology of Testimony 
  It is widely assumed in the epistemology of testimony that there is a connection 
between testimonial knowledge transmission and the constitutive norm of assertion.  
Timothy Williamson, in his seminal discussion of knowledge and assertion, remarks that, 
It is...pointful to ask why we have such a speech act as assertion in our 
repertoire...No doubt we need a speech act something like assertion, to 
communicate beliefs, but could we not have done so just as well by using 
a speech act whose rule demanded less than knowledge? ... One obvious 
answer is that we need assertion to transmit knowledge. (Williamson, 
2000, p. 267) 
 
Similarly, in her work on reductionism and anti-reductionism, Elizabeth Fricker claims 
that, 
The speech act of assertion is...governed by the norm: one should assert 
that P only if one knows that P...in asserting that P, the asserter gives her 
word that P and entitles her audience to believe that P on the strength of 
her say-so, so that her audience may complain if P subsequently turns out 
to be false, or the asserter not to have known it to be true. (E. Fricker, 
2007, p. 104) 
 
In his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on problems in the epistemology of 
testimony, Jonathan Adler notices that, 
The [knowledge norm] seems to capture the hearer's point of view: The 
hearer accepts the speaker's testimony without learning of the speaker's 
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evidence or reasons or credentials, since the hearer takes the speaker to 
know. (Adler, 2013) 
 
These references to ‘the norm of assertion’, ‘the knowledge norm,’ and ‘the rule’ of 
assertion all invoke the notion of a speech act defined by being subject to a constitutive 
norm.  
Some epistemologists have even remarked on the frequent use of this assumed 
connection.  In her book on testimony, Jennifer Lackey points out that, 
Considerations regarding the [Knowledge Norm] have been quite heavily 
relied upon to provide support for [The Transmission of Epistemic 
Properties]. (Lackey, 2008, p. 105) 
 
Sanford Goldberg also mentions this assumption in his work on epistemic rights saying,   
I want to take the claim that assertion has a norm and put it to work in 
connection with some issues surrounding testimony.  I am not the first to 
try to link the debate over assertion’s norm to issues regarding testimony.  
Various people have already done so.  (Goldberg, 2011, p. 175) 
 
As all of these passages demonstrate, there is an apparently intuitive and often assumed 
connection between the norm that constitutes assertion and the knowledge we transmit 
through testimony.  
 Unfortunately, the constitutive norm of assertion is not a simple tool to use.  
There is little consensus over which norm, if any, constitutes assertion.  The constitutive 
norm of assertion is supposed to determine, for all assertions, whether or not those speech 
acts are proper.  This means that the norm does not describe how assertions normally are, 
it describes the characteristics of proper assertions.  It also means that a speech act is an 
assertion if and only if it is subject to that norm.  Defenders of the norm also specify that 
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the norm determines assertoric propriety, in particular, rather than legal, or moral, or 
practical propriety.15  However, neither the details nor nature of the norm are obvious.   
One sign of this confusion is that a wide variety of candidates for the constitutive 
norm have been defended.  Williamson (Williamson, 1996), Keith DeRose (DeRose, 
2002), and John Hawthorne (Hawthorne, 2004) defend the knowledge norm according to 
which proper assertions are known.  Matthew Weiner (Weiner, 2007), on the other hand, 
prefers a truth norm – that proper assertions are true.  Lackey (Lackey, 2007) defends a 
norm according to which it must be reasonable for a speaker to believe the content she 
asserts for that assertion to be proper.  Kent Bach (Bach, 2010)  defends a belief norm 
according to which a proper asserter only needs to believe the content she asserts. Ishani 
Maitra and Brian Weatherson (Maitra & Weatherson, 2010) defend a norm according to 
which it is proper to assert some content only if it is proper to act as if that content is true. 
And the debate is complicated even further: Janet Levin (Levin, 2008), John Koethe 
(Koethe, 2009), Daniel Whiting (Whiting, 2013), Mikkel Gerken (Gerken, 2013), Charlie 
Pelling (Pelling, 2013a, 2013e), and Herman Cappelen (Cappelen, 2011) have all raised 
worries about the nature and existence of a specifically assertoric norm.  The precise 
nature of the constitutive norm of assertion is a hard and complex problem in the 
philosophy of language. 
 So, the assumption that the constitutive norm of assertion has an important role to 
play in accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission comes at a cost – it commits the 
epistemologist to taking a stand on there being a constitutive norm for assertion, on the 
nature of that norm, and on that norm’s ability to play the role of explaining testimonial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 (Lackey, 2007) has a nice discussion of this. 
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transmission.  It would therefore be a benefit, and yield a simpler epistemological project, 
if the epistemological account of knowledge transmission could avoid commitments 
regarding the constitutive norm of assertion.  
 In this chapter, I will argue that this benefit is within reach – the constitutive 
norm of assertion, though it might seem integral to accounts of testimonial knowledge 
transmission, in the end, has no role to play in those accounts.  Furthermore, I’ll argue, 
there are alternative explanations we can give for testimonial knowledge transmission.  
These alternatives eschew the constitutive norm of assertion, but instead draw on general 
norms on behavior – norms of politeness, morality, and practicality.  So, not only does 
the constitutive norm play no role in explanations of testimonial knowledge transmission, 
we also already have all the norms we need to explain this phenomenon.   
 I begin, in the first section, with two somewhat simplistic ways of articulating the 
assumption that the constitution of assertion explains the knowledge hearers get from 
testimony.  Despite the fact that no particular philosopher defends such simplistic 
articulations, these cases offer a good place to start our examination of the purported 
connection.  In this first section I consider both internalist and externalist accounts of 
testimonial knowledge transmission that invoke the constitutive norm of assertion.  I will 
demonstrate that the constitutive norm of assertion has no plausible role to play in these 
accounts.  
 I next turn to an account of testimonial knowledge transmission that uses the 
constitutive norm of assertion more plausibly.  This account is closely related to features 
of the quoted Fricker and Williamson passages above.  It is an articulation of the 
assumption that the constitutive norm of assertion plays a role in making testimony 
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reliable.  In this section I will argue that the constitutive norm, at least as it is usually 
understood, cannot play that role. 
 Finally, I turn to an account of the rights conferred by testimony and the role that 
the constitution of assertion plays in explaining those rights.  Goldberg (Goldberg, 2011) 
and Philip Nickel (Nickel, 2013) have both recently claimed that assertion’s constitution 
helps explain this exchange of rights.  In the last section I demonstrate that the 
constitution of assertion has no role to play in these explanations either.  The upshot, if 
my arguments are correct, is that there are important norms on assertion at least one of 
which is epistemic, but none of which has to constitute the speech act in order to explain 
testimonial knowledge transmission.     
 
§2. Internalist and Externalist Accounts 
 A few more preliminaries are in order before going on.  First, I will assume 
throughout that testimonial knowledge transmission occurs.  I will also assume that there 
are familiar norms on our actions and that speaking is a kind of action.  By this I just 
mean that our speech acts can be measured against norms of practicality, morality, 
legality, beauty, etc.  I take both of these assumptions to be relatively uncontroversial, so 
I will not defend them here.  I will also not discuss the nature of belief or its relationship 
to knowledge and testimony.16  I will not engage in the lively debate over reductionism 
and anti-reductionism.17  I will mention, but not attempt to adjudicate between internalist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See (Williamson, 2000), (Lackey, 2008), (Millikan, 1984), (Gendler, 2008) 
17 (E. Fricker, 2007), (Horgan, 1996), (Lackey, 2003) 
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and externalist accounts of justification.18  I don’t leave these debates aside because I 
think they are unimportant – on the contrary, I think these are questions on which 
interesting and important work is being done.  In fact, I think that epistemologists of 
testimony should pursue that interesting work and abandon the assumption that they need 
the constitutive norm of assertion at all. 
 This is not to say that our theory of assertion can ignore norms writ large.  The 
familiar norms that I assume bear on our on our actions might well play a role in our 
account of testimony.  We might be interested in measuring a speaker’s testimony for 
practicality, beauty, or sincerity etc.  However, we can make these evaluations without 
claiming that they constitute the speech act of assertion.  The constitutive norm, on the 
other hand, is supposed to be special – it is the measure that defines assertion, making an 
utterance that kind of speech act, rather than a conjecture, or a swearing.  The constitutive 
norm is unlike other norms in that it defines assertion.  Michael Rescorla puts this 
distinction well when he says that, “a norm is constitutive of a practice [if and only if] 
one must obey the norm to engage correctly in the practice” (Rescorla, 2009a, p. 101).   
 Further, the constitutive norm of assertion measures an assertion-specific kind of 
propriety.  It is independent of norms or manners or morals.  And, the constitutive norm 
of assertion has nothing to say about frequency or likelihood.  Williamson himself points 
out that we may only infrequently meet the constitutive norm of assertion (Williamson, 
1996).  Nonetheless, being subject to this norm is what sets assertions apart from other 
speech acts.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See (Bonjour, 2002), (Goldman, 1979), (E. Fricker & Cooper, 1987), (Kornblith, 
2001), (Feldman & Conee, 2001) 
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Now we are in a position to begin by looking at the simplest ways of using the 
normative constitution of assertion in our account of testimony.  This simple (perhaps 
simplistic) beginning will serve an important function: it will allow us to steer clear of 
some potentially distracting, and ultimately unworkable options.  First, let’s look at an 
internalist account of testimonial knowledge transmission – taking the sort of access 
internalism that has been defended by Laurence BonJour (BonJour 1992) as our test 
case.19 According to a simple version of access internalism, an agent must be able to 
access the justification for her beliefs for those beliefs to be justified.  For testimony, this 
means that a hearer who comes to have knowledge because of an assertion must be able 
to access the justification that that assertion provides.   
How might a simple, straightforward internalist account of testimony make use of 
an epistemic constitutive norm of assertion? Mere knowledge of this norm would be 
insufficient.  Notice the immediate implausibility of the following:  
Internalist Account 1 (Int1) 
A speaker S truly asserts that p and is heard by hearer H who comes to 
believe that p.  Assertion has a constitutive epistemic norm.  H knows (or 
is in a position to know) that assertion is so constituted.20  H comes, 
thereby, to know that p. 
 
This account claims a connection between an epistemic constitutive norm and the 
justification available to the hearer.  The hearer has access to the constitution of assertion, 
so if that knowledge could justify her belief, then the hearer has access to the justification 
for her belief.  Clearly, though, knowing about the epistemic constitutive norm of 
assertion does not justify belief in asserted content.  Knowing that a proper assertion has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This is merely for simplicity, as I am confident that there is a mentalist analog available 
20 Something like this is usually assumed in accounts that make use of the constitutive 
norm of assertion.  See (Goldberg, 2011), for example. 
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some features does give H much knowledge at all about a particular assertion, including 
S’s.   
 This is especially clear given that the constitutive norm of assertion neither 
guarantees nor makes likely that asserters stand in the appropriate epistemic relation to 
the content they assert.  Instead the normative constitution of assertion gives conditions 
for when assertions are proper.  So, the hearer only gets justification to believe the 
asserted content if the assertion in question is proper.  But the propriety of the asserted 
content is neither assumed in Int1, nor is it something that the hearer clearly has access to 
by knowing about the normative constitution of assertion.   
 An improved internalist account would have to include more details.  For one, it 
requires a condition according to which the justification is conferred only when the 
assertion is proper.  It also requires a condition to the effect that the justified hearer has 
access to the fact that the assertion is proper.  Supplementing with these considerations in 
mind yields the following: 
Internalist Account 2 (Int2) 
S truly asserts that p and is heard by H, who comes to believe that p.  
Assertion has a constitutive epistemic norm.  H knows (or is in a position 
to know) that assertion is so constituted.  If S’s assertion is proper, then H 
has justification to believe the content.  H has access to the fact that the 
assertion is proper.  H comes, thereby, to know that p.  
 
Int2 claims that if an assertion is assertorically proper, and the hearer is aware of or has 
access to this propriety, then the assertion justifies belief in the content expressed.  In this 
supplemented version we have a more complete explanation.   
In supplementing to make the account more complete, it becomes clear just how little 
work the constitutive norm is doing.  If H has access to the fact that S’s assertion is 
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proper, then H has access to S’s epistemic relationship to P.  Given that we’re 
considering the knowledge norm of assertion, this means that H has access to the fact that 
S knows that P.  Perhaps H knows or has access to S’s track record with respect to P-
related subject matter.  Perhaps H knows or has access to the fact that S is sincere and 
well informed regarding P in this case.  However H comes to have access to the fact that 
S knows that P, H must have this access independent of S’s assertion for Int2 to be 
plausible.  With this in mind, we can substitute the epistemic relationship that makes the 
assertion proper (i.e. knowledge) in for ‘is proper’ and get a simpler picture.  To see this, 
consider the following alternative: 
Alternative Account 1 (AltA1) 
S truly asserts that p, and is heard by H, who comes to believe that p.  If S 
knows that p, and H has access to this fact, then H has justification to 
believe the content.  H has access to the fact that S knows that p.  H 
comes, thereby, to know that p.  
 
AltA1 offers at least as good of an account as Int2 does.  The norm of assertion plays no 
role in the explanation, and AltA1 is simpler for leaving it out.  If simplicity is a virtue, 
then AltA1 provides a better alternative than either of the internalist accounts. 
 What about externalist accounts?  As in the discussion of internalism, let me 
specify a test case for externalism: reliabilism.  Reliabilist accounts of justification do not 
require that the knower have epistemic access to her justification.  Instead, either the 
source, or the kind of source for the belief in question must be reliably truth conducive, 
either because the belief is formed by way of a reliable process, or because the beliefs 
themselves are reliable indicators (Armstrong, 1973), (Goldman, 1979), (Bach, 1985), 
(Alston, 1988).  For testimony to justify belief in the content asserted, either the testifier, 
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or testimony in general, needs to yield true beliefs enough of the time.  So, our reliabilist 
story of testimonial knowledge transmission would go something like this: 
Externalist Account (Ext) 
S truly asserts that p, and is heard by H, who comes to believe that p.  
Assertion has a constitutive epistemic norm.  If S’s assertion that p is a 
reliable indication that p, then H is justified in her belief that p.  S’s 
assertion that p is a reliable indicator that p.  H comes, thereby, to know 
that p.  
 
Given the foregoing, it is probably clear that the constitutive norm of assertion plays no 
role in Ext1.  To see this consider the following: 
Alternative Account 2 (AltA2) 
S truly asserts that p, and is heard by H, who comes to believe that p.  If 
S’s assertion that p is a reliable indication that p, then H is justified in her 
belief that p.  S’s assertion that p is a reliable indication that p.  H comes, 
thereby, to know that p.   
 
So, if we’re already assuming (as in Ext) that S’s assertion is a reliable indication of the 
truth of the asserted content, then knowledge is transmitted for entirely general reasons, 
having nothing to do with whether reliability is the norm of assertion. Whether reliability 
is the norm of assertion is actually irrelevant to the explanation of why H acquires 
knowledge.  If this is right, then we don’t need an epistemic constitutive norm of 
assertion to account for testimonial knowledge transmission as described by Int2 or Ext.  
 Both alternative explanations are simpler than the accounts that invoke a 
constitutive norm.  From this, I conclude that such a norm is not necessary in these 
somewhat simple explanations of the knowledge a hearer comes to have via testimony.  
Whether we employ an internalist or an externalist notion of justification, the constitutive 
norm plays no role in these accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission.   
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 Perhaps there are more plausible ways to incorporate the constitutive norm of 
assertion into our account of testimonial knowledge transmission.  Internalists and 
externalists who are committed to the normative constitution of assertion could certainly 
pursue more complicated accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission in which the 
normative constitution plays an important role.21  The challenge, for these more 
complicated options, is to show that the constitutive norm of assertion has an important 
role to play in our explanation of testimony, and avoids the objections I’ll detail below.   
As I’ll argue in the next section, statistical norms of assertion, and proper 
functional accounts of assertion, might plausibly work well in an explanation of 
testimonial knowledge transmission, but the normative constitution of assertion is neither 
of these.  In light of this challenge, I think we are unlikely to make much progress with 
these hypothetical more complicated versions of the connection between the normative 
constitution of assertion and testimonial knowledge transmission.  If such a connection 
could be made clear, however, perhaps there would be a role for the constitutive norm of 
assertion to play. 
 
§3. Reliability  
  The constitutive norm of assertion might play a different, less direct (but more 
plausible), role in accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission.  No matter what 
analysis of justification turns out to be right, testimonial knowledge transmission seems 
to require that speakers be trustworthy, at least enough of the time.  This is part of the 
point of the Williamson passage quoted above – if speakers didn’t speak sincerely some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21An Internalist might look to (E. Fricker, 2006) and an Externalist might try (Burge, 
1993), or (Graham, 2012a) for potential ways forward.   
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sizable proportion of the time, we would simply not use a speech act like assertion to 
testify.  An epistemic constitutive norm of assertion might explain why we use assertion 
reliably to report and transmit our knowledge.  Perhaps testimony is reliable because 
knowledge is the norm of assertion.  In other words, the reliability of testimony, and the 
hearer’s subsequent knowledge, might require that knowledge is the norm of assertion.  
 There are two ways the constitutive norm of assertion could contribute to the 
reliability of testimony.  First, speakers might be aware that they can only speak properly 
if they meet the norm – the constitutive norm of assertion might, e.g., motivate speakers 
to only assert what they know.  Second, the constitutive norm of assertion might be 
necessary in an explanation of why speakers continue to use assertion to communicate 
knowledge – we continue to use assertion in this way because asserters tend to be 
reliable.  I’ll consider each of these in turn. 
First, perhaps the constitutive norm of assertion motivates speakers to be reliable.  
Certainly we are sometimes motivated by norms.22  Norms of driving motivate us be safe 
drivers – we approximate the speed limit, for example, and so drive more safely.  Legal 
norms play a role in explaining why we drive safely.  So too, perhaps assertoric norms 
play a role in explaining why we testify reliably.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The classic analogs for the norm of assertion are the rules of chess.  A game cannot be 
chess, the analogy goes, unless the players are subject to the rules of chess.  I don’t think 
that chess makes a great analogy, however.  The claim is something like this: just as the 
rules of chess, taken all together make chess the game it is, the norm of assertion makes 
assertion the illocution it is.  But chess and assertion just aren’t analogous in a way that 
helps motivate the normative account. If I violate the rules of chess, taken together, on 
purpose, I’m simply not playing chess.  It is important for the normative account of 
assertion that I can violate the constitutive norm and still be asserting (albeit improperly) 
(Williamson, 1996), (Lackey, 2007), (Bach, 2010), (Turri, 2013).  
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 Despite its initial plausibility, this way of understanding the connection does not 
work for two reasons.  First, there is a clear disanalogy between the driving and asserting 
cases: the speed limit is not a constitutive norm for driving.  If there were no speed limit, 
driving would still be possible, and the speed limit does not pick out a driving-specific 
kind of propriety. So, the speed limit is not a constitutive norm for driving.  It is clear 
there are norms we’re motivated to follow – the speed limit is one – but that’s not enough 
to show that the constitutive norm of assertion motivates us, especially as the two norms 
fail to be analogous in this important way.   
Worse still, comparing these cases does not support the need for an epistemic 
constitutive norm of assertion to account for speaker’s motivation.  Drivers are motivated 
to follow the norms on driving because of specific and (largely) tangible consequences 
for not so doing.   Drivers approximate the speed limit because of the legal, and practical 
(and perhaps moral) consequences for violating that norm on driving.  The same is not 
true when we violate the constitutive norm of assertion.23 
Of course, speakers can experience negative consequences for their legally, 
practically, or morally improper assertions.  Lying offers a good example.  In some 
contexts, violating the moral, legal, or practical norms prohibiting lying can be very bad 
for the liar indeed.  Perjurers, whose assertions violate legal norms, can face very tangible 
negative consequences.  Moral, legal, and practical norms encourage speakers to be 
reliable (at least some of the time), but these kinds of norms are precisely unlike the 
constitutive norm of assertion – they measure the kinds of propriety that the constitutive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Consider Williamson’s point that asserters only rarely properly assert (Williamson, 
1996). 
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norm attempts to leave aside.24  Given that moral, legal, and practical norms govern our 
speech behavior, it is reasonable to believe that these norms encourage speakers to be 
reliable.  Therefore, the explanation of reliability does not need the constitutive norm of 
assertion.  The moral, practical, and legal consequences for violating these norms already 
account for speakers’ motivation.  As Goldberg remarks, 
There are all sorts of other pressures that can be brought to bear against an 
irresponsible asserter. These include a diminishment in the trust such a 
speaker is accorded, the consequent diminishment in the roles that are 
open to her to play in the deliberations of the various communities of 
which she is a member, other forms of loss of status (and perhaps loss of 
friends and partners) and the moral disapproval of one’s peers.  (Goldberg, 
2013, p. 143)  
 So, even if speakers are motivated by norms to be reliable sources of testimony, we do 
not need the constitutive norm to account for this. 
There is another way that the constitutive norm of assertion might contribute to 
asserter reliability.  As Williamson points out, we habitually use assertions to 
communicate our knowledge to one another.  If assertions are to perform this function, 
speakers must stand in the epistemic relationship to the content they assert that is 
specified by the norm.25  If we are to continue to use this speech act to communicate 
knowledge, then speakers need to meet this epistemic norm with some regularity.26  If 
speakers used assertions only or usually when they failed to stand in the requisite 
epistemic position to transmit knowledge, we wouldn’t use assertions the way we do.  As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 (Lackey, 2007) 
25 Or in one of a range of relationships. 
26 There might be some cases, like those brought up by Lackey (Lackey, 2007), and 
Maitra and Weatherson (Maitra & Weatherson, 2010), where hearers can come to know 
content based on unjustified or disbelieved assertions.  The norm need not be knowledge, 
it merely needs to feature in the eventual production of knowledge on the part of the 
hearer. 
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long as enough asserters stand in an epistemic position that allows us to transmit 
knowledge, the speech act will last as a discursive habit with this use.  So, perhaps the 
role for the constitutive norm of assertion in analyses of testimonial knowledge 
transmission is to explain why speakers habitually assert in this way. 
 First, let me note that this purported explanation is making a sizable assumption.  
Even if Williamson’s observation is right, it is still not clear why this should motivate us 
to believe in a constitutive norm of assertion.  Williamson’s observation is that asserters 
must know the content of their assertion enough of the time, if we are to continue to use 
assertion to transmit knowledge.  This, however, is a necessary condition on our using a 
speech act in a particular way.  Alone, this tells us nothing about how it is proper to use 
that speech, or about the nature of the speech.   
Even if we could fill in more of the details, the constitutive norm of assertion, at 
least as it is described in the literature, cannot explain why speakers habitually assert 
reliably.  For this explanation we need to demonstrate why speakers have a particular 
epistemic position enough of the time.   It must be, so to speak, normal to use assertion in 
this way.  We could offer a standard for so-called ‘normal’ or ‘paradigm’ assertions, and 
so capture this requirement with some kind of ‘norm’.  This measure, however, is not a 
constitutive epistemic norm in any recognizable form.  The epistemic constitutive norms 
determine propriety, not frequency (Williamson, 1996) (Lackey, 2007). So, even if we 
need some sort of norm to account for the reliability of testimony, the constitutive norm 
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won’t do the trick.27  The other norms, with their tangible consequences, are much more 
likely to make speaker reliable enough of the time.28 
 It is perhaps tempting to use the constitutive norm of assertion to explain why 
these other norms apply.  The other norms might explain speaker’s motivations to be 
reliable, but perhaps the constitutive norm has a place in an explanation of the 
applications of these other norms.  This explanation would go something like this: 
linguistic communities hold one another legally, morally, and practically responsible for 
asserting reliably precisely because assertion is normatively constituted.  The normative 
constitution of assertion might have a role to play after all – it might ground or explain 
our other normative assessments. 
 I confess that I fail to see how such an explanation is enlightening without much 
more detail.  And, I confess, I find it difficult to imagine how that detail could come from 
the resources of criticism and assertoric propriety available from the constitutive norm of 
assertion.  This explanation does not seem promising, but it is, I grant, an open option if 
we need to explain the moral, legal, and practical norms on assertion. 
Luckily, however, an explanation for our habitual use of assertion, and for the 
norms that stabilize that use, is already available. Ruth Millikan’s proper functional 
account of speech acts explains why the reliability of assertion contributes to our 
continued use of assertion in our testimonial practices (See (Millikan, 1984), (Millikan, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 A norm that merely describes a statistical measure, like in (Millikan, 2005) could work 
here.  This kind of norm is not what the N-theorists have in mind. 
28 Perhaps there is a temptation to claim, here, that the constitutive norm explains why 
such assertions are normal.  I am not sure how this explanation would go, unless the 
constitutive norm motivates speakers to be reliable.  And this would just collapse into the 
first way of developing the connection to reliability.  Otherwise the constitutive norm of 
assertion, at least one that measures assertoric propriety, does not seem to contribute to an 
explanation at all.   
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1998), and (Millikan, 2005)).  Leaving most of Millikan’s details aside (they are outside 
of the current scope) let me emphasize just one important point: according to Millikan, 
proper functions are not normative in the way that the constitutive norm of assertion 
purports to be.  The proper function of assertion is determined by historical facts, not 
facts about assertoric propriety.  These historical facts might explain why our assertions 
are the way they are now, but they have nothing at all to say about how they ought to be, 
now or in the future.  So, if additional explanation is needed for our application of the 
norms that motivate asserters to be reliable, such an explanation is available without 
using the epistemic constitutive norm of assertion.  
Philosophers have pursued ways of linking the proper functionalist account of 
assertion to the epistemic requirements on assertion.  Peter Graham, for example, 
develops a proper functionalist account of the epistemic norms on our behavior, including 
our speech behavior (Graham, 2012c).  I find this account both interesting and attractive.  
The idea is that speakers hold one another accountable for their epistemic relationships to 
their utterances, punishing liars and the unreliable, and rewarding truth-tellers.  Speakers 
have internalized this, and the epistemic requirements have become evaluative as well as 
descriptive norms.29 This behavior has proved beneficial, and has promoted the survival 
of this testimony as a mode of knowledge exchange.30  There are, therefore, evolved 
epistemic norms that help explain how we learn from one another’s words.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Paul Faulkner (Faulkner, 2007) offers a genealogical story as well, though his is a 
genealogy of trust rather than of reliability.  I think my response to Graham responds 
mutatis mutandis to Faulkner as well.   
30 It is possible that there is some kind of evolved normative stance that conversers take to 
each other – and this could even be part of our cognitive architecture.  This is a 
fascinating suggestion, and could have implications for our approach to the epistemology 
of testimony, but it is outside of the current scope.   
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Graham is clear, however, that the epistemic norms he is investigating are not 
necessarily constitutive of assertion.  Indeed, several of his points tell directly against 
understanding his target norms as constitutive.  He says, “three [norms] are involved, I 
believe, in our practice of “truth-telling” with differing scope, strength, and compliance, 
on differing subject-matters in different contexts” (Graham, 2012c, p. 20).  Furthermore, 
Graham cautions against jumping to the conclusion that a norm on some practice is 
constitutive of that practice.  Therefore, I don’t think Graham’s account, even if correct, 
can compel us to call upon the constitutive norm of assertion.  The epistemic 
requirements we make of each other will likely play a role in our explanation of 
testimonial knowledge transmission, but these requirements do not need to constitute the 
assertions speakers use to testify.   
 
§4. Epistemic Rights 
 The constitutive norm of assertion has, so far, had no role to play, but perhaps 
there is still a need for it in explaining the epistemic rights exchanged in testimony.  In 
the quote above, Fricker points out that if speaker S testifies that p, she makes herself 
vulnerable to a variety of criticisms if she does not have the requisite epistemic 
relationship to p (E. Fricker, 2007).  One reason a speaker might be subject to criticism is 
that her assertion has granted her hearers certain rights, for example, a right to expect her 
to be knowledgeable, or justified, etc.  
In his recent discussion of testimony, Goldberg (Goldberg, 2011) discusses the 
rights exchanged in testimony.  In particular, he observes that in at least some instances 
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testifiers grant their hearers certain rights.  He calls these rights Buck-Passing and Blame, 
and defines them as follows: 
Buck-Passing: [If] H accepts speaker S’s testimony that p, under 
conditions in which H had the epistemic right to accept that testimony… 
[then] H is epistemically entitled – is within her epistemic rights – to pass 
the epistemic buck to S (by representing S as having more in the way of 
epistemic support for the truth of p).   
 
Blame: [If] H accepts S’s testimony that p under conditions in which H 
had the epistemic right to accept that testimony… [then] H is entitled – is 
within her epistemic rights – to blame S for the insufficient epistemic 
support of her (H’s) own belief.  (Goldberg, 2011, p. 178) 
 
According to Goldberg we can explain these rights if we make two key assumptions.  
First, we must assume that assertion has an epistemic constitutive norm.  Second, we 
must assume that speakers and hearers are in a position to know this about the nature of 
assertion (Goldberg, 2011, pp. 178-179).  These two assumptions give us the tools to 
explain these rights. 
 So, the normative constitution of assertion figures as an assumption in one 
explanation of the exchange of epistemic rights.31  Such an explanation might go 
something like this: 
Epistemic Rights 1 (Rights1) 
Assertion is constituted by being subject to an epistemic norm such that 
the assertion is only assertorically proper when the speaker stands in the 
requisite epistemic relation to the content she expresses.  Speakers and 
hearers are in a position to know that assertions are only proper if known 
by the asserter (or if the asserter stands in the requisite epistemic 
relationship to the content).  A hearer can, therefore, fault a speaker who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Goldberg offers an explanation like this as one way to explain the epistemic rights 
exchanged in testimony.  His goal in doing so is to demonstrate that such an explanation 
is possible by way of the constitutive norm of assertion and a speaker who is well placed 
to assert.  He is attempting to demonstrate that no further assurance is necessary.  He does 
not, therefore, argue that an explanation like Rights1 is the best or only explanation.  
There are clearly other explanations available.  
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fails to stand in the required relationship for failing to be assertorically 
proper – This is Blame.  A hearer can also call on a speaker to demonstrate 
to some third party that she has behaved assertorically properly – this is 
Buck-Passing. 
 
The idea is plausible enough – Buck-Passing and Blame describe the rights we have to 
hold speakers responsible for behaving properly.  And, if assertion is normatively 
constituted, one must meet the constitutive norm to be behaving properly.32  But must the 
norm that explains these rights be constitutive of assertion?  To see if a constitutive norm 
is required, here, we should see if we can develop a convincing account of Buck-Passing 
and Blame without it.  
The most promising way to begin to develop this alternative is by observing the 
following: much of our behavior, whether discursive or otherwise, can be measured 
against a wide variety of norms.33  There are standards of beauty, efficacy, legality, etc, 
for many of our actions, including our speech actions.  Sometimes when we hold 
speakers responsible for speaking properly, we are holding them to these kinds of 
standards.  We sometimes evaluate speech as deft, artistic, beautiful, or evocative.  
Failing to meet these standards, in some situations, comes with blame.  Appearing to 
meet these standards also invites buck-passing.  To see this, consider standards of 
efficacy in question and answer sessions.  Imagine I am allowed to ask two follow-up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For further discussion of how these epistemic rights are acquired see Philip Nickel’s 
work on the subject (Nickel, 2013). 
33 There is another way we might remove the constitutive norm from the account: we 
could offer an alternative account involving a kind of error theory.  That is, we could 
deny that assertion is epistemically normatively constituted but imagine that S and H 
retain their belief that it is.  We could still account for Buck-Passing and Blame if S and 
H (perhaps their entire discursive community) merely believed that assertion was only 
proper when known.  This alternative might have promise, but I doubt it is simpler than 
Rights1, so I won’t pursue it. 
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questions of a speaker.  If you’re chastised when you attempt to do the same, you can 
pass the efficacy buck to me, asking me to justify the efficacy of asking two questions.  
These standards are not constitutive of any speech act but they are, nonetheless, standards 
of proper speech in some contexts.   
  I also think that it is equally plausible that the kind of propriety required by the 
explanation of epistemic rights is due to meeting a norm on assertion rather than the 
constitutive norm of assertion.  H and S can hold and be held responsible for propriety 
even if that responsibility does not constitute assertion.  If S and H are in a position to 
know that their speech community expects them to say what they know, or to say what is 
beautiful, or what is legal, then H has the right to expect that S’s assertion meets these 
norms.  The constitutive norm is not required to account for the rights described in 
Rights1.   
From this observation we can construct an alternative account of the epistemic 
rights conferred by testimony.  This alternative capitalizes on general norms that govern 
our discursive behavior – norms that are already familiar and at work in our 
understanding of our general behavior – and so is simpler.  Consider the following: 
Epistemic Rights 2 (Rights2) 
Social acts, like testimony, are governed by norms on behavior that are 
enforced by social and linguistic communities.  S and H are in a linguistic 
community that holds speakers accountable for speech that is impolite, 
inarticulate, misleading, dishonest etc. Therefore, S can be held 
responsible for failing to meet any of these – if she is dishonest, she can be 
blamed.  If S led H to believe H was epistemically well placed to believe 
S’s assertion, H can ask that S to demonstrate that to a third party – H can 
pass the buck.  Thus, the general norms enforced in the community can 
account for Buck-Passing and Blame. 
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In Rights2, Buck-Passing and Blame are explained by the conventions and practices of 
the communities in which testimony takes place without calling on a constitutive norm of 
assertion.  Some norms explain the exchange of rights, but they are norms on general 
speech behavior.  There is no need for these norms to constitute assertion. To see that this 
is plausible consider the following counterfactuals. 
First, imagine a community of language users who quassert.  Quassertions are 
declarative utterances – quasserters put forward content just as asserters do.  The 
difference, however, is that there is no constitutive norm of quassertion – all utterances 
are either not quassertions or are quassertionally proper.  Nonetheless, members of this 
community are reluctant to quassert without justification because the penalties for 
misleading interlocutors are very harsh.34  We could even imagine a community in which 
quasserting without justification or knowledge is punishable by law, despite being 
perfectly quassertionally proper.35  It seems likely that members of this community could 
testify to one another by quasserting, and that they would be reasonable in having certain 
expectations because of the conventions on quasserting.  If a speaker quasserts that p her 
hearers expect her to be able to offer justification for that content.  Similarly, they expect 
to be able to rely that speaker’s quasserted content, and the justification for it in later 
conversational contexts.  In this case the conventions that bear on quasserted testimony 
seem to ensure Buck-Passing and Blame.  If anything, quasserters even better off with 
regard to their Buck-Passing and Blame practices than we are – they can be surer that 
their fellow quasserters have justification.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Note that in some contexts this is similar to our actual community – misleading people 
from the stand in a court room is legally and practically inadvisable.   
35 Consider: even perfectly executed u-turns are illegal in some contexts. 
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Now, imagine a community of language users who assert, and whose assertions 
are only proper when known.36  This is a community of happy bull-shitters: they flout the 
constitutive norm and rarely make proper assertions.  Further, imagine that there are no 
conventions or social consequences for improper assertion.  In such a community, would 
Buck-Passing and Blame describe rights from asserted testimony?  I think not.  We 
would not blame an asserter who fails to know the content she asserts if she has not 
generated the expectation that she knows.  Similarly, we would not ask, of such a 
speaker, that she demonstrate her knowledge to some third party – we would not expect 
her to have this knowledge.  This suggests that what makes testimony the kind of practice 
that gives hearers the rights described in Buck-Passing and blame is the broader social 
context in which speakers testify, rather than facts about the nature of assertion.  Thus, 
we can have a constitutive norm without securing or accounting for Buck-Passing and 
Blame.      
An objection might arise, at this point, to the effect that these norms on 
quassertion are epistemic norms.  If, after all, a quasserter is punished when she quasserts 
without standing in a particular epistemic relation to the content she expresses, then there 
is an epistemic norm on quassertion.  Our quasserters are held to an epistemic 
quassertional norm.  So, in what way is this explanation different from the kind of 
explanation Goldberg offers?  The explanations are different because there is nothing 
quassertional about the impropriety of quasserting without justification.  The norms on 
quassertion do not constitute that speech act, nor do they measure quassertoric 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The details of the epistemic constitutive norm don’t matter here. 
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impropriety.  So, there can be epistemic norms on some behavior that do not constitute 
that behavior. 
For an analogous example, take the epistemic norms on betting behavior.  For a 
bet to be ‘safe’ the positive outcome needs to meet a threshold of probability.  It is likely 
that this threshold varies across bets with different stake/payoff ratios.  This varied 
threshold might set a standard for being an epistemically appropriate bet, but there is no 
reason to require that this standard constitutes betting behavior.   Nor do we feel pulled to 
say that there is some specific betting impropriety that this norm measures.  An epistemic 
norm on assertion could be much the same – setting a standard for a speech act to be 
epistemically proper37, without constituting the speech act.    
Perhaps the lesson from all this is that there is a special relationship between the 
epistemic norm of assertion and assertion itself.  Perhaps this relationship is distinctive in 
such a way that the epistemic norms are much more important to the nature of assertion 
than the other norms that might bear on the speech act.  This idea might go something 
like this: grant that assertions can be measured for morality and beauty, as well as along 
an epistemic dimension.  A speaker might assert without ever attending to the beauty of 
her words, but if she asserts without ever attending to her epistemic relationship to the 
content expressed, something has gone wrong.  And this seems especially true if we’re 
interested in the knowledge she transmits by way of her assertions.  This, perhaps, 
suggests that epistemic norms are special to – perhaps even constitutive of – assertion.38   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Perhaps even epistemically proper given the contexts.  Note that the threshold can vary.  
That’s a complication for another time, but see (Levin, 2008), and (Greenough, 2011) for 
more.   
38 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.   
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Certainly, the epistemic measures of assertion are especially important to 
epistemic matters, like testimonial knowledge transmission.  This I grant.  I balk, though, 
at the next step in the above.  Why should the fact that epistemic measures of assertion 
are important for understanding epistemic practices that use assertion be evidence of 
anything about the constitution or nature of assertion?  If we were concerned with jokes 
rather than with testimony we would expect aesthetic measures like humor to be 
especially important.  If we were concerned with legal liability, we’d be concerned with 
legal measures.  None of this has direct implications for the constitution of assertion.  
Instead it suggests that there are various measures for our actions, each of which might be 
highlighted by a different avenue of inquiry.  And speakers can be held accountable for 
meeting these various normative measures.   
Further, it is not clear that the epistemically inattentive agent we’re imagining 
couldn’t participate in testimonial knowledge transmission.  The agent who is universally 
inattentive to the epistemic relationships speakers bear to assertions might none-the-less 
be a reliable enough indicator of some states of affairs to transmit knowledge, even if she, 
herself, is unaware of that.  Lackey, in her book on testimonial knowledge transmission, 
considers cases like this (Lackey, 2008).  Borrowing from Lackey, we can imagine an 
agent who, because of some brain injury or pathology, has a mental block about 
epistemic relationships.  She doesn’t attend to her own epistemic relationship to content, 
nor does she attend to the relationships others bear to the content they assert.  Her doctor, 
however, has noticed certain patterns in her chatter – for example, the agent only 
mentions deer when she’s lately seen horses.  From her testimony, then, the doctor can 
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learn when the agent has seen horses.39 While we might hold such an agent to be 
epistemically irresponsible, and while she might not be aware that her hearers are 
learning from her, nonetheless, she could participate in testimonial knowledge 
transmission, even if she is unaware of her participation. 
 From these considerations, I conclude that it is at least as likely that Buck-Passing 
and Blame are due to our conventions, practices, and expectations about testimony, rather 
than anything about the normative constitution of assertion.40 While there must be norms 
on assertion – even epistemic norms – those norms need not constitute assertion or pick 
out any specifically assertoric propriety.  
 It might be tempting, at this point, to consider the features of testimony discussed 
above, together, rather than separately.  That is, while I’ve demonstrated that these 
phenomena can be explained by way of alternatives that don’t require the constitutive 
norm, the constitutive norm offers a unified account of all the phenomena in question.  
So, while the constitutive norm may not be the simplest explanation for any particular 
feature of testimony, it offers the simplest explanation for the phenomena considered 
together.  If this is the case, then we can infer that we need the constitutive norm of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Perhaps we’re tempted to say that such an agent fails to testify because she fails to 
assert.  Her babble might allow the doctor to learn, but it is not learning through 
testimony.  Going this way, however, seems perilously close to begging the question. 
40 An objection, here, might be that the normative constitution of assertion just is the 
collection of conventions, practices and expectations about testimony.  If that is the case, 
then, clearly, I have no bone to pick with the normative constitution of assertion.  In that 
case, though, the literature has been mightily misleading.  Arguments over which 
assertions are subject to assertoric criticism ought to be supplanted by an empirical study 
of the conventions, practices, and expectations about testimony.   
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assertion because it is the best explanation of many features of testimonial knowledge 
transmission.41  
 I find this line of argument unconvincing for two reasons.  First, the point I’ve 
been making in the above is that appeals to the constitutive norm of assertion are not 
compulsory.  That is, if we don’t want to involve ourselves in the debates over the 
constitution of assertion, we need not.  This does not mean that there are no reasons one 
might appeal to the constitutive norm, just that we can explain the target phenomena 
without doing so.  The second reason I’m dubious is that it remains to be seen how 
unified an explanation the proponent of the constitutive norm can offer.  Until such an 
explanation is made, and made in detail, this candidate explanation appears to be a 
promissory note that the constitutive norm is involved somehow.   And that’s where we 
began.  
 The nature of the epistemic norms on assertion should be investigated.  We stand 
to gain a better understanding of the epistemic requirements to which we hold asserters if 
we examine these requirements directly.  Such an understanding has promising 
applications to our understanding of various kinds of testimony, and to matters of 
epistemic justice.42  We can pursue an understanding of the epistemic requirements on 
assertion more easily if we relinquish the commitment that the same norm must apply to 
all and only assertions – the commitment, that is, to the normative constitution of 
assertion.   
 
§5. Conclusion  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.   
42 See (M. Fricker, 2007) for a discussion of this latter project.   
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 I’ve offered alternatives to the accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission 
that use or rely on the constitutive norm of assertion.  These alternatives only make use of 
the familiar norms that govern our behavior – norms of conversation, morality, 
practicality, or legality.  Neither justification, nor reliability, nor epistemic rights require 
a constitutive norm of assertion for their explanations.  Perhaps there are other reasons to 
believe that the constitutive norm of assertion is necessary for an explanation of 
testimonial knowledge transmission.  I have certainly not demonstrated that such a reason 
is ruled out in principle.   I hope, however, that the alternatives discussed demonstrate 
that the link between testimony and the constitutive norm of assertion is not compulsory.  
We do not need to rely on a constitutive norm of assertion to account for testimonial 
knowledge transmission.   
 The alternative explanations discussed above offer evidence for the fairly weak 
claim that we do not need to invoke a constitutive norm of assertion in our explanation of 
testimony.  In closing, I’d like to offer one reason for a stronger claim: we should not 
invoke a constitutive norm of assertion.  The reason is this: assertion’s epistemic norm 
likely varies by context – in some situations we must know to properly assert; in others 
we must merely have justification.  Just as other measures of propriety, like politeness 
and beauty, vary in their requirements from context to context, so too does the measure of 
epistemic propriety.  And, given that this norm does not constitute assertion, its variance 
is no worry for the unity of the speech act.   
 The above considerations lead me to conclude that the debate over which norm 
constitutes assertion is misguided, at least to the extent that it is motivated by a need to 
account for features of testimony.  Testimonial knowledge transmission, reliability, and 
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epistemic rights can be explained without appealing to the constitution of assertion, if we 
acknowledge that many norms govern our behavior.  Those norms might include some of 
the measures thought to constitute assertion, but we ought not conclude from that that the 
speech act is constituted by those norms.  Norms bear on behavior without constituting 
that behavior.  And, by freeing the epistemic norm from the constraints of constitution, 
we can account for the variety of epistemic measures of assertion.   
 As we’ve seen, in these first two chapters, there are good reasons to doubt that we 
need a constitutive norm to understand assertion or its function in our communicative 
practices.   This assumption and its attendant debates can be left aside.  In the next 
chapter, I turn to another key assumption in the literature on assertion and illocutionary 
force – the assumption that each utterance has one and only one such force.  
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Chapter 3: Objective Illocutionary Force? 
Abstract:  Suppose I make an utterance, intending it to be an assertion.  You don’t take it 
to be one.  Is there an objective fact of the matter about who is correct?  More generally, 
are there objective facts about whether a given utterance has a particular illocutionary 
force at a time?  Since the 1950s, philosophers of language have used Austin’s 
distinctions between locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions.  In that time, it has been 
assumed that there is an objective fact of the matter about what illocutionary force, if any, 
each locution has.  An utterance is, objectively, either an assertion, or a command, or a 
question, or mere vocalizing etc. but not more than one of these. In this paper, I argue 
that objectivists about illocutionary force face some grave difficulties.  I consider several 
flavors that this objectivism might take, highlighting both the benefits and challenges of 
each.  I thereby demonstrate that none of them fares particularly well.  In closing, I 
consider and recommend an alternative perspective-dependent, relativistic understanding 
of illocutionary force.  
 
§1. A Case of Disagreement 
 In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when a police officer says, “May I 
look in your bag”, that officer has issued a request (Nadler & Trout, 2009).  Justice Scalia 
argued for this conclusion on the basis that such an officer, “has made it very clear that 
he's asking for your permission”(U.S. v. Drayton, 2002).  Many people do not take these 
sorts of utterances, made by police officers, to be mere requests for permission.  
According to one study, only 20% of participants who hear such utterances by police feel 
free to leave or to decline (Kessler, 2009).  The participants who do not feel free to 
decline seem to disagree with Justice Scalia – they think the utterance is a command.  
These participants, then, disagree with the Supreme Court over what philosophers have 
called the illocutionary force of this sort of utterance.   
We might argue over who is right – the Supreme Court, or the majority of study 
participants. To argue about this, however, is to make a key assumption: it is to assume 
that there is an objective fact of the matter about what kind of conversational move a 
police officer makes in a case like this.  This assumption is the target of exploration for 
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this paper.  Are there objective facts about whether a given utterance has a particular 
illocutionary force at a time?  If so, in what does this objectivity consist?43  
J.L. Austin’s influential How To Do Things with Words points out that speakers 
do many things with their words beyond simply declaring beliefs (Austin, 1975).44  In 
demonstrating that this observation was not at odds with a detailed analysis of language 
and conversation, Austin developed useful tools for understanding speech action.  In 
particular, he distinguished between three ways of describing any particular speech 
action: locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions.  When a speaker in a conversation says, 
“may I look in your bag” she issues a meaningful utterance.  The meaningful utterance is 
what Austin called the locution.  If that locution was a conversational move (and not 
merely a vocal exercise), then it had some illocutionary force, making it an assertion, or a 
command.  If the utterance has distal effects – a sympathetic look, or another round at the 
bar – these effects are the perlocutionary effects.   
 As usually conceived, a locution in a context can have many perlocutionary 
effects – I might annoy you and get you to open your bag.  However, as usually 
conceived, a locution can have, at most, one illocutionary force.  This is not to say that 
“May I look in your bag” is always a command.   In some context it might be a request, 
in others a question.   As usually conceived, however, this locution does not (perhaps, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 There’s a wrinkle running through this whole treatment that I simply ignore, namely, 
the possibility of vague or indeterminate illocutionary forces.  Perhaps a particular 
utterance could fail to be objectively simply an assertion, or simply a conjecture because 
illocutionary forces are indeterminate, and this utterance is assertion-ish, but also 
conjecture-like.  I take no issue at all with this kind of indeterminacy and I don’t ignore it 
here because it isn’t interesting.  I only ignore it because it is a complication, and we 
must take things one-step at a time.  I suspect that the challenges for Objective 
Illocutionary force will remain mutatis mutandis for a subtler Objectivism that allows for 
indeterminacy.   
44 Perhaps this should have been obvious.  It wasn’t.   
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even could not) have more than one force in a single context.  The literature assumes that 
there is an objective fact of the matter about what conversational move (if any) each 
utterance is.45  Call the position that maintains this assumption Illocutionary Objectivism.  
 In this chapter, I will argue Illocutionary Objectivism faces some serious 
difficulties.  In the next section I will review some of the philosophical debates that 
involve or invoke this assumption.  In section 3, I will examine different types of 
objectivism about illocutionary force, pointing out the difficulties for each.  In closing, I 
will consider and recommend an alternative conception of illocutionary force, one that 
allows locutions to have more than one illocutionary force at a single time. 
 
§2.  Arguing Over Illocutions 
Austin distinguished between locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions.   
Subsequent work from Searle (Searle, 1969) and others (Sbisà, 2001) distinguished 
between different kinds of illocutionary force.  These analyses have proved useful in 
diverse philosophical pursuits.  The debates over the constitutive norm of assertion 
(Lackey, 2007), (Williamson, 1996), (Whiting, 2013), (Rescorla, 2009a) are, in many 
ways, the direct result of the features and flaws of speech act theoretic tools.46  The 
debates over silencing and communicative injustice, (Langton, 1993), (Jacobson, 1995), 
(Langton & Hornsby, 1998), (Maitra, 2009), (Rebecca Kukla, 2012), even more 
explicitly build on Austin and Searle’s tools and taxonomies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 This understanding of illocutionary force similar to the account offered by Marina 
Sbisà (Sbisà, 2001) 
46 One way, for example, to understand Williamson’s project is to fill in the details of the 
distinction between conjecturing and asserting that Searle posits.   
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Along with the tools, however, these debates inherited the assumption that there is 
an objective fact of the matter about which unique illocutionary force (if any) an 
utterance has.  Austin does not explicitly require that there be such an objective unique 
force, however his discussion certainly suggests it.  In introducing the idea of 
illocutionary force he says, “in general, to perform a locutionary act is, we may say, also 
and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act” (Austin, 1975, p. 98) (underlined emphasis 
added).   
I don’t want to make too much of the singular article, but notice that Searle’s 
discussion also suggests there is an objective fact of the matter about the illocutionary 
force of each utterance. Searle says, “the illocutionary force indicator shows how the 
proposition is to be taken… what illocutionary force the utterance is to have” (Searle, 
1969, p. 30) .  So, there’s at least some evidence that Austin and Searle assumed that each 
utterance objectively has only one illocutionary force, and has that force as a matter of 
objective fact. 
The debates that invoke illocutionary force mentioned above have taken this 
assumption and run with it.  It is operative in the debates mentioned above over the 
constitution of particular illocutions, like assertions or promises, and over illocutionary 
disablement.  Consider the points of contention between the parties to these debates.  
Among those concerned with the constitution of assertion, for example, there’s a great 
deal of contention about whether test-case utterances count as assertions rather than 
conjectures or a swearings.  One example of this, from the work of Jennifer Lackey, is a 
case where teacher tells her students some content she does not believe (Lackey, 2007).  
We are asked to judge whether or not her utterance counts as an assertion.  The parties to 
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debates like this use our intuitions of illocutionary force as evidence in favor of their 
preferred account.  But our intuitions differ.  Despite this difference, the assumption is 
that each utterance has, at most, one illocutionary force.   
And then, among those concerned with communicative injustice and illocutionary 
silencing, there’s a great deal of debate over whether or not speakers can be restricted in 
making illocutionary acts.  Rae Langton offers an influential case of a woman attempting 
to refuse sex.  She utters, “no”, but her attacker has consumed violent pornography, and 
so does not recognize her utterance as a refusal – Langton argues that this keeps the 
woman’s utterance from having that illocutionary force (at least from having it fully 
successfully). Alexander Bird (Bird, 2002), Ishani Maitra (Maitra, 2009), and others (M. 
K. Mcgowan et al., 2011) argue over the force of that woman’s utterance.  The point of 
contention is whether she in objective fact refused.  I’ll return to this example below, but 
for now, notice that the debate is over an alleged objective illocutionary fact. 
So it seems like there is an assumption, inherited with the tools from Austin and 
Searle, that there is an objective fact of the matter about which illocutionary force each 
utterance has.  In some cases, this assumption seems like no big deal.  Sure, we might 
debate over what it takes to be an assertion vs. a conjecture, but that’s not a problem – 
that’s why we do the hard philosophical work.  In some cases, however, the assumption 
seems like more of a problem, as when our intuitions are intractably different.  In fact, as 
I’ll argue in the rest of the paper, the assumption is problematic because of the difficulties 
that face various varieties of objectivism about illocutionary force.  Let’s turn to these 
varieties now.   
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§3. Flavors of Objectivism 
 When philosophers say that some fact is objective, they often have one or both of 
the following points in mind.   
1. That fact is universal or absolute 
2. That fact is mind or practice independent.   
A fact is universal or absolute when it is true in all contexts from all points of view.  
Mathematical truths are usually taken to be paradigm examples of these kinds of facts.  It 
is an absolute fact that “2+2=4”.  There are no circumstances under which that 
proposition would be false.  A fact is mind or practice independent would obtain even if 
human practices either ceased or radically changed.  If there were no humans, for 
example, the facts described by physical laws would remain the same.  Rate equals 
distance over time no matter what we think, or how physicians practice.  Even if there 
were no people physical propositions would either be true or false.  (See (Boghossian, 
2006) for more discussion of the tenents of objectivism).    
So far, so good.  However, there are a number of different ways that these tenents 
of objectivism could be understood and combined.  One kind of objectivism might 
maintain that facts are absolute but not mind-independent, while another kind could hold 
the opposite.  According to the strongest kind of objectivism for some subject matter, 
facts about that subject matter are both absolute AND mind or practice-independent.  Call 
this Strong Objectivism.  A slightly weaker objectivism holds that propositions about a 
subject matter do depend on people’s practices, but are nonetheless absolutely true or 
false.  Call this Moderate Objectivism.  Moderate Objectivism, as I’ll discuss it here, 
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comes in at least three flavors.  In what follows we’ll consider how both sorts of views 
might be applied to illocutionary force. 
Let’s start with Strong Objectivism.  We can imagine a strongly objective position 
about moral propositions.  Strong Objectivism about morality holds that the proposition 
expressed by, “murder is wrong”, is true or false absolutely and independent of human 
practice.  So, if it is true that murder is wrong, the proposition expressed by, “murder is 
wrong” is true in every context, whether or not anyone ever knows it, and however 
people behave.  For a marginally less contentious example consider strong mathematical 
objectivism (sometimes called Platonism).  Recall that the proposition expressed by, 
“2+2=4” is true everywhere, no matter what people think about it (Horston, 2015).  It 
makes no difference to the truth or falsity of this proposition what mathematicians 
believe, or how we evolved to use mathematics.  It also makes no difference whether or 
not mathematicians disagree over the truth or falsity.  And, in general, the Strong 
Objectivist holds, partly as a consequence of these other commitments, that there is no 
faultless disagreement.  If you and I disagree over the answer to an arithmetic problem, at 
least one of us must be making a mistake.  Or so says Strong Objectivism. 
Indeed, one appeal of Strong Objectivism about illocutionary force is that it 
appears to allow us to adjudicate cases of disagreement.  If you think that the proposition 
expressed by, “Mary issued a command” is true, and I think its false, then we disagree 
about the illocutionary force of Mary’s utterance.  Perhaps Mary uttered, “The door is 
open” in a context where her utterance is taken as a command and as an assertion.  If we 
disagree about what force her utterance has, Strong Objectivism picks out a fact of the 
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matter.  It is not up to us or to the conversational participants to just decide what force 
Mary’s utterance has.  Strongly objective facts don't depend on what anyone thinks.   
Instead, Strong Objectivism about illocutionary force holds that ascriptions of 
illocutionary force are true or false, universally, and independent of our practices or 
perceptions.  This means that if the proposition expressed by, “Mary issued a command” 
is true, then it is true even if we think it is false, or don’t know Mary etc.  It is true even if 
Mary herself thinks it is false.  It is true even if every speaker ever thinks it is false.  
There is no requirement, according to Strong Objectivism, that speakers have any 
epistemic access to the illocutionary facts. Strong Objectivism is really pretty strong.   
 Strong Objectivism about illocutionary force, indeed, looks too strong.  If 
illocutionary force were strongly objective, then there could be global error about the 
illocutionary forces of conversational moves.  That is, all conversations could have 
proceeded in just the way they in fact did – plans could be made, knowledge transmitted, 
offense meant and taken – without anyone getting the illocutionary facts right.  But there 
is no evidence of this kind of global error.  Strong Objectivism is, therefore, deeply 
undermined.  
 Perhaps this appears to be question begging.  Let me put it a little more carefully: 
A position that claims that the facts about the illocutionary force are entirely independent 
of the practice of conversing seems difficult to sustain.  According to Strong Objectivism 
about illocutionary force, a tool developed to capture some facts about conversations is 
entirely independent of the facts about conversations.  This is tantamount to holding that 
the facts about what chess moves are entirely independent of the practice of playing 
chess.   
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 Now, this is a coherent position to hold about illocutionary force.  I just don't 
know why anyone would want to hold it.  What would be the appeal of describing our 
practice with tools that are entirely divorced from and independent of those very 
practices?  It is not as if there are mysteries about illocutionary force that can only be 
solved by appeal to this kind of fact of the matter.  So, while Strong Objectivism about 
illocutionary force is a coherent position, it scores poorly in terms of plausibility and 
appeal.   
 If this is still unconvincing, let me try an appeal to authority.  Rebecca Kukla has 
informative and important work on illocutionary force.  She makes the following point 
about a position like Strong Objectivism:  
“A basic commitment for me is that normative statuses are material social 
statuses. They cannot exist unless they have practical social cash value. 
Normative statuses supervene on concrete, materially implemented 
dispositions to act. A speech act that does not make a difference to how 
people are actually disposed to behave does not succeed in having a 
normative output at all… speech acts have their [illocutionary] force only 
in virtue of the concrete social difference that they make, or how they are 
taken up in practice.”  (Rebecca Kukla, 2012, p. 443) 
 
I’ll return to Kukla’s positive position later, but in terms of a response to Strong 
Objectivism and its ilk, I think this is simply correct.  
 Let’s turn our attention to Moderate Objectivism.  Of our two tenents of 
objectivism mentioned above, Moderate Objectivism only maintains the first.  Moderate 
Objectivism holds that illocutionary facts are absolute, but not mind-independent.  It is 
open to the Moderate Objectivist, to say that propositions about illocutionary force are 
objectively true or false precisely because of some fact about people (perhaps ideal 
people) and their practices.  So, for the Moderate Objectivist about moral propositions, 
the proposition expressed by “murder is wrong” is true because of something about the 
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way people are, or about our practices and behavior.  One way to understand this is in 
reference to, for example, an idealized agent.  This is the position that the proposition 
expressed by “murder is wrong” is true because murder is not something a virtuous 
person would do.  Moderate Objectivism about illocutionary force, then, holds that the 
proposition expressed by, “Mary issued a command” is true because of some facts about 
conversers or conversation.   
Notice that the Moderate Objectivist holds that there is a connection between the 
target facts and our practices.  Believing in this connection encourages them to hold an 
additional commitment: namely, that the facts in question are “epistemically constrained” 
(Wright, 1992). This means, for Moderate Objectivism about illocutionary force, that we 
could, in principle, have epistemic access to the illocutionary forces of utterances.47  
Individual agents might still be mistaken about the illocutionary force of a 
particular speech act, but Moderate Objectivism means that if an agent understood 
conversation as it is actually practiced, she would be able to detect the illocutionary 
forces of locutions.  Advanced sociolinguistics, or accurate speech act theory could grant 
this kind of epistemic access.  The epistemic constraint as applied to illocutionary force, 
then, means that something about actual conversational practices determines the 
illocutionary force of actual locutions.  Moderate Objectivism is still objectivism – it still 
holds that facts about illocutionary force are universal.  If you and I disagree about the 
illocutionary force of some utterance, then at least one of us must be wrong.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This is an additional commitment for the Moderate Objectivist because simply mind-
independence does not entail an epistemic constraint.  It could be that a set of facts 
depends on our practices, but that those facts are so complex or difficult that they are 
inaccessible to us.   
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Moderate Objectivism comes in several varieties, as there are several different 
ways that objective illocutionary force could be determined by conversational practice.  
First, as in the moral case above, the objective illocutionary force might be determined by 
the judgments or behaviors of an ideal agent.  Here, rather than the morally virtuous 
person, the ideal agent is an ideal interlocutor.48  According to this version of Moderate 
Objectivism, the illocutionary force of a particular utterance is the force that the idealized 
interlocutor would assign to it.  So, if an ideal interlocutor would call Mary’s utterance a 
command, then the proposition, “Mary issued a command” is true.  Call this variety of 
objectivism Ideal Interlocutor Objectivism.49   
Ideal Interlocutor Objectivism is appealing in the same way that Strong 
Objectivism was appealing, with the additional benefit of appearing to meet the epistemic 
constraint.  Just like the Strong Objectivist, the Ideal Interlocutor Objectivist need not 
side with any actual interlocutor in a case of disagreement.  But, because Ideal 
Interlocutor Objectivism is a form of Moderate Objectivism, the verdict is not divorced 
from practice.   We can defer to a counterfactual or ideal interlocutor.  The utterance in 
question has whatever force she would reasonably take it to have.   
While Ideal Interlocutor Objectivism is initially more plausible than Strong 
Objectivism, it still faces some difficulties.  First, if the position is to be anything more 
than a promissory note, it needs to provide some explanation of the ideal interlocutor. 
Such an explanation would describe the features of such a person – maybe give an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The term is largely incidental.  We could call this interlocutor conversationally 
virtuous, or any number of other things.  
49 I’m grateful to Sandy Goldberg for suggesting this flavor of objectivism. 
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algorithm for how she determines the illocutionary force.  Further, such an explanation 
would need to specify what it takes to be reasonable.     
There are, after all, a variety of ways of behaving that might be called reasonable.  
So, too, there are a number of ways of reasonably ascribing illocutionary force.  It is 
reasonable, in one way, to assign an utterance the illocutionary force that puts the speaker 
in the best position.  Take, again, the case in which Mary utters, “The door is open”.  If 
Mary will get in trouble for issuing a command, perhaps it is reasonable to ascribe 
assertoric force to her utterance.  It is reasonable, in another way, to ascribe to the 
locution the illocutionary force that the most powerful hearer ascribes to it.  If Mary’s 
boss takes her utterance to be a command, then it is reasonable that it has that force.  And 
there are surely other considerations that bear on the reasonable assignment of 
illocutionary force.  Ideal Interlocutor Objectivism would have to fill in either a way to 
choose between or to aggregate these different ways of being reasonable.   
Perhaps there is a better way to ascribe force by way of idealization.  Instead of an 
ideal interlocutor, we might specify ideal epistemic conditions.  This is a second form of 
Moderate Objectivism – call it, Ideal Conditions Objectivism.  Ideal Conditions 
Objectivism holds that an utterance has a particular force just in case it would be judged 
to have that force, were ideal conditions to obtain.  The proposition expressed by, “Mary 
issued a command” is true just in case her utterance would, in ideal epistemic conditions, 
be judged to be a command.50 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 This idea of ideal epistemic conditions is closely related to the conditions under which 
we might have what Michael Lynch calls Superwarrant (Michael P. Lynch, 2009), and 
what Crispin Wright calls Superassertibility (Wright, 1992).   
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Of course, for Ideal Conditions Objectivism to fare any better than Ideal 
Interlocutor Objectivism we need to say something about the ideal conditions – otherwise 
we’re just pushing the mystery back a level.  Perhaps the ideal conditions involve 
knowledge of the relevant conversational history, awareness of the interlocutors’ social 
positions, and access to the relevant perceptions and intentions.  This is plausible enough, 
but the proponent of the Ideal Conditions position would have to justify these conditions 
as ideal.  To yield the correct illocutionary judgment, an agent in the ideal epistemic 
conditions must know everything that might bear on the force of the utterance, and it is 
difficult to give an account of what that would include, without appearing to be either ad 
hoc or question begging. 
Further, for Ideal Conditions Objectivism to avoid collapsing into Strong 
Objectivism it must be possible for actual agents to be in the ideal epistemic position – or 
at least it must be possible for real agents’ force ascriptions to match those of the ideal 
agents.  And, if this alternative is to meet the epistemic constraint, it must be possible for 
actual agents to know when they’re in ideal epistemic conditions.  These requirements are 
not clearly out of reach for this alternative, but it does require some work to demonstrate 
that the conditions can be met.    
A further wrinkle for Ideal Conditions Objectivism is that it is not clear that there 
is only one set of ideal epistemic conditions.  If an agent is in ideal epistemic conditions, 
then she has a coherent set of beliefs – it is hard to see how an incoherent set of beliefs 
would emerge in ideal epistemic conditions.  If an ascription of force is made in these 
conditions, that ascription will cohere with the coherent set of beliefs.  Here, then, is the 
rub: given the nature of coherent sets, it is possible for there to be more than one coherent 
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set of beliefs in response to a single set of epistemic conditions.  If these coherent sets of 
beliefs yield different judgments for a single utterance, then we have a case of reasonable 
disagreement  - equally coherent sets of beliefs in equally epistemically ideal 
circumstances can yield different ascriptions of force for a particular utterance.  And 
Ideal Conditions Objectivism does not offer a way to choose between them.   
While this is not, in principle, a problem, part of the appeal of Illocutionary 
Objectivism was that it promised to yield a single force for each utterance.  After all, the 
tenant of objectivism that Moderate Objectivism retains is that facts about illocutionary 
force are absolute.  If appealing to an ideal interlocutor does not yield a single objectively 
true ascription of force, then it’s hard to see why such a position would appeal to an 
Objectivist at all.  Perhaps the proponent of Ideal interlocutor Objectivism could devise a 
way to decide in cases of reasonable disagreement.  But, again, the method has to meet 
the epistemic constraint or risk collapsing into Strong Objectivism.  I am not optimistic 
about this prospect.   
Luckily for Moderate Objectivism, there are other forms of Moderate Objectivism 
available.  Many, including Strawson (Strawson, 1964), Grice (Grice, 1957), Green 
(Green, 2013) and arguably Millikan (Millikan, 1984), have taken the speaker’s 
intentions to be the objective authority on illocutionary force.  Speaker Centric 
Objectivism, then, is the position that the objective illocutionary force of an utterance is 
determined by the intentions of the speaker.  This position has prima facie appeal.  After 
all, Mary, as the producer of the utterance whose force is in question, seems to have 
special insight or access into the nature of her utterance.  Mary probably meant to do 
some particular thing with her words – she had some sort of illocutionary intention (even 
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though she probably wouldn’t call it that).  Speakers make their utterances in the way that 
they do in order for those utterances to have some force, so it is plausible to take their 
word on the nature of that force.   
Speaker Centric Objectivism is much more moderate than Strong Objectivism, 
and offers even more epistemic access than Ideal interlocutor Objectivism.  If we want to 
know what the objective illocutionary force of an utterance is, we only need to consult 
the intentions of the speaker.  Speaker Centric Objectivism, then, offers an objective, 
practice-based, epistemically accessible illocutionary force.  Speaker Centric Objectivism 
is looking pretty good.   
While Speaker Centric Objectivism enjoys more plausibility than the other forms 
so far considered, it still faces some challenges.  First, as Rebecca Kukla observes, 
‘intentions in speaking are part of the story that gives a speech act the [illocutionary] 
force it has, but they are not privileged or definitive’ (Rebecca Kukla, 2012, p. 5).  Kukla 
motivates this claim by way of an example involving a factory floor manager named 
Celia.  95% of the workers that Celia manages are men, and when she gives instructions, 
her workers are rarely compliant.  Kukla’s claim is that one likely explanation is that the 
workers count Celia’s utterances as requests rather than orders.  She intends to order 
them to perform certain tasks, but, because she is a woman, the utterances are not 
perceived as orders.  Kukla explains the situation as follows: 
“Because of her gender, she cannot employ normal discursive conventions 
to mark her speech acts as orders. She might add, “No really, I mean it!” 
or “I will dock your pay if you don’t do this now!” and this still might not 
overcome the fact that her body marks her as not an ordering authority in 
this context. No matter how carefully she cleaves to what would normally 
be the conventions for ordering, the local context and discursive practices 
surrounding her speech acts—which will always include the workers’ 
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uptake of and response to these acts—will in fact turn them into requests 
instead”(Rebecca Kukla, 2012, p. 446) 
 
Kukla’s point, here, is multi-faceted, involving claims about social position, authority, 
and subordination.  These are all important points.  For our purposes, however, it is 
sufficient to observe that Speaker Centric Objectivism cannot accommodate the 
following purported datum: a speaker can intend her speech to have one force only to 
find that it has an entirely different force.   
And this is not just a feature of political or social subordination.  To see this, 
imagine Alesha is speaking to her 14-year-old daughter.  Alesha plans to be offering her 
daughter some advice.  She utters, “You know, you really could study before the day of 
the exam”.  As she makes this utterance, Alesha realizes that, despite her intentions, her 
daughter will probably take her utterance to be a criticism – indeed, as Alesha hears the 
utterance, she herself comes to count it as a criticism.  Speaker Centric Objectivism 
predicts that the force of Alesha’s utterance is to advise.  This prediction is counter-
intuitive.   
Another problem for Speaker Centric Objectivism is that most speakers do not fix 
their intentions very precisely.  Children, for example, seem to make conversational 
moves without much forethought (they are, perhaps sadly, not alone in this).  If the 
objective illocutionary force is fixed by speaker intentions and some speaker fails to 
intend a particular force, is her speech devoid of force?  Is it devoid of force even if 
everyone involved treats it as a command?  A Speaker Centric Objectivist is committed 
to this being the case. 
Further, sometimes our utterances just “slip out”.  Conversations don’t always 
proceed by way of reasoned, planned locutions, and we nonetheless hold speakers 
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responsible for the illocutions we perceive them to have made.  In some cases, we are 
likely to hold speakers responsible especially because their illocution is unintentional.  A 
person might, in a heated discussion with their partner, for example, be held responsible 
for issuing an ultimatum she did not intend.  Unintentional speech can have weighty 
consequences.  Speaker Centric Objectivism must explain why apparently force-less 
speech has these features.   
 These observations about speakers and their intentions do not constitute decisive 
arguments against Speaker Centric Objectivism.  Instead, they demonstrate that an 
initially plausible, apparently simple way to determine objective illocutionary force faces 
difficulties.  Indeed, a proponent of Speaker Centric Objectivism will either have to bite 
some bullets regarding speaker intentions, explain away the data, or retreat to a different 
position.  One possible retreat would be to rest illocutionary force with some idealized 
speaker’s intention.  The difficulty, of course, is explaining this ideal without collapsing 
into a version of Ideal interlocutor Objectivism, with all the attendant difficulties.   
 Kukla’s discussion, however, suggests another mild form of Moderate 
Objectivism.  This is the view according to which the hearer fixes the objective 
illocutionary force of an utterance.  Kukla claims that Celia’s utterance is turned into a 
request by the workers’ responses to it.  The worker’s hear her utterance as having the 
force of a request, and so that is the force it has.  Call this form of Moderate Objectivism 
about illocutionary force Uptake Objectivism.   
Uptake Objectivism has its roots in part of Austin’s original analysis.  Austin 
says, “unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, 
successfully performed… the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the 
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meaning and force of the locution.  So the performance of an illocutionary act requires 
the securing of uptake” (Austin, 1975, pp. 116-117).  Uptake Objectivism takes this 
requirement seriously, basing illocutionary force on the uptake of a hearer.  
 According to Uptake Objectivism, a proposition expressed by “Mary issued a 
command” is true just in case Mary’s interlocutor takes her utterance to be a command.  
This kind of position plays a role in some of the debates over illocutionary disablement.  
Rae Langton’s work on illocutionary silencing appears to require Uptake Objectivism (a 
point I’ll return to in chapter 5)(Langton, 1993).  In one of her motivating examples, a 
rapist silences a woman when he does not take up her uttered “no” as a refusal.  Uptake 
fails, and the woman’s utterance does not count as a refusal.  Note, that if Speaker 
Centric Objectivism were true, the woman’s intention to refuse would be sufficient to 
give her utterance that force.  This is a paradigm example, then, of Uptake Objectivism.   
The requirement of uptake for illocutionary force is one of the more contentious 
points in Langton’s analysis.  Daniel Jacobson (Jacobson, 1995), and Alexander Bird 
(Bird, 2002), both argue that uptake is not, or at least not always, necessary for 
illocutionary acts.  Bird argues by way of examples of utterances where uptake fails, but, 
intuitively, the utterance still has the intended force.  Here is one such example: 
“When the judge passes sentence, his words may be addressed to the 
prisoner in the dock, but sentence is passed whether or not the prisoner 
realizes that this is what the judge is about. Nor does anyone else have to 
realize that, so long as the judge performs his duty in accordance with the 
law and established procedures (although someone had better realize it for 
the sentence to be carried out). Here the conditions for successful 
illocution do not include uptake” (Bird, 2002, pp. 7-8). 
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If Bird is right about the utterance in this case, then uptake is necessary for, at most, only 
some illocutionary forces.  The challenge for Uptake Objectivism, then, is to say what 
determines illocutionary force for those cases in which uptake is not necessary. 
 A further challenge for Uptake Objectivism is this: many conversations take place 
between more than two people.  Uptake Objectivism seeks to determine illocutionary 
force by way of the uptake of a hearer.  If, however, there is more than one hearer and if 
those hearers disagree, what is the illocutionary force of the utterance?   
 Let’s return, for a moment, to the case of Celia, the factory floor manager.  Celia 
is addressing a group of workers who are starting their shift.  She says, “place all emptied 
shipping crates in bays 3 and 4,” to a group of ten workers.  Six of them take up her 
utterance as a request.  Three of them take it up as a command.  Two are busy thinking 
about their kids, or their bills, or their next cup of coffee, and don’t take it up at all.  
Uptake Objectivism is committed to uptake determining illocutionary force.  So, Celia’s 
utterance is a request, and a command, and a mere locution, as these were the forces 
ascribed to it by the uptake of the audience.  Uptake Objectivism, therefore, is in the 
same position as Ideal interlocutor Objectivism: either it must offer a way to decide 
between candidate illocutionary forces that does not collapse into Strong Objectivism, or 
it cannot determine a single objective illocutionary force.  And, if it cannot determine 
such a force, Uptake Objectivism loses its appeal as an objectivist position on 
illocutionary force.   
 We’ve now considered five kinds of objectivist positions on illocutionary force.  
And, upon consideration, the various flavors of objectivism face some serious challenges.  
Strong Objectivism is so divorced from practice and so epistemically inaccessible to 
	   89	  
practitioners that it seems, at best, unmotivated.  More mild forms of objectivism enjoy 
more plausibility but face challenges of their own.  Ideal interlocutor Objectivism faces a 
dilemma - it either collapses into Strong Objectivism or needs an epistemically accessible 
way to weigh the various requirements on being reasonable.  Ideal Circumstances 
Objectivism has no resources to adjudicate cases of reasonable disagreement.  Speaker 
Centric Objectivism makes implausible predictions in many kinds of cases, and must 
either bite those bullets or explain away the data.  And, Uptake Objectivism faces several 
challenges.  First, not all illocutionary forces require uptake.  And, second, a dilemma 
looms here, as well: either Uptake Objectivism must explain how to decide between 
hearers whose impressions disagree, or it must countenance more than one force, thereby 
losing its appeal to objectivists.  From this, I conclude, that proponents of objectivism 
about illocutionary force have some explaining to do.   
 
III. Alternatives to Objectivism 
 It would be reasonable to work quite hard to fill in the theory of objective 
illocutionary force, especially if there were no alternatives to Illocutionary Objectivism.  I 
will not take the time to do a full defense of any such alternatives here, but I do want to 
demonstrate that such alternatives exist.  I’ll consider three alternatives to objectivism 
that are familiar from similar debates in other domains: Nihilism, Expressivism, and 
Relativism.   
 Nihilism about illocutionary force is the position that there is no such force.  Such 
a position holds that of the three categories from Austin, at most only locutions and 
perlocutions are real.  We need only look at conversation to see that there are meaningful 
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utterances, and that these utterances have distal effects.  The nihilist, however, would 
deny that these utterances fit into categories of conversational moves.  One such nihilist 
(the only one I’m aware of) is Herman Cappelen.  Cappelen denies that illocutionary 
force is anything more than a philosopher’s invention (Cappelen, 2011).  According to 
Cappelen, speakers do make utterances in a variety of grammatical moods, but there are 
no useful categories of conversational moves.  
 Nihilism is one alternative to Objectivism, but I don’t find it particularly 
appealing.  First, Nihilism cannot distinguish between conversational moves and mere 
vocalizations or diction practice.  I can make the utterance “the rain in Spain stays mainly 
in the plain”, without making a conversational move, or I can use an utterance of those 
sounds to assert something about Spanish meteorological facts.  Nihilism can’t capture 
this difference. 
Further, while Cappelen’s nihilism makes some use of grammatical mood – that is 
there are declarative utterances, imperative utterances etc. – these distinctions seem too 
course grained.  Uttering, “my mother-in-law is coming to town” to my boss in a 
conversation about days off is different from uttering the same sounds to my partner in a 
conversation about cleaning the bathroom.  This, plausibly, is a case where the same 
sounds, with the same grammatical mood can (at least) two different conversational 
moves.  Nihilism cannot capture this difference.  (If this seems familiar, that’s because it 
recalls a discussion from chapter 1). 
 Another alternative to objectivism, in many domains, is Expressivism.  In the 
moral domain, for example, Expressivists argue that moral propositions aren’t objectively 
true or false, because they are not truth-evaluable propositions.  Moral propositions, 
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according to the Expressivist, are expressions of approval or disapproval.  So, “murder is 
wrong” is an expression of disapproval on the part of the speaker, and cannot be 
evaluated for truth or falsehood anymore than “ouch” can be.   
 I don’t know of any illocutionary Expressivists, but I can imagine the 
commitments of such a view.  The idea would be that the proposition expressed by, 
“Mary issued a command” is not objectively true or false because it isn’t truth-evaluable.  
Ascriptions of force, on this view, are not in the game of representing facts.  Instead they 
are tools used by speakers to direct their interlocutor’s perceptions and behavior.  In this 
way, illocutionary Expressivism would be a special kind of a more general Expressivism 
(perhaps similar to one defended by Huw Price (Price, 2013)).  
 One benefit of such a view is that it secures epistemic access to illocutionary 
force.  There is no worry that illocutionary force is divorced from practitioners, as the 
categorizations would be entirely based on the attitudes of speakers.  Illocutionary 
Expressivism, then, avoids the concerns faced by Strong Objectivism.   
 Expressivist positions, however, do face notorious challenges.  The most pressing 
of these is often called the Frege-Geach problem (Schroeder, 2008).  The problem is this: 
often Expressivist propositions appear in arguments with truth-evaluable propositions.  
Consider this example: “If charity is good, then I will go to the soup kitchen today.  
Charity is good.  Therefore, I will go to the soup kitchen today”.  The argument seems 
straightforwardly valid.  The consequent of the conditional, “I will go to the soup kitchen 
today,” is truth evaluable.  I’ll either go, or I won’t.  But the antecedent and the second 
premise are moral propositions – they have no truth-value.  Truth is not preserved, in this 
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apparently valid argument, because only some of the propositions are true.  Expressivism 
must explain away this apparent problem. 
 Expressivists have done a lot of work to attempt to address this problem (Hare, 
1970), (Price, 1994), (Kölbel, 2002), (Michael P Lynch, 2013).  Many of the proposed 
solutions may be available to the Illocutionary Expressivist.  For my money, the more 
challenging problem is to demonstrate that Illocutionary Expressivism51 is preferable to 
alternatives that do not face these challenges.   
 A third alternative to Objectivism is Relativism.  Relativism about illocutionary 
force is the position utterances only have illocutionary force(s) relative to some 
perspective.  There are no illocutionary forces simpliciter, only perspective-relative 
forces.  There are a number of different ways to understand these perspectives, but one 
appealing way would be to let each participant in a conversation determine a perspective-
relative illocutionary force.  So, in Celia’s case, her utterance would be a request relative 
to some workers’ perspectives, and a command relative to others’.  A proposition 
expressed by, “Mary issued a command” would never be true simpliciter, but it could be 
true if it were elliptical for “Mary issued a command relative to Martin’s perspective”.   
 Relativism enjoys the following benefits: first, it is both practice-dependent and 
epistemically accessible.  As long as we can tell how a participant in a conversation 
perceives some utterance, we can tell what force it has relative to her perspective.  
Second, Relativism does not have to privilege any one measure of illocutionary force 
over another – the speaker and all the various hearers can be right about the illocutionary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 I should say, too, that I think that an Illocutionary Relativist could maintain that 
utterances have illocutionary forces only relative to a perspective, and also that 
ascriptions of force are tools used by speakers to manipulate one another.  These two 
commitments are not incompatible.   
	   93	  
force.  Proponents of both Speaker Centric Relativism and Uptake Relativism have made 
cases for the importance of their favored perspective on illocutionary force, and 
Relativism can rule in favor of both.   
 One challenge to Relativism about illocutionary force is that it must either 
countenance all perspectives, including those of intransigent or peculiar interlocutors, or 
explain why some perspectives can be discounted.  Imagine one of Celia’s workers 
perceives her utterance as a promise, or worse, as a christening.  The other workers take 
her to have requested, or commanded, but Murray (let’s call him), takes her to have 
christened.  According to Relativism, Murray is just as right about the illocutionary force 
(relative to his perspective) as the other workers are.  Relativism would have to address 
the intransigent perspective, either by denying its possibility or, more plausibly, by 
explaining away the datum.  Perhaps the relativist could argue that while Murray is right 
about the illocution, no one needs to attend to his perception unless they have a moral, 
practical, or legal reason to do so.  But this would need some fleshing out. 
  
§4 Conclusion 
These are not full or complete examinations of the alternatives to objectivism.  
Such examinations are beyond the current scope.  What I hope to have demonstrated is 
that there are such alternatives.  If the challenges raised against the flavors of 
Objectivism make that position unpalatable, then Nihilism, Expressivism, and Relativism 
are available.  If objectivism remains an appealing position, I hope to have pointed to 
some lacunae in the positions as they currently stand.   
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 Many debates involving illocutionary force assume that illocutionary force is 
objective.  This assumption is seldom acknowledged, let alone explained. I’ve attempted 
to sketch some of the logical space for such explanations, and the challenges that these 
explanations face.  These challenges motivate an exploration of the alternatives to 
objectivism.  Of the alternatives under consideration, Relativism seems to be the most 
promising.  In light of this promise, I’ll explore the position further in the next chapter, 
looking, in particular, at the ways in which Illocutionary Relativism might account for 
assertoric force.   
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Chapter 4: Perceiving Assertions 
Abstract: So far, I’ve challenged two important assumptions from the literature on 
illocutionary force and assertion: first, the assumption that assertion is normatively 
constituted.  I’ve argued that this assumption is neither compulsory nor helpful.  Second, 
I’ve challenged the assumption that each utterance has, as an objective matter of fact, one 
illocutionary force.  Relinquishing these assumptions would come at a considerable cost 
if doing so precludes a workable theory of illocutions in general and assertion in 
particular.  The project of this chapter is to demonstrate that we do not face this costly 
consequence.  We can account for assertion without a normative constitution and without 
objective illocutionary force.   
 
§1. Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going 
So far, in the dissertation, I’ve argued for the following: 
• Assertion is not normatively constituted (Chapter 1) 
• Nonetheless, norms do bear on assertions (Chapters 1 and 2) 
• Assertion is a more-or-less distinct illocutionary type (Chapter 1) 
• We can account for testimonial knowledge transmission without the constitutive 
norm of assertion (Chapter 2) 
• There need not be an objective fact of the matter about whether a particular 
utterance is an assertion, or a conjecture, or has some other illocutionary force 
(Chapter 3) 
Even if only some of these arguments are correct, there are lingering questions still to be 
answered: how do we distinguish illocutionary forces?  What is distinctive about 
assertion?  How must an attempt at communication be perceived for it to be an assertion?    
Inspired by Austin (Austin, 1975), and Searle (Searle, 1969), we can start to 
answer to these questions: As discussed in chapter 1, Searle individuated illocutionary 
forces in terms of what he called the essential rules, the preparatory rules, and the 
sincerity rules.  This, while helpful, is only a start.  The goal of this chapter is to develop 
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an account of assertion that, while inspired by speech act theory, attends to the points for 
which I’ve argued in the foregoing.   
I will proceed as follows: in the next section I will discuss illocutionary force in 
general, calling attention to helpful tools from Searle, Austin and Lewis.  One major 
difference between my view and the extant views is the importance of the reactions of 
those involved in the conversation.   The third section will discuss these reactions, what 
I’m calling perceptions of speech, and the importance of these to our analysis of 
illocutionary force.  In the fourth section will attempt to forestall some objections by 
acknowledging and explaining some consequences of my account of illocutionary force.  
In the fifth section, I will turn from a general discussion of perceived illocutionary force 
to focus more specifically on what happens when an utterance is perceived as an 
assertion. This discussion of assertion will undoubtedly raise some concerns, especially 
given work from earlier chapters on the epistemic and other general norms that bear on 
our speech.  So in sections 6 and 7, I will address some of these, first discussing 
epistemic norms, before turning to more general norms on behavior.  Our first task, then, 
is to consider some speech act theory, beginning with some features of Searle’s work on 
illocutionary force. 
 
§2.   Illocutionary Force 
Searle’s essential, preparatory and sincerity rules work together to individuate 
illocutionary forces.  These rules apply in different ways.  All utterances with a particular 
illocutionary force must meet the essential rule.  Meeting this rule is “essential” because 
it is a necessary condition for having one illocutionary force rather than another.  All 
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promises count as the undertaking of an obligation on the part of the speaker.  All 
greetings count as courteous recognitions of the hearer by the speaker, etc. (Searle, 1969).  
The sincerity and preparatory rules, on the other hand, are not met to the same degree by 
all instances of an illocution.  The sincerity condition on promising says that the promisor 
represents herself as intending to perform the action.  I can make a promise even if I 
intend to break it.  Nonetheless, preparatory and sincerity conditions do help individuate 
illocutionary forces. The way in which the utterance meets the essential rule will generate 
some of a set of expectations typical of the illocutionary force in question.  A bet, like a 
promise, counts as the undertaking of an obligation for future behavior on the part of the 
speaker, so these forces share an essential rule.  The two forces, however, differ in the 
expectations that utterances with that force typically generate, and so they meet the 
essential rule in different ways.  
Here’s how this is supposed to work: usually, when I utter, “I promise I’ll pick 
you up at 7”, I count as undertaking an obligation to pick you up at 7.  Paradigmatically, 
counting as undertaking an obligation means that I have also represented myself as 
sincere in that promise (even if I am not), as if you’d like me to do so (even if you would 
not), and as if that would be something I would not normally do (even if I would).  I 
might still count as promising even if, for instance, I count as undertaking an obligation 
to do something I would normally do (or you wouldn’t like, etc.), but these conditions 
pick out the usual expectations generated by illocutionary types.  The preparatory and 
sincerity rules for an illocution describe the paradigm or expected conditions under which 
one makes an illocution.  These conditions help to explain why “I promise to breathe in 
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and out” or “I promise to beat you at chess” may count as promises, but of a peculiar, 
funny, or ironic sort.   
This is a very good start – speech act theory is promising precisely because it 
acknowledges the wide variety of actions that speakers perform using words, and offers 
criteria for individuating those actions.  Unfortunately, the criteria used by early speech 
act theorists like Austin and Searle paved the way for the confusion about norms 
discussed in the previous chapters.  In particular, Austin fixes on a target by discussing a 
kind of ideal illocution that he calls “happy”, and, “felicitous” (Austin, 1975, pp. 14-15).  
Failures to meet this ideal are called “abuses”, or “misfires”.  Despite his admonitions 
that we “[ought] not stress the normal connotations of these names!” (Austin, 1975, p. 
16)52, it is hard to read the descriptions of happy felicitous promises, or abused assertions 
as anything but normative.  And recall from chapter 1 that I’ve argued against attempts to 
discover a constitutive norm of assertion.   
Searle’s discussion of the preparatory conditions for illocution has a similar 
problem.  The ideas of “counting as…” and “presenting as if…” are not entirely clear, 
and are not free from normative connotations of their own.  “Counting as…” harkens 
back to the bothersome game analogy.53  In games, after all, certain moves count as 
scoring a point, or going out of bounds etc.  This game analogy was one of the main 
motivations for the normative constitution of assertion discussed in chapter 1.  There, I 
argued that we must be cautious in our faith in and use of this analogy.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 As discussed in a footnote, Austin considered using the thinner notion of a “non-play” 
for the misfires.  Perhaps this less loaded term would have tempted fewer stresses of the 
normal connotations (Austin, 1975, p. 31).   
53 To which we’ll return in a moment. 
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It is a short step from Austin and Searle’s terminology to the kind of N-theoretic 
commitments rejected in the foregoing.  We want to avoid that step, attractive though it 
might be, given the arguments we’ve considered above.  We also want to be able to 
define assertions in general without relying on unreliable and mutable linguistic habits – 
as we’ve seen in our discussion of Cappelen (Cappelen, 2011) in chapters 1 and 3, we 
can’t rely on grammatical mood.  What we need is a way to discuss assertions in the 
abstract, avoiding normative connotations, and making room for the creative ways that 
speakers use locutions.   
 In light of these considerations I propose the following alternative: rather than 
“normal”, “happy”, or “felicitous” illocutions, I propose discussion of the classic 
illocution.  I don’t propose this shift just to multiply terminology.  Instead, the notion of a 
classic such-and-so will be useful for our purposes here.  It will allow us to offer a 
paradigm or central case of something, without either normative connotations or reliance 
on statistical normalcy of particular linguistic flags.  The classic such-and-so could be 
quite bad – think of the classic serial killer, the classic adulterer or the classic case of 
pancreatic cancer.  The classic such-and-so could also be in a small minority – most 
photos of the Eiffel tower will fail to be classic, being off center, out of focus, or of 
tourists and the tower.  The classic such-and-so is just a useful way of talking and fixing 
on a target of analysis.  If this use is accomplished by any other terms on offer, substitute 
those instead.  I, however, think that the notion of the classic such-and-so is likely to be 
very helpful for our analysis of illocutionary force. 
 To see this, consider the Classic Sonnet.  Classically, a sonnet is a 14-line poem, 
with various structural properties.  The classic sonnet is composed of two parts, first 
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some form of problem or question, and second a kind of answer or solution.  The classic 
sonnet expresses praise of the sonneteer’s subject – classically his or her beloved or the 
object of his or her affection.  The classic sonnet has some rhyme scheme that it follows 
throughout.  Classic sonnets are more closely related to odes (in some salient ways) than 
they are to diatribes.  They’re more closely related to limericks (in some salient ways) 
than they are to declarations of war.   
 Particular sonnets deviate more or less from the classic sonnet.  A particular 
sonnet might not include the two-part structure.  Or it might not express praise.  A 
particular sonnet might not rhyme smoothly, or entirely according to scheme.  These 
deviations are sometimes cause for criticism, but sometimes cause for commendation.  
Consider Shakespeare’s Sonnet 130 (“My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the sun”) 
(Shakespeare, 1975).  This sonnet is appreciated precisely because of its comedic 
deviance.  Classic is, therefore, not a measure of sonnet propriety.   
 There is one way in which a poem must resemble the classic sonnet in order to be 
a sonnet at all: a sonnet must have 14 lines.  There are, however, variations in the rhyme 
scheme that sonnets employ, allowing for distinctions within the sonnet family: the 
Petrarchan sonnet differs from the English sonnet, and from the Spenserian sonnet, etc.  
Members of all these groups bear some resemblance to one another, but the resemblance 
is even closer between members within the groups.  (This feature will become important 
later.) 
So much for the classic sonnet; what of the classic illocution?  By having 
illocutionary force x or y an utterance will bear some resemblance to the classic x or y.     
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Searle lays out the following conditions for an utterance to have an illocutionary force in 
(what I’m calling) the classic way: 
Propositional Content Rule:  
1. Sets limits on what propositions can be expressed by utterances with 
the force in question; ie: promises must be about future actions – “The 
utterance… predicates some future act A of the speaker S”(Searle, 
1969, p. 63) 
Preparatory Rules:  
1. The implied conditions for the illocutionary force in question.  “When 
I make a statement I imply I can back it up, when I make a promise I 
imply that the thing promised is in the hearer’s best interest” (Searle, 
1969, p. 65)  
Sincerity Rule: 
1. The state the speaker would have to be in to be sincerely uttering with 
the force in question.  “Wherever there is a psychological state 
specified in the sincerity condition, the performance of the act counts 
as an expression of that psychological state.  This law holds whether 
the act is sincere or insincere.”  (Searle, 1969, p. 65) 
Essential Rule: 
1. The change the utterance counts as making to the positions of the 
salient agents.  For example, for promises “the utterance… counts as 
the undertaking of an obligation [on the part of the speaker] to do 
[some action].  (Searle, 1969, p. 63) 
 
The first three kinds of rules can be met to more or less degree by some utterance, 
and that utterance would thereby bear more or less resemblance to the classic illocution 
of the specified kind.  The essential rule is just that – it is essential must be met for the 
utterance to have the illocutionary force in question.  The classic conditions individuate 
different types of illocutionary forces that have the same essential rule (more on this 
below).   
As an analysis of illocution, however, this is, unfortunately, incomplete.  Searle’s 
account relies on our making sense of the idea that series of meaningful sounds count as 
some conversational move or other.  Part of the point from Searle’s analysis, a point that 
he echoes from Austin, is that we can do many and varied things with the same words.  “I 
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promise” does not always flag the undertaking of an obligation to perform future action.  
We use it differently when we say, for example, “I promise I went to the store”. And this 
variability increases if we consider linguistic practice across time.  Variety in word use is 
precisely why speech act theory does not individuate illocutions in terms of paradigm 
locutions, or usual linguistic flags.54  Searle individuates in terms of what the locutions 
count as doing.  So, we need to understand what it takes to count in this target sense.   
To do this, we will have to look at the behavior of the relevant conversers and the 
changes particular speech acts bring.  Returning to the game analogy might help clarify 
this: we play chess in many different ways – on boards, with computer programs, etc.  
And we can imagine playing in even less familiar ways, like by shouting out coordinates 
to one another or with human players as pieces as in Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s 
Stone (Rowling, 1999).55  It would be insufficient for an explanation of castling to 
describe the move as picking up pieces shaped like-such-and-so and moving them thusly 
even if that’s the most common way to castle.  Castling is more general than that, and 
there are many ways we do and could count as making that move.   
Just as there are many ways to perform an act that counts as castling there are 
many ways to count as asserting, or as promising etc.  Describing utterances with these 
forces in terms of the grammar or words usually used in making such utterances would be 
an insufficient explanation – incomplete and prone to exceptions.  Instead, what we need 
to understand what it takes to count as a particular illocution.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For more on why it is hard to use individual words as flags or indications of types of 
illocutions, see (Austin, 1975, p. 33). 
55 Consider, also, Sellars’s example of Texas Chess (Sellars, 1954a). 
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 To do that, let’s start with utterances.  Uttering meaningful content is different 
from thinking precisely because the content is expressed, that is, it is made more or less 
public.  In making meaningful signs or signals, I do something observable from the 
outside (so to speak).  Sometimes speakers utter to themselves by thinking out loud or 
soliloquizing, but even those acts are different from mere thought precisely because the 
proposition is expressed.56  When a speaker expresses a proposition as part of a 
conversation, that speech changes the state of that conversation.57   
 The details of these changes depend on many facts about the interlocutors.  
Among these are their histories together, the clarity with which the speakers speak, the 
state of the conversation so far, etc.  Lewis offers a helpful analogy.  In his work on 
presuppositions (Lewis, 1979), Lewis gives an account of parts of conversation in terms 
of scorekeeping.  He takes the now-familiar position that conversation is, in some 
relevant ways, like a game.  There are various moves that speakers can make that affect a 
set of aspects of the game, what he calls (albeit loosely) the score.  The analogy is a 
familiar one, but Lewis’ treatment is more explicit than most.  Taking baseball as 
conversation’s analog, he offers two distinct ways we can understand the relationship 
between the score and the rules.  
On the first understanding, the rules dictate how to the score changes between 
points in the game, given particular moves that players make.  The score at t and the rules 
dictate the score at t’, after particular moves have been made.  On the second 
understanding, the score of the game is dictated by the official scoreboard (whatever that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 It is intuitive to take these less public cases as derivative of more public expression. 
57 See (Brandom, 1998) or other left-wing Sellarsians for this. Also, we’re leaving aside, 
for now, cases of silencing. 
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is – the mechanical physical board, some running count in the umpires’ heads, or some 
combination of mental scoreboards).  The rules, by this account, are “empirical 
generalizations, subject to exceptions, about the ways in which the players’ behavior 
tends to cause changes on the authoritative scoreboard” (Lewis, 1979, p. 344).  Either 
account will allow us to make certain predictions about how the game will go.  In some 
cases these predictions will be shared by both accounts.  In others, like in cases wherein a 
call is contested, the accounts will generate different results. 
The important aspect of Lewis’ analogy, for our purposes, is the notion of a 
conversational scoreboard.  For baseball, the official or authoritative scoreboard might be 
either the umpire (or the fans, or some collection thereof) or the displayed tally – it’s not 
clear which is beholden to which.  For conversation, however, the official score is even 
less clear.  Most conversations don’t have umpires or referees, and we rarely display a 
score.  And Lewis is forthcoming about this.  He says, 
“Conversational score is, by definition, whatever the mental scoreboards 
say it is; but we refrain from trying to say just what the conversationalists’ 
mental scoreboards are. We assume that some or other mental 
representations are present that play the role of a scoreboard, in the 
following sense: what they register depends on the history of the 
conversation in the way that score should according to the rules…  It is no 
harm if [the rules] underdetermine the evolution of the score, and it is 
possible that score sometimes evolves in a way that violates the rules” 
(Lewis, 1979, p. 346).   
 
 Lewis’ analogy is helpful because it brings to light the ways in which conversers 
keep track of the changes made in conversations.  However, a strictly Lewisian 
conversational scoreboard is too narrow to capture all of the important aspects of 
conversational practices.  Lewis offers the scoreboard analogy to explain how conversers 
can change the scoreboard by adding or subtracting presuppositions.  But just as not 
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every move in baseball changes what team is ahead, (running to 1st base does not, by 
itself increase a team’s score), not every conversational move adds or subtracts 
presuppositions.  We need to cast a wider net in order to capture all we want to about 
conversations and illocutionary forces.   
Conversations are more complicated than mere presupposition addition, and can 
be altered in myriad ways.  If I utter, “I promise to put the cat on the mat”, for example, 
then I’ve made some changes to the conversation beyond just adding the presupposition 
that the cat’s location is somehow relevant.  My promise is added to the history of the 
conversation as is the fact that I’ve undertaken an obligation to place the cat on the mat in 
the future.  Depending on the correct theory of promising, perhaps my interlocutors have 
a right to my doing so.  At the very least they have a prima facie expectation that I will do 
so.  
The lesson I want to take from Lewis and his use of the scoreboard analogy is that 
conversers themselves keep track of many of the important details of the conversation in 
which they’re taking part.  This is what he means by pointing to the “conversationalist’s 
mental scoreboards”.  What we want to do, in describing the kinematics of conversation, 
is to give generalizations about how conversations go, and how speakers who participate 
in conversations make the changes they do.   
 I propose that having a particular illocutionary force can be understood in terms 
of changes in an interlocutor’s impression of the conversation.  Conversation, like many 
games, proceeds smoothly as long as all parties agree on the score.  The people involved 
in (or observing) the conversation keep track of the moves that are made therein, 
adjusting their expectations and behavior as needed.  If disagreements arise, they usually 
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manifest themselves in some surprise or confusion for the interlocutors or players.  One 
difference, perhaps, between games and conversation is in the tolerance we have for 
creativity in each.   Our practices allow for much more creativity and malleability, not to 
mention more divergence in perspectives, for the state of conversation than they do for 
the states of play in more regimented games like baseball and chess.   
 Most conversations, unlike most games, do not have strictly codified rules58.   
This is not a necessary condition on being a conversation – conversations in court, 
perhaps, are exceptions.  In general, though, the kinematics of a conversation will be 
more nebulous than the kinematics of baseball.  Because of this, the idea of counting is 
perhaps misleading.  Most conversers do not keep a tally of their conversations, nor do 
they think in terms of the categories of conversational moves.  “Count” invokes both 
something more official, and something more considered than is appropriate for most 
conversations.    
 The impressions conversers have of conversation are, in general, more automatic 
and less specific than the scoring of points in a game.  Most conversers will have 
impressions of their interlocutors’ moods, their interlocutors’ goals, whether their 
interlocutor has their best interests in mind, etc.  These aspects of conversation, however, 
do not lend themselves to official tallies, scores or public record.  We want something 
more impressionistic than that, so, I will call these impressions the conversers’ 
perspectives.  A converser develops a perspective by forming various perceptions of the 
conversation and the moves made therein.  An utterance in conversation is perceived as 
having certain (related) characteristics, including volume, propriety, and illocutionary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Calvinball being the notable exception (Watterson, 2005).   
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force.  I will use perception as a technical term in the analysis of assertion, so I’ll take the 
next section to explore it more fully.   
 
§3. Perceptions 
 The term perception has a storied history in philosophy.59  The term’s most 
familiar contemporary use relates to our senses – our perceptions are the information we 
receive from our visual, auditory and tactile sensations (Crane, 2014) (Siegel, 2013).  I 
hear a chirping, and see a flapping wing, and perceive (perhaps indirectly) a bird.  I smell 
hot breath, and feel a furry ear, and perceive my dog.  My senses generate a perception 
when presented with stimuli.  I would like to use the term perception as applied to speech 
acts in a related but technical and slightly different way. 
While there is clearly an auditory aspect in our perception of spoken utterances, 
and visual and tactile aspects for other meaningful signs and signals, I intend to use the 
term in a technical sense defined as follows: the perception one has of a speech act is the 
collection of impressions one has of it, including impressions of content, volume, tone, 
appropriateness (according to all sorts of measures), and illocutionary force.  So, if you 
call across a room to me, “we’d better get this show on the road”, and I am attending to it, 
then I will have a perception of that speech act.  My likely perceptions of it are as 
expressing content about what we should do next, as louder than many speech acts, as 
jovial (perhaps), and as a suggestion or a request.  Clearly these perceptions are highly 
context sensitive and affected by many variables.  I will discuss some of these later in this 
section. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The nature of perception was a central issue even for early modern philosophers 
(Hume, Kant, and Descartes, and many others, were concerned about perceptions). 
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One thing to note right away is that our perceptions of speech, like our sense 
perceptions, are largely automatic.  When we engage in conversation we smoothly and 
mostly unconsciously perceive speech acts in a variety of ways.  My experience with a 
speaker I believe to be a liar automatically influences how I perceive her speech.  I might 
perceive her as promising but as making a false promise.  I don’t have to consciously 
bring my experiences to mind in order to have this perception.  My knowledge of 
children automatically influences how I perceive a toddler’s speech.  I might not perceive 
a toddler as able to make a promise, even if she utters the sounds “I promise”.  I don’t 
have to consciously remind myself of facts about toddlers in order to do this.  Perceptions 
of speech, like the attitudes and beliefs that affect them, are largely automatic and 
unconscious.  While I’ll return to this point in some detail below, this observation is a 
point in favor of perceptions over countings.  That is, in lieu of Searle’s idea of an 
utterance counting as doing such-and-so, I would like to understand illocutionary force in 
terms of an utterance being perceived in a particular way.  
 Recall that Lewis stays quiet about the official scoreboard of conversations (and, 
incidentally, of baseball).  This is, I suspect, for two reasons.  First, he doesn’t really need 
to fix an official scoreboard to make a fruitful analogy for an analysis of presuppositions.  
The second reason, however, is that it is very difficult to say what scoreboard is official, 
for any given conversation.  There is no official mechanical scoreboard to reflect the 
updates that speakers make, and the rules of conversation are not so clear that we all have 
in mind a single unambiguous ordered n-tuple for the score.  And this gets more and 
more complicated, the more you add to your analysis of the conversation. 
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 Imagine telling a fan about a baseball game that you’re watching.  The fan doesn’t 
have first hand access to the game and has called to ask, “what’s going on??”  You could 
tell the fan the score, but she’d probably want more than that.  A full picture of the state 
of a baseball game includes things like the score and the runs and the players on base, but 
it should also include things like the strictness of the umpires, the volatility of the 
catchers, and the fatigue in the pitcher’s arm.  And, if you gave the fan one report, even 
one including all these factors, she might well seek a second opinion.  I might make a 
report on the state of the game that is informatively different – and without calling the 
veracity of your report into question.  Reports of the state of play of the game can differ 
without any intuition that at least one report must be wrong.  I’d like to suggest that the 
state of the conversation is like this.  Different participants are likely to differ on the 
details of the set of obligations or responsibilities, and positions of the speakers, and the 
presuppositions assumed.  When perceptions diverge too much, we should expect 
confusion or disagreement, just as we would if there were divergent perceptions of the 
state of a baseball game.   
 Widely divergent perceptions are relatively rare.  Most of the time, baseball 
games proceed without confusion about the state of play.  And, most of the time, 
conversational participants are able to converse and satisfy their social goals.  This 
suggests that neither players nor conversers diverge very often in their perceptions of the 
state of their activities.  Baseball’s official scoreboard helps players to align their 
perceptions because it is an objective measure against which players can correct their 
perceptions.  Conversation, we might think, must have some similar objective measure. 
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 I discussed this kind of objective measure in detail in the last chapter.  For our 
purposes here, it is sufficient to recall that no appealing measure was forthcoming.  We 
were unsatisfied with an absolute, mind-independent illocutionary force, as it was too 
divorced from conversational practice.  Ideal Interlocutor Objectivism did fare slightly 
better, but in the end was mysterious.  Ideal Conditions Objectivism was still better, but 
still was unable to adjudicate cases of reasonable disagreement.  And, neither speaker- 
nor hearer-based objective forces offered an intuitive way to determine force in all cases.    
Furthermore, it is not clear that we need objective illocutionary force.  According 
to the picture from Lewis, each participant in a conversation can keep score.  Sometimes 
these scores will disagree, and participants will register different scores, and have 
different expectations despite hearing the same utterance.  These different perceptions 
and expectations will generate varied predictions for the kinematics of the conversation.  
A small divergence in perception may have a proportionately small effect, while a large 
divergence might be brought to the fore as the interlocutors act on their different 
expectations.  If I take Mary’s utterance to be an assertion and she takes it to be a 
conjecture, we may never realize our disagreement, as our expectations are sufficiently 
similar.  If, however, I take Mary to be issuing a command, and she takes herself to be 
asserting, then our disagreement will likely yield differences in expectations that are 
manifested in our behavior.  These disagreements happen in everyday conversation and 
seem well described without insisting on objective illocutionary force. 
While these disagreements are familiar, they’re not ubiquitous.  Perhaps our 
general agreement seems hard to explain without objective illocutionary forces to which 
we all align.  We can explain the convergence of perceptions, however, without an 
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objective measure if we consider the reasons that motivate conversers to participate in 
conversations.  Perhaps some of us converse just for conversation’s sake, but cases 
strictly like this (where companionship etc. are not motivating factors) are rare. Desires 
and pressures external to conversation itself often motivate conversers.  Psychological 
studies reveal that speakers are often motivated by attempts to fit in and be accepted 
(Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011), (Dunbar, 2004), (Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 
2012). We converse, at least in part, because conversation is a tool for us to pursue these 
motivations.60 We are social creatures who coordinate our behavior at least in part by 
communicating using our words.  Exclusion from this joint activity comes at a serious 
cost (Smith, 2014), (Waddington & Fletcher, 2005).  Conversers are, therefore, highly 
motivated to read social cues and be constantly checking their perception of the state of 
the conversation against the impressions they have of their interlocutors perceptions.  
And, it seems, some of the most artful conversers are those who best track their 
interlocutors’ perceptions of the state of the conversation.     
 Artful individuals are not always cooperative.  Tracking conversation and 
aligning conversational perceptions of utterances might seem to require a team effort on 
the part of all interlocutors, a requirement that would clearly not be met.  Fortunately, the 
kind of tracking I have in mind does not require global conversational cooperation.  This 
is for two reasons – first, to align perception with yours I do not have to believe what you 
believe writ large, I just have to agree with you about the force of the locution – about the 
obligations and expectations that the utterance is generating.  I don’t have to agree with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 This kind of pressure is discussed at length in Price (Price, 2010), (Moran, 2005), and 
(Green, 2013).  Related work is being done in sociolinguistic accounts of politeness.  I 
have in mind work from Brown and Levinson (P. Brown & Levinson, 1987) and the 
subsequent literature.   
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you about what expectations are reasonable or practical – the utterance just has to 
change our perspectives in the same way.  Second, and relatedly, perceptions of 
illocutionary force are perceptions of representations that speakers are making.  A person 
who perceives her own utterance is a greeting takes that utterance to represent her as 
happy to see her interlocutor.  I can align my perception with hers even if I know she is 
not feeling that way.  Becoming skilled at aligning one’s conversational count with one’s 
interlocutors’ is, I suspect, a contributing skill for those who are particularly adept at 
conversation – both as benevolent and as malevolent interlocutors – the con artist must, 
after all, be able to keep track of her mark’s perceptions.    
 Consider the phenomenon of innuendo or off-the-record speech (P. Brown & 
Levinson, 1987).  Think how closely interlocutors must track one another’s perceptions 
to execute such acrobatic (yet ubiquitous) conversational moves.  If a stopped driver 
utters, “Gee, officer. I was thinking that maybe the best thing would be to take care of the 
ticket here, without going through a lot of paperwork” (Lee & Pinker, 2010), she’d do 
well to track how the officer perceives her speech before making any more 
conversational moves.  She wants to make sure that both of their perceptions are aligned.   
 Aligning perceptions, in this way, is familiar skill in many diverse areas of our 
lives.  Conversation is only one activity among many in which we must rely on our 
impressions of other participants’ perceptions of the state of the activity: in 
improvisation, both musical and comedic, we see the same thing.  If you and I are 
cooking together, we must keep track of one another’s perceptions and expectations.  If 
we’re executing a football strategy, we must do the same.  Indeed, in any unscripted 
cooperative activity, we can, without the aid of objective measures, coordinate.  This, 
	   113	  
perhaps, requires further explanation, but it at least should not be surprising that 
conversers can and do coordinate without an objective score for the conversation, given 
that we do so in our other pursuits. 
 With regard to illocutionary status I conclude the following: a locution has a 
particular illocutionary force to the extent to which conversers take it to change the state 
of the conversation in ways typical of that illocution.  If a converser takes my locution to 
be putting the content forward as true in a way that generates expectations of sincerity 
and justification, then I have asserted.  If no perspective reflects that I’ve done so, I have 
not.  There is, just as in other perspective-relative cases, an objective fact about what 
counters have registered.  There is an objective fact about whether a speaker’s locution 
counts as an assertion relative to some perspective, but there is no perspective-
independent fact of the matter.  Illocutionary force, then, is relative to perspective – and 
this is the position I called Illocutionary Relativism in the last chapter.   
This conclusion may not enjoy universally appeal.  As a new and controversial 
thesis, this is to be expected.  I will do my best to increase its appeal by attempting to 
assuage some immediate concerns in the remainder of this section.   
 First, a speaker’s own perception is sufficient but not necessary for her utterance 
to have some illocutionary force.  If I perceive my own locution as an assertion, then it is 
one relative to my perspective.  Another interlocutor might perceive my utterance as an 
assertion even if I do not.  And again, this is sufficient for me to have asserted relative to 
her perspective.  This helps account for why children, or other speakers who may not be 
in a position to keep a count for the state of the conversation can, nonetheless, make some 
illocutions.  Perhaps children do not often count as promising, and almost never count as 
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marrying, but we do sometimes perceive their locutions as assertions.  And we can do so 
even if they do not yet have the concept of assertion, expectation or obligation.   
 Certainly we do, sometimes, have a strong intuition that a particular speaker 
asserted (or promise etc.), no matter what anyone thinks.  Sometimes we want to correct 
one another’s perceptions.  Without an objective scoreboard or official tracking for the 
state of the conversation, how are we to understand these intuitions?   
 The answer, I think, lies in important facts about how we use language.  These 
facts have figured in the above, but they warrant emphasis.  While illocutionary forces 
are perspective-dependent, they also have weighty social consequences.  There are often 
social costs when perceptions differ, and we have, therefore, some motivation to align our 
perceptions with others’.  There are also social costs associated with relinquishing one’s 
opinion.  If my perception differs from yours, and I change it to bring it in line with 
yours, I admit to having miscounted – if only relative to my new position.  I admit to 
have made a mistake, from our now-shared perspective, in my understanding of the 
distribution of the obligations and permissions in the conversation.  Because of these 
pressures, the costs of divergent perceptions often motivate us to convince one another of 
the authority of our perspective.61 These kinds of social costs and benefits will be 
discussed at length in chapters 5 and 6.   
Similarly, I submit, sometimes our apparent disagreements over illocutionary 
force are actually disagreements over which social, practical, or political norms are 
operative on our conversational context.  So, if you and I appear to disagree over whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 There is even evidence that speakers who voice divergent perspectives are often 
identified as out group members – so perhaps there’s social pressure to align on that front 
as well.  (Sunstein, 2000) 
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or not an utterance was a joke, we might instead be disagreeing over whether or not that 
utterance should be treated as a joke.  It might be that when I insist that a locution is a 
joke I’m actually recommending that we proceed as if the speaker was joking because it 
is more practical, moral, or legal to do so.  So we might be disagreeing about the best 
course of action rather than about the illocutionary facts.   
Also, notice what we do to develop intuitions about illocutionary force: we use 
our own impressions of the conversation – even if we were not participants.  Say you’re 
telling me about a fight you had with your partner.  In the midst of this fight your partner 
uttered, “well, that’s because you’re just like your mother, isn't it?”  When I want to 
know if your partner’s utterance is an assertion or a question (or has some other force), I 
investigate the history of inquiring about your conversational history with your partner.  I 
might ask about past conversations relating to you and your mother.  I might inquire 
about tone.  I might also inquire into how you responded, or are disposed to respond to 
your partners’ locutions.  In other words, I inform myself as to the state of the 
conversation, and then determine how to perceive the locution.  By positioning myself to 
assess a locution’s illocutionary status, I generate a perception thereof.  As a practiced 
converser, I have some justification for believing that others would share my perception, 
as my perceptions have aligned with others’ in the past.  
 However, as our own conversational experiences and the literature on N-theories 
demonstrate, we are also familiar with disagreement over perceptions of locutions.  These 
disagreements can be fleeting, and resolved in the course of the discussion, or they can 
last, as they seem to in the philosophical literature.  Philosophers in the n-theoretic debate 
make excellent cases for divergent judgments about the illocutionary status of locutions.  
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One advantage of an account like mine is that they can all plausibly be right.  A single 
locution might be perceived as an assertion, a conjecture, or some other illocution 
altogether, relative to different perspectives.  
 There are a few things to notice in light of this.  First, no perspective is 
authoritative in virtue of illocutionary facts.  Recall that speakers themselves keep track 
of conversations.  It is not as if my hearer has the only perspective on the state of the 
conversation.  If he takes me to be obligated, and I do not take myself to be, then there is 
no intuition, nor reason to think that I am, thereby, ultima facie obligated.   If my only 
hearer counts my locution, “is the cat on the mat?”  as an assertion, and I do not, then 
there is a good chance that we will reach a conversational impasse sooner or later – and 
his attempt to elicit my justification will likely come to naught.   
 The harder case is one in which many, all, or particularly powerful interlocutors 
differ from me in their perceptions.  In cases like this, I may well be persuaded to change 
my perspective because of practical considerations.  I may be given good reason, to 
supply justification or retract, even if I do not take myself to have undertaken an 
obligation to do so with my locution.  If a thug or a henchman responds to my locution, 
“is the cat on the mat?” with threats unless I can offer justification, then retraction seems 
like a good and practical option.  But the motivation to retract, if there is one, does not 
come from the perceptions of my interlocutors alone: it is due to the position they hold 
relative to me.  No extra danger is undertaken by the difference in counts that would not 
be undertaken by the holding of any minority opinion.    
Further, the power of the perspective of the majority only affects how a speaker 
might change her own perspective, or her own behavior.  I might become convinced to 
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update my perspective to reflect an assertion, to bring my perspective in line with that of 
the powerful party (presumably, approximates one way in which we teach children how 
to individuate illocutions – how to tell a promise from a guess).  Or, I might change my 
behavior, but maintain my perception.  I might just act on what, from my perspective, is a 
miscount on the part of the powerful group. 
 The second thing to note about the potential risks undertaken by speakers is that 
while perceptions are relative to a perspective, they are not always under the conscious 
control of interlocutors.  Conversations often (for better or for worse) proceed without 
much reflection on the part of the conversers.  We do not, most of the time, think 
consciously about the state of the conversation unless something goes wrong. If the 
behavior of one of our interlocutor indicates that her conversational expectations have 
been violated, for example, we might pause and reflect.  We occasionally make explicit 
the commitments and responsibilities we count speakers as undertaking, especially when 
we’re teaching people to converse. Most often, though, conversation proceeds with 
updates in the state of the conversation over which counters have no, or limited, control. 
 Incidentally, this relative automaticity is why I prefer the term “perception”.  
Usually when talk about perceiving something we mean that we’re sensing that thing, or 
becoming aware it by way of our senses.  Perception is not the sort of thing we have to 
try to do.  We may try to consciously train our senses, by focusing our attention or by 
habituating ourselves to some way of sensing, but perceptions, for the most part, proceed 
without much effort on our part.  Perceptions, in the technical sense I’m employing here, 
are much the same.   
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 If I’m right about illocutionary force, then an utterance is a member of an 
illocutionary type, relative to a perspective, when that locution is perceived to be a 
member of that type.  That perception, however, need not be explicit or even considered 
by the interlocutor in question.  As we learn to converse, we learn to keep track of the 
effects that particular patterns of speech have.  We learn what kinds of expectations our 
locutions generate in our interlocutors, and what kinds of consequences befall those who 
violate these expectations.  And most speakers do all this without ever hearing the words 
“illocution”, “speech act”, or even “perceptions”.    
 A complication arises, here, with regard to perceptions and reactions.  We, in the 
philosophical literature, are well used to developing perceptions and having reactions to 
speech acts in hypothetical or imagined conversations.  We eavesdrop, so to speak, on 
conversations of imagined interlocutors in order to generate a variety of intuitions.  We 
see this in the literature on the norms of assertion, (Williamson, 1996), (Lackey, 2007), 
(Maitra & Weatherson, 2010).  We see it in the literature on testimony (Lackey, 2011), 
(Pelling, 2013c).  And we see it in the literature on the nature of knowledge (DeRose, 
2009), (Ludlow, 2005), (Schaffer, 2004), (Stanley, 2004), and in other areas of 
philosophical inquiry.  We tend, in these discussions, to treat illocutionary force as more 
or less obvious.  However, I’ve been arguing that illocutionary force depends on the 
perspective of those interlocutors involved in the conversation.  Those perspectives, in 
turn, depend on the history and habits of those interlocutors.  If we’re imagining 
speakers, and observing a hypothetical conversation, there are no real interlocutors with 
habits and histories.  Further, in many cases we use, the imagined interlocutors are 
unaware of some salient feature of the speech act (remember DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR 
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from chapter 1).  So, given what I’ve said, are the speech acts we use as data devoid of 
illocutionary force? 
 I think not.  When philosophers imagine observing a conversation, they develop a 
perspective on the conversation that allows them to perceive utterances as having 
particular illocutionary force.  The philosophers, then, are like interlocutors (albeit 
relatively quiet and omniscient interlocutors).  The utterances in question have a status 
relative to the perspective of the philosopher who is considering it.  The information that 
that philosopher has, and the history that that philosopher stipulates, stand in for the 
history and habits of the interlocutors in everyday actual conversations.  This allows that 
philosopher to perceive the speech act as having a particular force, and to have certain 
(perhaps counterfactual) expectations about the conversation in question.   
 Again, the perceiver need not explicitly acknowledge or be aware of her 
expectations.  It is sufficient to have some expectation, to be counterfactually surprised 
by violations thereof.  So, for example, I can have the expectation that the floor of my 
office remain solid even if I don’t acknowledge this to myself.  I would be surprised if 
the office floor dissolved.  Similarly, a perceiver would be surprised if a speaker whose 
speech she perceived as an assertion objected to reiteration of the asserted content.  A 
perceiver would be surprised if a speaker whose speech she perceived as a promise 
immediately made contrary plans.  This is all that is required to have an expectation.   
 It is important to see that locutions can be perceived as having some force even if 
(and, most commonly when) the interlocutors have never heard of illocutions, assertions, 
or even promises.  But this should not be surprising.  The labels we’ve put on 
illocutionary forces are just that – and surely we can recognize things without knowing 
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what they’re called, and without knowing everything about our own recognition of them.  
We are happy to describe non-human animals and babies as recognizing their own names 
even before they can articulate the concept of a name.  We do this because of their 
reactions – the response to the sound of their name is different than it would be to some 
other phoneme.  A similar rationale is available for our analysis of illocutionary force.  
We can tell when conversers have perceived a locution as having a particular force 
because of the reaction they have to it, and to subsequent behavior.  This reaction is 
different when they perceive a locution as a question, say, rather than an assertion.   
 The kind of automatic reaction I have in mind is similar to the following familiar 
phenomenon: I might catch my interlocutor’s attention saying, “Look!  Your train!”  My 
interlocutor, assuming she is like most fluent English speakers, will not be able to help 
having some fleeting thought about trains.  She does so automatically. Just as that fluency 
in a language prompts our thinking when we are confronted with particular familiar 
words, fluency in conversation prompts our thinking in the face of locutions.   Saying 
“the cat is on the mat” just prompts most of my interlocutors to perceive my utterance as 
an assertion.  Absent some history together, or contraindicating condition like tone or 
expression, my utterance will have that effect.  Thus, while we may occasionally face a 
particularly devious interlocutor, most of the time perceptions of force and perceived 
obligations will match.  When an interlocutor takes me to be undertaking an obligation by 
way of my utterance (or to be expressing belief etc.), the same undertaking will be 
reflected in my perception, and so no disagreement over obligations will occur. 
 A mismatch between perceptions, however, is still possible.  The various 
interlocutors in a conversation clearly leave space for a difference between how the 
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speaker the force of her speech and how her interlocutors perceive that force.  In most 
cases, a speaker will perceive her locution as having the force she intends. According to 
other conversers, however, she may have spoken with a different force.  The speaker’s 
utterance could, for example, be perceived as a sincere assertion when, in fact, she 
intends to be speaking sarcastically.  This will generate a mismatch in perspective-
relative obligations.  When this sort of mismatch occurs, it may interrupt the flow of 
conversation because expectations are violated.  In a case like this conversers will have to 
negotiate and bring their counts into better alignment, or will have to abandon the 
conversation.   
 Conversers generally coordinate perceptions because they are usually (though not 
always) motivated to bring their perceptions of the state of the conversation fairly close 
together.  Most of the time, speakers don’t want to generate responsibilities inadvertently, 
nor do counters want to expect things unreasonably.  Conversers are, at least most of the 
time, participating (more or less) voluntarily in a (more or less) cooperative practice.62  
Thus, in a simplified case, speakers’ utterances are perceived as having the force they 
intend those utterances to have.  Again, too much divergence causes confusion, and 
frequently thwarts conversational goals.  So, in addition to the mostly automatic 
perceiving of locutions, there is a great deal of social pressure to coordinate perceptions 
of the conversational state.  And some speakers, again, can exploit this fact about 
conversational dynamics to their own ends.  This all means that we should not, practically 
speaking, be bothered by the intransigent interlocutor’s expectations.  Our conversational 
practices have built in and familiar ways of moving past such expectations.  So far, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Searle calls this “Shared Intentionality” in (Searle, 1990).  Cooperation like this is also 
familiar from Grice (Grice, 1957).   
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however, I’ve said nothing about what obligations we in fact have.  I will address these at 
the end of the next section.  In it, I look at some of the more surprising and apparently 
less comfortable consequences of Illocutionary Relativism. 
 
§4. Some Consequences of Illocutionary Relativism 
 In explaining and defending illocutionary relativism, I’ve addressed a number of 
objections and concerns.  There remain some consequences of the view that I’ve not yet 
mentioned or addressed.  These consequences might seem like objections or concerns, 
but I want to suggest that they are not as worrisome as they might appear – though I did 
consider calling this section “bullets to bite”.   
 The first consequence to note may also be the most obvious: Illocutionary 
Relativism holds an utterance has whatever force it is perceived to have.  That means that 
if a hearer perceives my utterance as an assertion, it is an assertion relative to her 
perspective.  If she perceives it as a threat, it is a threat relative to her perspective.  It also 
means that an utterance can have no force at all, if it is either not perceived, or not 
perceived as having a force.  So, the first consequence is that there can be forceless 
utterances. 
 Forceless utterances are not just a consequence of Illocutionary Relativism.  Even 
Austin acknowledged that some utterances of meaningful signs and signals could be mere 
locutions, without illocutionary force, or perlocutionary effects (Austin, 1975, p. 98).  If I 
utter “testing, one two three” into a microphone, my utterance will, in most cases, be 
perceived as having no force at all.  And, indeed, illocutionary relativism predicts the 
intuitive result that like this has no force.  
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 The more subtle case is that in which an utterance has no force relative to any 
perspective because it is not perceived at all.  Illocutionary relativism is committed to 
saying that an utterance that goes entirely unnoticed has no force at all, as there is no 
perception of its force.  And, perhaps, this seems prima facie bad. 
 One difficulty with a case like this is that this failing of perception is not simply a 
classic case of failed uptake by the hearer(s) – one in which I utter something to you and 
you do not attend.  To have a case of forceless utterance, according to Illocutionary 
Relativism, is to have a universal failure of perception.  This is because the speaker’s 
own perception of her utterance generates a perspective relative to which the utterance 
has a force – mere failures of uptake on the part of the hearer won’t do the trick.  If no 
one at all including the speaker perceives the utterance, then it is, indeed, forceless.   
So, Illocutionary Relativism is committed to the possibility of forceless locutions 
but only in two rare cases: there are the forceless utterances that are mere vocalizations – 
pronunciation practice, recitations, and microphone tests – and there are forceless 
utterances that are universally unperceived.  In this latter set perhaps we have dying 
whispers, meaningful utterances shouted on windy mountaintops, or text messages that 
are deleted before they’re even sent.  To be really forceless, an utterance must be truly 
universally unperceived.  And in those rare cases, I’m happy to say that the locution is 
forceless. 
Another consequence of Illocutionary Relativism is that we never improve in our 
ability to ascribe force over time.   Illocutionary force is determined by perception, so we 
determine the illocutionary force by perceiving it.  Our perceptions are always equally 
good at matching the facts because they always determine the facts.  And this, perhaps, 
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seems counterintuitive.  Indeed, there are ways in which people seem to improve – 
children learn about different conversational moves, and as we become more familiar 
with our conversational partners, we become better able to gauge their illocutionary 
intentions.  Illocutionary Relativism seems prima facie ill equipped to handle this kind of 
improvement. 
Luckily, there are other measures on the quality of force ascription than mere 
accuracy, and we can improve along these measures.  Recall, from the discussion above, 
that we assess an interlocutor’s perception along moral, legal, and practical lines.  In 
some cases we are also interested in measuring force ascriptions for alignment.  And this 
seems to be what is happening in the cases above.  We explain to children what different 
kind of forces there are in order to allow them to align their perceptions with others.  We 
improve in our ability to predict the intentions of our intimates because we improve in 
our ability to align with them over time.  And the impetus for alignment does not rely on 
anything about objective illocutionary force – alignment is helpful for all the reasons 
detailed above.   
Perhaps the most daunting consequence of illocutionary relativism is this: the 
emphasis on perspectives might appear to place speakers in a precarious position.  
Illocutionary Relativism holds that an utterance of mine is an assertion relative to some 
perspective just in case it is perceived as an assertion from that perspective.  If I assert 
relative to my hearer’s perspective when I do not intend to do so, my hearer will take me 
to be undertaking a responsibility I do not intend to undertake.  Namely, she will take me 
to be representing myself as justified and sincere (to some extent).  It may be troubling to 
think that I can be perceived as having the responsibilities associated with these 
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representations without intending to undertake them.  What do we do, if this is true, when 
faced with particularly petulant or intransigent conversers?  Can I really be obligated to 
supply justification just because one of my interlocutors perceives my utterance as having 
some force?  
There are a couple of ways to go about addressing this concern. The first is to 
simply restrict the obligations generated by illocutionary force to perspective-relative 
obligations.  This would mean that in the case of the perceived assertion, I have an 
obligation to supply justification relative to that perspective.  I think that this is 
unsatisfying at best.   
The other way to address this problem is to acknowledge that at least some of the 
obligations we generate in conversations are objective.  Insofar as these obligations are 
objective, they will have a complicated relationship with perspective-dependent 
illocutionary force.  While I think it is beyond the scope of the current project to attempt 
a full picture of this relationship, I do want to demonstrate that accounting for the 
relationship is at least possible.   
 Here is one hypothesis regarding the relationship between expectations and 
obligations (I won’t defend it too far, though I think that it may be plausible): in all of 
these cases, someone thinking I have an obligation to do x might generate a prima facie 
obligation for me, even if that person is mistaken about my intentions.  That thought only 
generates an ultima facie obligation in the unlikely case that that prima facie obligation 
goes undefeated.  To see what ultima facie obligations an agent have, we will have to 
consider other factors, like the moral, practical, and legal situation of that agent. 
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 Take the following example: Dave expects Sally to come to his birthday party.  
His expectation, alone, seems sufficient to generate a (very) weak obligation for Sally.  
This obligation could be strengthened or weakened by other circumstances, including 
Sally’s background knowledge and plans.  It could easily be defeated if attending the 
party will come at some prohibitive moral, practical or legal cost, or indeed, if Sally does 
not know about the party.  This, I think, is the same with differences in illocutionary 
perceptions.  That my interlocutor perceives my locution as an assertion generates a 
prima facie obligation to provide justification, but that can be defeated by my different 
perception, or strengthened by the other practical or moral costs of not providing 
justification.  The ultima facie obligations incurred by speakers will depend on many 
factors beyond the illocutionary status of their locutions.  
 So there is at least one sketch of a way to connect perspective-relative obligations 
with perspective-independent or objective obligations.  When my interlocutor perceives 
my locution as an assertion she takes me to be obligated to supply justification.  That 
generates for me a very weak obligation to do so, but that obligation can be defeated 
easily.  For any account of obligation, if that account allows for a distinction between 
prima facie and ultima facie obligations, this connection should work. This is merely a 
sketch, but there may be good reason to be optimistic about the possibility and 
plausibility of this kind of connection between count relative and objective obligations.   
 Even if this sketch turns out to be implausible, or if other better accounts are 
available, perspective-dependent illocutionary force does not obviously preclude such an 
account.  My interlocutor perceives me as obligated to justify the content in question, and 
so perceives me as asserting.  The relationship between this perceived obligation and any 
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objective obligations might well be fraught.  If I’m right that perception is sufficient for 
illocution, it is a further question whether or not perception is sufficient for obligation – 
at least for the account at hand.     
There are many familiar examples of unexceptional circumstances in which 
participants in a conversation disagree over the obligations of salient agents.  Even in 
situations without disagreements about illocutionary force, agents disagree about who is 
obligated to do what.  Conversations in committees, teams, and boards of directors all 
offer examples of cases in which interlocutors disagree about the obligations generated in 
conversation, though they might have perfectly aligned illocutionary perceptions. I want 
to suggest that these cases have a great deal in common with the differences that might be 
generating concern about unexpected speaker obligation.  That is, the ultima facie 
obligations a person has are complicated by many factors, and sometimes obligations 
emerge unexpectedly.  This is not to say that the illocutionary facts are not among these 
factors.  It is just that a theory of illocutionary force, alone, won’t settle the question. 
I’ve attempted, in this section, to forestall some objections to Illocutionary 
Relativism by discussing some of the consequences of the view.  I don’t expect these to 
be fully satisfactory, but I hope to have clarified, at least, what I take to be some 
surprising but acceptable consequences of the view.  Next, we turn to assertion.   
 
§5.  Perceiving Assertions  
Our next concern is to say what it is for conversers to take a locution to change 
the state of the conversation in ways characteristic of assertion.  The strategy will be, as 
in the above, to start with speech act theory.  We know, from speech act theory, that a 
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speaker can affect her situation in many ways.  Some of these are perlocutions – the 
effects the speech act has on the thoughts or actions of those who hear it.  By promising I 
might reassure or comfort you.  By asserting I might inform or annoy you.  A single 
speech act can result in many perlocutionary effects, and many illocutionary types can 
have the same perlocutionary effects.  My promise might inform you, and my assertion 
might comfort you.  There is no supervenience relation between illocutions and 
perlocutions.   
 Speech acts can also affect the presuppositions held by conversational partners.  
These presuppositions are part of Lewis’ conception of the conversational scoreboard, but 
these do not work to individuate speech act types any more than perlocutions do.  I can 
add or subtract presuppositions using any number of illocutionary types.  Thus, the 
effects on the state of the conversation that are particular to illocutionary types are neither 
perlocutions nor the addition or subtraction of presuppositions.   
 The target of our analysis in this section, then, is the effect on the state of the 
conversation that indicates that the participants in the conversation have perceived a 
locution as an assertion.  This effect will be had in common across all and only members 
of an illocutionary type – assertions will have a characteristic effect on the scoreboard. 
This effect will, therefore, individuate utterances made with assertoric force without 
relying on a norm or linguistic flags for assertion.   
Searle takes the schematic general outline for illocutionary force (discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter) and specifies it for several particular forces.  He lays out the 
following conditions for assertions: 
Propositional Content Rule:  
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1.  Any proposition p 
Preparatory Rules:  
2. The speaker (S) has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of p 
3. It is not obvious to both S and the hearer (H) that H knows (does not 
need to be reminded of, etc.) p. 
 
Sincerity Rule: 
2. S believes p 
Essential Rule: 
2. Counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an actual state 
of affairs 
 
According to Searle, the essential rule for assertion is that the speaker counts as 
putting the content she expresses forward as true.  The classic conditions include a 
sincerity condition – she represents herself as believing the content.  They also include a 
justification condition: the speaker represents herself as having the necessary justification 
for the proposition. She also represents herself as making a conversationally appropriate 
contribution.  In asserting, “the cat is on the mat”, I count as putting it forward as true 
that the cat is on the mat.  Further, I count as representing myself as believing that that is 
the cat’s location (even if I don’t), as justified in that belief (even if I am not), and as 
presenting something conversationally appropriate (even if it isn’t).  
 According to the essential rule, to count as asserting is to count as putting the 
proposition expressed forward as true.  In terms of the current theory, this means that the 
speaker is perceived as putting the content forward as true.  When a converser counts as 
doing so, this will generate some particular changes in the perceiver’s perception of the 
state of the conversation. According to the classic conditions, asserters are perceived as 
representing themselves as believing and standing in the requisite justificatory 
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relationship to the proposition they express.  These too will generate some particular 
changes in the perceiver’s perception of the state of the conversation.  We will look at the 
changes described by both kinds of rules, though they work together and are not cleanly 
separable. 
 What happens to the state of the conversation when a speaker’s utterance is 
perceived as putting content forward as true?  When a locution is perceived in this way, 
the perceiver takes the speech act to offer defeasible permission for the hearers to infer 
the proposition expressed, and any undefeated entailments thereof.63  The perceiver will 
behave as if the asserter has made that content available for use by the hearers – and this 
will generate certain expectations.  The counter treats the locution and the fact that the 
speaker locuted as she did as permission from the speaker to her hearers to use the 
content expressed as evidence in reasoning.  If my locution “the cat is on the mat”, is 
perceived as an assertion, then the perceiver treats me as offering permission for 
inferences that my hearer can use in reasoning going forward.   
An example will help: if Sally perceives my utterance, “the cat is on the mat” as 
an assertion then she will take me to be, by my speech act, permitting my hearers to infer 
that the cat is on the mat and is not on the chair etc.  Sally expects to be able to say “the 
cat is not on the chair” to me without my challenging her, even if she has no other 
knowledge about the cat’s location.  This permission can, of course, not result in such an 
inference – my licensing Sally to make an inference means neither that she will nor that 
she ought to make it.  Sally might, for example, know I am attempting to mislead her 
about the cat’s location.  This would defeat Sally’s justification to think she should make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 I leave aside, here, over hearers, eavesdroppers, and the speaker herself.  I will return to 
these points in subsequent discussion. 
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that inference from my assertion, but my locution has, nonetheless given her (defeated) 
prima facie permission from me to infer the proposition I express and entailments thereof.  
In general, participants who perceive my locutions as assertions will expect that it is safe 
for my interlocutors to expect that I will not challenge a subsequent expression of the 
same proposition.  In counting you as asserting I take you to have generated expectations 
that would be explained by your having a certain epistemic relationship to the content 
you expressed – I take you to have represented yourself as having that relationship.   
Work on inferentialism from Brandom (Brandom, 1998), and Kukla and Lance 
(R. Kukla & Lance, 2009) make use of some similar ideas.  That work is largely invested 
in analyzing meaning in terms of conversational permissions.  According to the 
inferentialist account of meaning, the meaning of the proposition expressed just is the 
inferences it licenses for hearers.  If my assertion means that the cat is on the mat, it does 
so by licensing that inference for my interlocutors.  By making that utterance I’ve voiced 
my permission for my hearers to believe that content and use it in their reasoning.  My 
analysis of assertion, while similar to this work in some respects, also differs in important 
ways.  My analysis of assertion is similar in that it incorporates the notion of inference 
licensing more generally into the account of the effects that are paradigmatic of assertion.  
The view floats free from any commitments regarding the meanings of utterances.  A 
familiar truth-conditional approach could be the best analysis of meaning, and help 
account for how noises or signs get to be locutions with particular meanings, and still 
work perfectly well with the analysis of assertion on offer. 
Let’s return to the essential rule and classic conditions from Searle, to see how 
they are to play a role in the view on offer.  The essential rule and the classic conditions 
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help explain why a converser who perceives an utterance as an assertion expects to be 
permitted, by the speaker, to make certain subsequent moves.  Say you perceive my 
utterance, “the report is due on Thursday”, as an assertion.  This perception means that a) 
I’ve put the content forward as true and done so in such a way that you expect me to 
behave as if the following are true: b) I believe that the report is due on Thursday; and c) 
I have some appropriate level of justification for that belief.64  If I behave differently, for 
example, by challenging the proposition when expressed by an interlocutor, my behavior 
would be surprising and confusing.  Sensible interlocutors would quickly adjust their 
expectations of me and of conversations with me.  They might make some effort to 
exclude me from future conversations, or their perceptions of the state of conversation 
will no longer be updated to reflect assertions on my part – my utterances might no 
longer be perceived as assertions.     
 Of course, not all speech acts that have the same illocutionary force meet the 
classic conditions for that illocution fully.  Sarah might order Dave to do something 
against her will or better judgment.  She might order him to do something and even hope 
he disobeys.  The classic conditions do not describe essential features of the illocution.  
Rather, the classic conditions describe features that are usually present to some degree in 
members of the illocutionary type.  If Sarah’s utterance is perceived as an order, it is 
perceived as a member of an illocutionary type that is classically issued by speakers who 
want the subject of the order to obey.  And conversers can recognize locutions as 
members of that type even if the speaker clearly does not desire obedience.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 What level is appropriate may vary across conversational contexts.  More on this later. 
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Similarly, Sarah might assert insincerely.  She might assert something hoping that 
Dave recognizes her insincerity (if, for example, they’re conspiring against a third 
conversational participant).  If Dave perceives Sarah’s utterance as an assertion, he 
perceives it as the member of an illocutionary type that is classically sincere.  And 
conversers can recognize members of that type even if the speaker is clearly not sincere.   
 The classic conditions for an illocution just describe expectations about 
illocutions of that type.65  Violations of those expectations comes with two kinds of risks 
– first, an individual who regularly violates the expectations of her interlocutors is likely 
to lose the ability to update the scoreboard in the usual ways.  That is, chronic liars are 
not counted as asserting once their habits are discovered.  Second, whole communities 
who fail to meet the classic conditions are unlikely to have the illocution in question in 
their repertoire for long.  If my community learns that expectations of sincerity are 
always misplaced, there will be no expectation generated even if I try to represent myself 
as sincere.  What we call asserting, with its familiar conversational effects, will no longer 
exist in this community.   
 Some of the classic conditions for asserting are familiar – like the conversational 
maxims outlined by Grice.  These conditions – Searle mentions the salience condition – 
apply to virtually all speech acts and so won’t help us individuate assertion (Searle, 
1969).  The sincerity and justification conditions, however, will.  
Taking, first, the sincerity condition: if a locution is perceived as an assertion, the 
speaker is perceived as representing herself as believing the content expressed.  Even if 
she is insincere, she can still be perceived as asserting if she is perceived as representing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The frequency with which speakers whose utterances are perceived as assertions do in 
fact meet the classic conditions might be the subject of some interesting empirical work. 
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herself as sincere to some extent.  When speakers sarcastically express declarative 
utterances, they don’t represent themselves as sincere.  If, while holding the cat on my lap 
I say, “the cat is on the mat” (with a tone or a smirk, usually66), then I will not be 
perceived as representing myself as believing that the cat is on the mat.  My locution will 
likely not be perceived as an assertion.  Neither sarcastic nor clearly insincere declarative 
utterances, therefore, are members of the set of assertions.  Thus, meeting the classic 
condition of representing oneself as sincere, to some extent, helps separate assertions 
from other declarative locutions.  
 The other key classic condition for assertion is that the speaker represents herself 
as justified in her belief in the proposition she asserts.  This is the justification condition.  
When a locution is perceived as an assertion the speaker is perceived as representing 
herself as having the evidence or as being reliable for the proposition she expressed.  
Even if she lacks the justification or is unreliable, she can still be perceived as asserting 
to the extent that she is treated as representing herself as justified.  Speakers who express 
declarative utterances without being perceived as representing themselves as so justified 
are not perceived as asserting.  They might be perceived as conjecturing, or supposing, 
instead.  Say we’ve been wondering about the location of the cat, and I’ve denied having 
any evidence to bring to bear.  In that case, my locution “the cat is on the mat”, will not 
likely be perceived as an assertion, but rather as a conjecture.  This is because I’m not 
representing myself as having the justification necessary for assertion – that is, I’m not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Sometimes with a condescending “Yeah, sure” appending to the beginning – as in 
“Yeah, sure, the cat is on the mat”.  But notice that these flags can appear in sincere and 
asserted locutions as well.   
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representing myself as meeting the classic conditions.  Thus, the classic conditions on 
asserting also help distinguish assertions from these other illocutions.   
 Assertions generate different expectations and different responsibilities than other 
illocutions, and the classic conditions capture this difference.  If an interlocutor perceives 
my utterance as an assertion, she takes me to be representing myself as justified and as 
believing the content I express, at least to some extent.  To that extent, then, she expects 
me to continue to believe it when she or another hearer expresses it. She expects to be 
treated as permitted to express the proposition and its entailments.  If I want to continue 
to be treated as an asserter, I better not violate these expectations too often or without 
explanation.  I have a (degree of) responsibility to my interlocutors not to generate and 
then violate expectations.  I have this responsibility generally, not just in conversation, 
because of the general social norms that govern all of my behavior. This responsibility is 
not particular to making a move with some illocutionary force.   
 Similarly, the fact that the classic assertion is justified generates expectations in 
those who perceive my utterance as an assertion.  To the extent that I am perceived as 
representing myself as having appropriate justification, I am perceived as representing 
myself as able to offer that justification in response to challenges (Rescorla, 2009a).  I am 
treated, then, as responsible for being able to meet these challenges, or to act as a source 
of justification for others.  If Sally asks me how I know the cat’s location, I am perceived, 
in virtue of being perceived as asserting, as having represented myself as able to answer 
her.  If I am not able to do so, I take certain risks – I may be scolded, asked to retract, 
treated as an unreliable asserter, or I may fail to be treated as an asserter in the future.  
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And each of these comes at some potential cost for me as a converser, at least with 
respect to those interlocutors and conversations with them.   
 One feature of this account is that it captures the ways in which a speaker’s 
illocutionary efficacy depends, in part, on her illocutionary history.  It might seem 
initially odd that my locution “the cat is on the mat” could be perceived as an assertion in 
some contexts, but not in others, despite being the very same locution.  Notice, though, 
this flexibility is not uncommon: Dave should, prima facie, perceive his boss, Sarah’s, 
locution “get the report to me by Friday” as an order.  If, however, Sarah scolds and 
berates him each time he gets her his reports by the specified day, he may cease to 
perceive her locutions as orders.  One of the classic conditions for ordering is that the 
speaker represents herself as wanting the subject of her order to behave in the ways 
indicated (Searle, 1969).  Given that Sarah behaves as if she does not like when Dave acts 
in accordance with her orders Dave should, at the very least, hesitate to count her as 
ordering.  Here, as in the assertion case, whether or not a speaker’s locution is perceived 
as a particular illocution depends on the speaker’s conversational history with her 
interlocutor.  Notice that if I hear Sarah’s utterance to Dave, and know only their 
positions in the company, I will perceive her utterance as an order.  This is because my 
history with Sarah differs from Dave’s.   
 Conversers react differently to locutions they perceive as different illocutions.  
And it is this reaction – the one that co-varies with the illocutions – that distinguishes one 
illocution from another.  These reactions are explained by the essential and classic 
conditions of each illocutionary type.  Some reactions, however, are quite similar.  The 
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reaction conversers have to conjectures, for example, seems similar in various ways to 
the reactions conversers have to assertions.  
 It is not always easy to tell whether my perception of an utterance is closer to a 
classic assertion, or to a classic conjecture.  And, it doesn’t always clearly make much 
difference to a conversation.  Assertions and conjectures, as well as presumptions, 
suppositions, and guesses, can serve remarkably similar roles in some of our 
conversations.  The reactions conversers have to these can be fairly close together, and 
they allow us to do very similar things – put content forward as true.   
Green describes this relationship between illocutionary forces saying that these 
similar forces all belong to the same family, the assertive family (Green, 2013, p. 404).  
In the terms of the account on offer, illocutionary families are groups of illocutionary 
types all of which have the same essential rule.  Recall that sonnets are a sort of family – 
classic Spenserian sonnets, classic Shakespearian sonnets, etc., are all members of the 
group of 14 line rhyming poems.  Just as all of these members of the sonnet family have 
14 lines, all utterances that are perceived as a member of the assertive family count as 
putting the content they express forward as true.  The various ways the speakers are 
perceived as representing themselves then distinguish the members of that family, 
distinguishing assertion from conjecture etc.  So, when my locution is perceived as 
putting the content expressed forward as true, it is perceived as a member of the assertive 
family.  
Grouping illocutionary forces into families is useful for several reasons.67  First, 
recalling the discussion of coordination and divergence above, sometimes conversers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Here I gesture a bit at the vagueness wrinkle I left aside in chapter 3.   
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need not align their perceptions precisely to proceed with their conversation – sometimes 
perceiving a locution as in the same family is sufficient for coordination.  If I say, “the 
cat is on the mat” I might perceive my locution as an assertion, while you perceive it as a 
conjecture.  In many contexts, no trouble will arise as a result of this difference in 
perceptions.  The essential rule is the same for both, and the conversational expectations 
are similar enough to allow the conversation to proceed smoothly.  All should be well, 
unless the level of justification expected of me having somehow becomes 
conversationally or contextually salient.  But in many cases, the differences between 
these two members of the assertive family just don’t matter.  And the account in question, 
by distinguishing illocutionary forces in virtue of both the shared essential rule and the 
classic conditions helps describe this intuitive and familiar similarity. 
These illocutions are best understood as coming in degrees or strengths.  A 
locution is an assertion rather than a conjecture when the locution is perceived as put 
forward as true and in such a way that the perceiver believes that the speaker is 
representing herself as having justification sufficient to warrant any reiteration in the 
context (R. Kukla & Lance, 2009, p. 22).  And a locution is a mere conjecture when it is 
perceived as put forward as true but in such a way that the speaker is not believed to be 
under the same obligation to provide justification.  And there may be many in-between 
cases.   
 For assertion, the picture we have so far is this: a speaker asserts when an 
interlocutor perceives her locution as an assertion. A speaker S’s locution that p is 
perceived as an assertive when it induces changes in an interlocutor I’s perspective on the 
conversation that reflect that I takes S to be putting p forward as true.  Further, that 
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assertive is an assertion when it is perceived in such a way that I takes S to be 
representing herself as having a justified belief that p.  The classic conditions (that the 
asserted content be believed and justified) help to explain the difference between 
utterances perceived to be assertions, and utterances perceived to be conjectures or 
swearings, etc.   
 To see this, consider the different expectations you have of someone whose 
speech you take to be asserted, and whose speech you take to be mere conjecture.  
Imagine you hear me utter, “the cat is on the mat”.  If you perceive my utterance as a 
conjecture, you take me to be putting the content forward as true, and you expect that I 
won’t immediately challenge conjectures (perhaps even assertions) of the same content 
by others present.  You also expect that I won’t defend the conjecture against all that 
many challenges.  You expect that I’ll have some reason for my claim (albeit possibly a 
very weak one), but that I won’t argue for it against countervailing evidence.  Those who 
count me as merely conjecturing have certain expectations of me with regard to that 
content.     
 If you perceive my utterance as an assertion, however, different expectations are 
generated.  If you perceive my utterance as an assertion, you expect me to allow 
repetitions of the content by my interlocutors.  You also expect me to allow assertions of 
salient entailments of that content by interlocutors.  You also expect me to offer evidence 
or retract the content in the face of a challenge.  You might expect that I’ll act surprised if 
countervailing evidence is presented to me.  Thus, the expectations are generated by 
illocutions of one of these types are explained by the classic conditions for each being 
different.   
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 Notice, though, that my interlocutors might not have the salient expectations 
unqualifiedly.  Just because an interlocutor perceives my utterance as an assertion does 
not mean that she expects to be able to assert the same content to me unchallenged 
forever into the future.  If I speak to Sally and Derrick while Sally and I are conspiring to 
fool Derrick about the location of the cat, then Sally may still perceive my utterance as an 
assertion.  Sally expects to able to reiterate that the cat is on the mat at least while the 
collusion continues – she takes me to be representing myself as justified in my belief that 
that is the cat’s location, even if I am not and she knows I am not.  That is why it is a 
representation – in this case it is, perhaps, merely a representation.  Once our conspiracy 
is over, however, she will not expect to be able to reassert the cat’s location.     
 So, for an utterance to be clearly and strictly an assertion rather than, say, a mere 
conjecture, the following is necessary: the utterance must be perceived as putting the 
content forward as true, and as representing the speaker having a justified belief in that 
content.  So, the speaker’s utterance must be perceived as representing the speaker as 
meeting the classic conditions, even if she does not.  All utterances perceived as 
assertions represent the speaker as believing and being justified in their belief in the 
content they express to the extent necessary for licensing inferences in the context in 
which they speak.  They need not, however, actually be sincere or justified.  And the 
degree of represented justification necessary for assertion may well very across contexts. 
 Searle says that the condition on asserting is that asserters represent themselves as 
“having evidence (reasons etc.) for the truth of [the proposition they express]” (Searle, 
1969, p. 66). Plausibly, at least some conjecturers are taken to have represented 
themselves as having some justification; so having representing oneself as having 
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evidence simpliciter will not make the difference between all conjectures and assertions.   
The difference maker will come in the level of justification speakers take me to be 
representing myself as having.  A locution is perceived as an assertion, to the extent that 
the speaker is taken to have represented herself as having justification sufficient to 
license others to assert the same content later in this and other conversations, and to 
respond to challenges.   
How are we to understand this requirement for represented justification?  
According to the justification condition, a speaker whose utterance is perceived as an 
assertion is thereby taken to have represented herself as having adequate justification.  
This justification is different from the justification someone who is perceived as 
conjecturing is taken to have represented herself as having.  But, just what level of 
justification is this?  And won’t this introduce the kind of normativity – that is, epistemic 
constitutive normativity – that was rejected in the chapters above?  Similarly, if I 
represent myself as believing and as justified in my belief, shouldn’t I in fact believe with 
justification?  I will address these worries in the next two sections, first returning to the 
epistemic norms of assertion, and then to the other norms that play an explanatory role in 
our understanding of assertion, and conversation more broadly.   
  
§6.  Epistemic Norms 
 As we’ve seen in previous chapters, there is quite a lively debate about the level 
of justification necessary for proper assertion.  I’ve argued, however, that this debate is 
mistaken (see chapters 1 and 2).  Yet here, in my discussion of assertion, obligations, and 
classic conditions, I’ve made use of the idea that interlocutors come to have certain 
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expectations about the epistemic states of those they perceive as asserting.  This could be 
a problem: one concern with the view of assertion on offer here might be that it is 
reintroducing the debate over epistemic normativity for assertion rejected above.  If this 
were true, my contribution would only be the contentious claim that illocutionary force is 
perspective-dependent.  Beyond that, the N-theoretic debate against which I’ve argued 
would still be a live one.  And if this were true, then we should still attempt to discover 
the constitutive norm of assertion. 
This is mistaken for two reasons:  first, the kind of normativity debated by N-
theories is of a different sort from that described by any of the classic conditions.  
Second, because these are classic conditions rather than essential rules, they need not 
remain fixed across contexts.  Let me address each of these reasons in turn. 
 First, the kind of normativity N-theorists purported to pick out was a measure of 
distinctively assertoric propriety.  For an assertion to be proper qua assertion, it had to 
meet the distinctively assertoric norm.  I’ve expressed (and argued for) doubt that there is 
any such special assertoric propriety – any propriety that makes a locution an assertion.  
Further, while the account I’m advocating involves what is expected of those whose 
utterances are perceived as assertions, behaving as expected does not mean behaving as is 
proper.  Behaving as expected doesn’t even mean behaving statistically normally.  If an 
assertion is as it is expected to be, then it meets its classic conditions to some extent.  
Propriety comes from meeting other sorts of norms.     
This still leaves us with one sort of epistemic debate: According to the picture 
I’ve been advocating, conjecture and assertion differ in terms of the epistemic 
relationship a speaker is taken to have represented herself as having to the content 
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expressed.  It is necessary, for a locution to be an assertion, that the speaker be taken to 
have represented herself as believing and as justified in her belief in the content 
expressed.   This might all be correct, but it still doesn’t settle one important debate – 
what level of justification and belief do we take asserters to represent themselves as 
having?  Is it knowledge?  Reasonable belief?  Reasons to believe?  Thus we see the 
return of one version of the debate we appeared to leave behind in chapter 1: what level 
of represented justification makes an utterance an assertion rather than some other kind of 
speech act? 
This question is different from that over which the N-theorists disagree because 
there are no claims about assertoric propriety or assertoric criticism.  There might be 
claims about what makes a classic assertion classic, but the classic assertion is not 
detectable by way of intuitions of criticism.  An abnormal or unexpected assertion might 
be perfectly proper, or even laudable, thus the favored test of the N-theorists is 
unavailable here.  Nonetheless, in a straightforward way, the question about the level of 
represented justification echoes of the debate rejected in the previous section – both that 
debate and the question at hand are concerned with the level of justification that makes an 
assertion an assertion.     
There are a number of candidate answers to the question about the level of 
represented justification.  First, we might deny that there is some such level.  Such a 
denial would go against speech act theory, the literature on assertion, the literature on 
testimony, and our own observations and practices.  I will not pursue this candidate.   
Second, we might argue that there is a single unique level of justification we 
represent ourselves as having when we assert.  We then have to argue over which – is it 
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knowledge?  Certainty?  Justification for belief?  This is the option that most clearly 
echoes the debates between N-theories discussed above.   
The third option is that the level of justification that asserters represent themselves 
as having is not fixed across all assertions.  A context sensitive, or relativistic answer to 
the question is possible.  This kind of answer might follow work from Janet Levin 
(Levin, 2008) or Patrick Greenough (Greenough, 2011).  And, given that this level of 
justification need not constitute assertion, the shiftiness will not undermine the coherence 
of the category, as Herman Cappelen argues it does (Cappelen, 2011).   
Either of these second two candidates can work with the account of assertion on 
offer.  Perhaps it is the case that there is a single level of justification that speakers are 
taken to represent themselves as having when their utterances are perceived as assertions.  
Perhaps all such speakers represent themselves as knowing, or as having justification 
sufficient for knowledge.  This would generate a debate very like the one occurring in the 
literature on the constitutive norm of assertion – only this time, the parties would be 
cautioned against using criticism as method of detection.   
Alternatively, perhaps that level varies from context to context (of assertion or 
evaluation).  The level of justification that sets assertion apart might just be more than 
what would be required for conjecture in that same context.  So, if we’re moved by 
considerations of context to give a shifty answer to the question at hand, we might do so 
by offering a comparative answer.  Asserters represent themselves as having more 
justification than would be necessary for conjecture but less than necessary for solemn 
swearing in the context.   
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One point in favor of the third shifty candidate answer is this: given that there is 
no need to fix a unique level of justification to distinguish assertoric force, the parties to 
the new debate could all be right about their data (though not about the positions they 
take the data to support).  In some context knowledge will be required, so a new version 
of the Williamson position is right (Williamson, 1996).  In others, mere belief might be 
required, so a new Bach position is right as well (Bach, 2010).  In still others, justification 
for knowledge (absent belief) might be the required represented level.  A new version of 
Lackey’s position is also right (Lackey, 2007).   
To see how this would work, imagine a case like this: in a very casual context, my 
interlocutors know I have reservations about the location of the cat, but still perceive my 
utterance as an assertion when I say, “the cat is on the mat”.  Because the context is 
casual, these conversers still perceive my speech as an assertion of the content – they 
would, for example, take themselves to be permitted to repeat the content to me with 
impunity.  They further think they can call on me for justification sufficient for them to 
be able to assert the same content in a similar context.  In higher-stakes contexts, an 
utterance that is perceived as having been made with the same level of doubt might be 
perceived as a conjecture or supposition, because it would not generate the assertion-
typical expectations in my interlocutors.  In this higher-stakes context the utterance does 
not meet the contextually determined requirements, despite being represented in the same 
way.  In this context, the level of justification I represent myself as having is not 
sufficient for assertion.  The conversational effects are, therefore, different in these 
different cases.  And this is what sets the illocutions apart.   
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I will not attempt to settle the question of epistemic requirements here.  Doing so 
is beyond the scope of the current project and is, as I hope I’ve demonstrated, not 
necessary for the stability of the category of assertion.  For now, I’ll stake two tentative 
claims: first, my intuitions are that the third candidate answer (the shifty answer) is likely 
to be right.  Second, I suspect that an empirical study of the expectations of interlocutors 
who register speakers as asserting might be useful in determining an answer to this 
question.  That would be interesting data, and helpful for understanding the epistemic 
norms to which speakers are held.   
 
§7. Extra-Illocutionary Norms   
 Epistemic norms are one among many standards against which we measure 
conversational moves.  We sometimes find an assertion lacking because the speaker 
expresses content we know to be false, or unjustified.  We sometimes find fault with a 
question because the answer is obvious – the speaker ought to know it already.  These 
conversational moves fail to measure up, epistemically.  We also, and perhaps more 
often, find fault with conversational moves because they are rude, impractical, or 
immoral.  A request can be disrespectful.  A conjecture can be derogatory.  A greeting 
can waste precious time.  These conversational moves, too, fail to meet some relevant 
standard.  Our concern, in this section, is with these latter kinds of norms – what I’ve 
called, in earlier chapters, “extra-illocutionary norms”.  In this section I’ll address some 
of the ways in which these kinds of norms bear on and interact with perspective-
dependent illocutionary forces. 
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 As in several of the previous chapters, extra-illocutionary norms on behavior play 
important explanatory roles.  First, social pressures and general norms on behavior help 
explain why interlocutors come to some agreement about the illocutionary status of 
locutions.  Second, violating the expectations of my interlocutors is, in some cases, a 
violation of any number of extra-illocutionary norms.  Representing myself as believing 
that the cat is on the mat (or representing myself as having justification) when, in fact, I 
do not, is immoral in many cases.  It may also be impractical if, for example, my 
interlocutors exclude me from future discussions, or punish me as a result of my 
misrepresentation.  Regardless of the veracity with which I represent myself, I might 
assert rudely or verbosely.  None of these norms constitute the assertion – they do not 
apply to all and only the members of the illocutionary type – and I can assert even if I 
misrepresent myself.  But, all of the norms affect what sorts of reactions the participants 
in the conversation might have to my assertion.  This is, in part, because assertions set 
expectations in hearers as predicted by the classic conditions for utterances with that 
illocutionary force.   
 Remember the case from section 2 in which I develop a perception of an utterance 
made by your partner during a fight.  When I develop this perception, I do so as a means 
to an end.  The perception is a means to a better understanding of what norms may or 
may not have been violated in the course of that conversation.  Coming to perceive your 
partner’s utterance as having some illocutionary status is merely instrumental.  Most of 
the time, the main concern is with some of the other judgments I might then make.  We 
use judgments about illocutionary force to inform our moral, legal, practical, etc., 
judgments.  And our illocutionary judgments offer, at best, only part of the story – we 
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don’t just care about how to perceive the locution, we also care how the parties to the 
disagreement perceived it.  If I inquire about your partner’s intentions in a fight, you 
might reasonably say something like, “However he intended it, I was offended” or “he 
may have been joking, but it was serious for me”, and these facts alone allow us to make 
the relevant judgments of the interlocutors’ behaviors.  
 In this case (and, I’d argue, in most cases), our main concern is with the familiar 
norms that bear on behavior in all parts of our lives.  These norms are not particular to 
assertion, and do not constitute it.  They do, of course, inform our evaluations of 
illocutions.  However, these evaluations at no point require that a locution be 
assertorically proper or improper.  Our usual concerns lie elsewhere, and we don’t need 
this extraneous kind of propriety to distinguish assertoric force from other illocutionary 
forces.   As before, the norms that bear on assertion are general, and bear on much of our 
behavior.  
 While, according to Illocutionary Relativism, there is no perspective-independent 
fact of the matter as to whether or not some speaker has asserted, there may well be a 
perspective independent fact of the matter as to whether or not her speech should be 
perceived as an assertion.  In other words, if there are objective facts about what is moral, 
practical, or legal to do, these facts might entail that there are objective facts about how 
interlocutors ought to perceive speech, even without objective illocutionary forces.  If 
there are moral, legal or practical reasons to perceive a locution as a particular illocution, 
then failure to do so is some kind of mistake – it’s just not a mistake about the 
illocutionary facts. 
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Recall the case of Celia from chapter 3.  Celia was the only female floor manager 
at her company.  If I am one of Celia’s employees, and I perceive her utterance as a 
request because she is a woman, then I’m plausibly making moral and practical errors.  
So, while illocutions are perspective-dependent, there can still be important judgments 
about illocutions and their propriety.  And these are moral, legal, or practical, etc. 
judgments.  They are not criticisms specific to an illocutionary force (qua assertion, or 
qua order).   
 The relationship between perspective-relative facts and the norms to which they 
are subject is familiar.  Consider judgments of personal taste – that I, perhaps, ought not 
find something tasty does not mean I’ve made a factual mistake about whether or not it is 
tasty relative to my palate.  Take the following extreme example: It can be true that 
human flesh is tasty relative to my perspective, and be true that I ought not find it so.  I 
have good moral, practical, and perhaps legal reasons to attempt to change my taste.  The 
same is true of my illocutionary count.  I may find that I reflexively take speakers who 
describe themselves as in pain as joking or speaking sarcastically, but I have good moral, 
practical and perhaps legal reasons to attempt to change my perceptual habits. 
Despite the fact that taste is relative to the taster, the perspective relative facts are 
not the only morally evaluable ones.  Hannibal Lecter’s taste for human flesh is morally 
problematic because what it does (or would, could, or might) cause him to do.  The moral 
impropriety of eating human flesh means that he ought not have a taste for it.  The moral 
evaluation, in some sense, dominates.  While it is true that human flesh is tasty relative to 
his perspective, he morally ought to change his perspective.  We can evaluate 
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perspective-relative tastes for moral goodness (or practical goodness).  And in just the 
same way, we can evaluate perspective-relative illocutionary forces.  
 So, we can assess interlocutors’ perceptions of the force of speech acts.  
Intuitively, however, we also make assessments of speakers for having spoken with some 
particular force.  If I perceive your utterance as an order when a request would be more 
polite, you are intuitively subject to some criticism.  This, however, may be surprising, 
since the illocutionary force that makes you subject to criticism – the force of an order – 
is relative to my perspective.  How can you be assessed for something that is generated by 
me? 
 There are two kinds of cases in which this kind of assessment might arise.  First, it 
might be that you also perceive your utterance as having the force of an order.  In this 
case, our perceptions align.  Given that it is impolite for you to issue an order in this 
circumstance, your utterance is impolite given the force it had relative to each of our 
perspectives.  If we both know the politeness norms operative in this context, then we 
will both perceive your utterance as impolite.   
 The second kind of case is one in which your utterance has the force of an order 
relative to my perspective, and some other force relative to your perspective.  In a case 
like this, your utterance only had an impolite force relative to my perspective.  Here, the 
details of the politeness norm matter.  If politeness is determined by someone’s 
intentions, then, assuming you did not intend to order, your utterance was not impolite.  If 
politeness is determined by the consequences of someone’s behavior, then your utterance 
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was impolite, as it had an impolite force relative to a perspective.68  If your utterance had 
the force of an order relative to many perspectives, then, it was rude to a greater extent.   
 Suppose (as is likely) that there are some norms that depend on the consequences 
of behavior (perhaps in conjunction with intentions).  Suppose further that speakers will 
sometimes violate these norms with the force of their utterances.  We want to be able to 
say, in general, how this can occur if illocutionary force is perspective-relative.  As a 
general gloss on assessing speakers for the force of their utterances, let me suggest the 
following: a speaker’s utterance violates a norm on force to the extent that that utterance 
is perceived as having the force that violates that norm.  If an utterance that is only 
perceived as having that force by a small proportion of the interlocutors, then that 
utterance has violated the norm to a lesser extent than one that is perceived as having that 
force by all or most interlocutors.   
 Again, the details of the norms in question will make a difference here.  If norms 
of politeness depend on consequences, but moral norms depend on intentions, then these 
kinds of violations will need different treatments.  For our purposes, establishing these 
details is beyond the current scope.  Suffice it to say, the present allows that the speaker 
and her interlocutor can behave improperly with regard to perspective-relative force.    
 
§8. Conclusion 
 This chapter has offered a sketch of a new account of assertion.  While this 
account has roots in traditional speech act theory, traditional inferentialism, and 
pragmatic approaches to conversation, the account moves beyond all of these by holding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 It is important to recall that interlocutors do not have perfect control over their 
perceptions.   
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that illocutionary force is relative to a perspective.  Belief in perspective-relative 
illocutionary force has been the result of thinking about speech acts and illocutionary 
forces in their natural habitats – the conversations in which they occur.  Conversations 
are malleable, messy, occasionally imprecise affairs.  Conversers come away from 
conversations with various impressions of the utterances that are made.  Sometimes this 
variety makes no difference and goes unnoticed.  Sometimes, though, the differences in 
impressions of the conversation make a notable difference to the lives of the conversers.  
The case of Celia is one such case.  Other cases, discussed in chapters 3 and 4, offer other 
examples.  Illocutionary Relativism allows us to explain these cases in an intuitive way, 
capturing the different impressions that speakers have.   
  Despite these differences, speakers often coordinate.  Speakers engage in 
conversations because doing so allows them to affect and move about in their social 
situation.  These movements require, and are facilitated by various degrees of social 
coordination.  Social coordination, in turn, helps explain why speakers are so sensitive to 
one another’s impressions of and perspectives on the conversation.  By tracking one 
another’s perspectives, speakers are able to bring their perceptions of speech acts in the 
conversation into line with their interlocutors’ much of the time.  So, while illocutionary 
force is perspective-dependent, the conversers’ perceptions will frequently reflect the 
same force for a single utterance.   
 These perceptions can be assessed according to general norms on behavior.  They 
can be assessed for moral goodness, as when the racist juror does not perceive Tom 
Robinson’s testimony as trust worthy because of Robinson’s race (M. Fricker, 2007).  
They can be assessed for epistemic goodness, as when Sebastian, the Distraught Doctor, 
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perceives his own speech as an assertion despite disbelieving it (Lackey, 2007).  And 
they can be assessed for practical goodness, as when Celia’s employees do not perceive 
her utterances as orders (Rebecca Kukla, 2012).  These norms offer measures according 
to which we can assess perceptions of conversational moves.  They are norms on 
conversational moves, but they do not constitute speech act types.  Those types – the 
forces utterances have in conversations – are determined by the perceptions of the 
interlocutors involved in those conversations.   
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Chapter 5: Failing to Count 
Abstract:  
In the first two chapters I argued that there is no constitutive norm of assertion.  I argued, 
instead, that assertion was constituted in roughly the way that early speech act theorists 
detailed.  In chapter 4, I offered more details as to the nature of assertion and its place in 
our discursive habits.  Working out those details required and allowed for a new 
understanding of illocutionary force more generally.  This new understanding is a 
variation on themes (albeit with some departures) from traditional speech act theory.   
 Speech act theory has enjoyed renewed attention, lately.  Philosophers working on 
free speech, restrictions of speech, and oppressive speech have found a ready application 
of speech act theoretic tools.  In some ways, however, these applications have suffered 
from an important difficulty: Traditional investigations of speech acts have, for a long 
time, ignored or explicitly excluded consideration of facts about the effect of social 
position on speech and speech acts.  Speech act theory has been faulted for being out of 
touch with important social and moral facts about conversation (Pratt, 1986).  Applying 
such a theory to explicitly moral and social questions, then, has been complicated.   
In this chapter I use my new account of illocutions to offer a new account of 
illocutionary silencing that addresses both of these worries.  According to this account, 
illocutionary force is a perspective-relative rather than objective matter.  As a new 
account, Illocutionary Relativism requires some explanation and motivation.  I briefly 
review the details from the last chapter before turning to the new account of illocutionary 
silencing.  Perspective-relative illocutionary forces can more easily handle cases of 
conversational confusion, and of silencing.  
 While I think that questions of silencing and communicative justice are 
independently important, these questions are also important for the dissertation.  In part 
this is because the discussion of restrictions on communication in general, and illocution 
in particular, helps to bring out details of our discursive practices.  It is also, however, 
because methodologically, I think it is important that our account of communication be 
sufficiently general to cover all cases. Some cases, though, are made messy by social 
factors.  Among those messy factors are facts about conversers’ social positions, and 
facts about conversations with multiple and diverse hearers.  These aspects are of great 
importance to the literature with which I’ll be engaged in the next two chapters. 
 
§1. Speaking and Silencing 
 Subordination can restrict a speaker’s ability to act by speaking.69  Members of 
subordinated groups – like women, African Americans, etc. – do not have the same 
speech actions available to them as members of privileged groups do.  In some ways, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Written or signed communications can also be silenced.  I use ‘spoken’ here for 
simplicity as a general term for all these.  If some content has been locuted, it has been 
spoken in this sense.  
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speech act theory accommodates this datum.  According to speech act theory, 
membership in some groups makes speech actions available that are not available for 
non-members.  Being a member of the clergy, for example, makes pronouncing 
marriages an available speech act.  Being a member of the royal family means you can 
christen ships by speaking.  In many cases, however, traditional speech act theory has 
idealized away from cases in which the authority in question is unofficial, or outside of 
an institution like the church or the government.  In contemporary American society, at 
least, there is no official institution according to which women or African Americans lack 
the authority to make speech actions simply because of their group membership. 
In the 1990s, as a response to philosophical work on pornography and free 
speech, (notably by (MacKinnon, 1985)), Rae Langton observed that one way in which 
subordinated speakers are restricted, compared to their privileged counterparts, is by 
being unable to speak with the same illocutionary force.  She called this restriction 
illocutionary silencing.  Langton described illocutionary silencing, particularly the 
silencing of women as one effect of pornography, as follows: ‘Sometimes “no" when 
spoken by a woman, does not count as the act of refusal.  The hearer fails to recognize the 
utterance as a refusal; uptake is not secured’ (Langton, 1993, p. 321).   
Langton developed her account of silencing as part of an analysis of competing 
free speech concerns.  On the one hand, pornography is protected by protections of free 
speech.  On the other hand, as Langton, and others70, point out, pornographic depictions 
of women enjoying their own sexual assault and objectification contribute to the 
problematic subordination of women.  Langton argues that these depictions do so to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 (Hornsby, 1994), (Langton & Hornsby, 1998) 
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point that they restrict women’s ability to act with their speech.  So, according to what 
has become the standard account, silencing occurs when a speaker attempts to act by 
speaking, but is problematically thwarted in that attempt.  I will not engage with this 
discussion of pornography and free speech, here.  Important as these debates are, they 
rely on a clear understanding of the theoretical machinery at hand.  We need to 
understand that it takes to illocute if we’re to understand illocutionary silencing. 
 Accounts of silencing, from Langton on, have used tools from speech act theory 
(Langton, 1993), (Langton & Hornsby, 1998), (Wieland, 2007).  We’re now familiar with 
the distinctions between locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions.  These distinctions help 
to pinpoint precisely where and in what capacity a speaker is restricted.  Accounts of 
silencing have also assumed, like traditional speech act theory, that each illocution has a 
single objective illocutionary force.  As we'll see, though the tools can be used effectively 
to analyze the phenomena, the assumption creates difficulties.   
In what follows, I will use the novel analysis of illocutions developed in the last 
chapter to give a novel account of illocutionary silencing that meets these requirements.  
Recall that this account of illocutionary force is an independently motivated account 
according to which illocutionary force is perspective-relative.  This new position rejects 
the assumption of objective illocutionary force.71  This assumption is partially responsible 
for the difficulty speech act theory has in accommodating the effects of social power on 
conversational dynamics. By understanding illocutionary forces as perspective-relative, 
we make available the tools necessary for a more accurate and nuanced understanding of 
both conversational practice and of silencing.  Because of this, the resulting account of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See, for a small sampling of views that make this assumption (Langton & Hornsby, 
1998), (Rebecca Kukla, 2012), (Searle, 2009), (Camp, 2012) and (Green, 1999) 
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silencing two important requirements: it offers a uniform analysis of illocutions and 
makes theoretical space for the influence of social power on conversation.  This allows it 
to distinguish between benign illocutionary disablement and problematic silencing.  In 
particular, the account is able to capture the intuition that an interlocutor who silences a 
speaker is guilty of a moral or legal wrong, and that this failure on the part of the 
interlocutor restricts the speaker’s ability to act with her words.  I’ll discuss these two 
requirements in more detail in the next section. 
 
§2. Desiderata for an Account of Silencing 
Accounts of silencing use the speech act theoretic tools to pull apart some of the 
kinds of restrictions that subordinated speakers face: when a subordinated group member 
is kept from making a conversational move, she is illocutionarily disabled.  This is 
different from a case in which she successfully makes the illocution she intends, but the 
perlocutionary effects are unexpected or unintended.  And it is different from a case in 
which she is kept from uttering (or kept from uttering meaningfully) and so does not 
make a locution at all.  The standard accounts of silencing largely, though not 
exclusively72, focus on illocutionary disablement – cases in which speakers are kept from 
making a conversational move, despite making a meaningful utterance.  Silencing occurs 
when this disablement is problematic.  Speech act theory offers the tools to make these 
distinctions, and so to locate precisely the various restrictions on speakers that occur.     
 The tools from classical speech act theory, however, come with limitations.  First, 
there is widespread disagreement about the details of the categories.  As we’ve seen in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Mary Kate McGowan, for example, has recently defended this distinction and offered 
an account of this second kind of silencing (M. K. Mcgowan, 2013).  
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the foregoing, philosophers disagree over just what it takes to be one illocution rather 
than another, and about what it takes to be an illocution at all, rather than a member of 
one of the other categories.73  These details make a difference to the plausibility of the 
standard account of illocutionary silencing.   
Further, silencing is morally, legally, and practically fraught, and the tools from 
speech act theory don’t obviously lend themselves to complete analyses of such 
phenomena.74  It is hard to capture the pernicious conversational effects of subordination 
with the descriptive categories that speech act theory provides.  In trying to do this, the 
standard account of silencing has lost some of the descriptive power of the speech act 
theoretic tools.  According to Austin, any utterance that was a move in a conversation had 
an illocutionary force.  Illocutionary force is supposed to be a very general category.  
However, in order to give an analysis of what goes wrong in cases of silencing, the 
standard account loses the ability to give a uniform general analysis of illocutions.75  And 
this, I think, has been the source of some of the objections to the standard view (Bird, 
2002), (Jacobson, 1995), (Wieland, 2007).  These objections are to the effect that the 
standard account fails to accommodate such illocutionary facts as uptake, and that the 
standard account assigns blame inappropriately.    
On the other hand, to the extent that speech act theory fails to make room for 
account of silencing, it fails to be an adequate description of conversational practice.  
Historically, speech act theory has been faulted for being out of touch with important 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See (Austin, 1975), (Searle, 1969), (Langton, 1993), (Hornsby, 1994), (Langton & 
Hornsby, 1998), (Green, 1999), (Alston, 2000), (Lackey, 2007), (Camp, 2007), (R. Kukla 
& Lance, 2009), (Maitra, 2009), (Rebecca Kukla, 2012), (Whiting, 2013), for this debate.   
74 Mary Louise Pratt has made a similar point. (Pratt, 1986) 
75 Such a uniform account of illocution is desirable so that the analysis of silencing can 
avoid the charge that it makes ad hoc distinctions within the category. 
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social features of conversation (Strawson, 1964), (Pratt, 1986), (Sbisà, 2002). According 
to classical speech act theory, members of subordinated groups are equally able as 
members of privileged groups to make illocutions like refusals.  By failing to account for 
important effects of social position, classical speech act theory is vulnerable to the charge 
that it fails to describe important conversational phenomena.   
Despite these difficulties, speech act theoretic tools – or something very like them 
– should be available to help us account for silencing.  Accounts of silencing employ 
speech act theoretic tools for good reason, and if an improved account can avoid the 
above pitfalls, the theoretical pay off is promising.  To do so, however, our account will 
need to do two things.  First, we must relinquish a widely held but rarely examined 
assumption in the literature –that there is something importantly explanatory about the 
objective illocutionary force of a particular locution.  Second, the account needs to make 
theoretical space for and accurately describe the subtle power dynamics that affect 
speakers and conversations.  Changing the account in these ways will allow us to make 
full use of the tools from speech act theory.  
 
§3. Doing things with words 
 First, a bit of a review of the work from the preceding chapters: imagine I say to 
you, ‘I will be at your beck and call’.  What have I done?  I’ve certainly uttered some 
noises, likely intending that those noises be taken to be meaningful words.  What kind of 
conversational move have I made?  In order to determine the conversational move we 
probably need to know more about the conversation in which this utterance takes place.  
If I said, for example, ‘Shannon was lying when she told you …’ and then uttered the 
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above, that’s quite different from a case in which I say, ‘These things I solemnly 
swear…’ beforehand.  Even if we fix the prior content expressed in the conversation, this 
same utterance could be taken many different ways.  If I am your boss, and make this 
utterance, it may be taken quite differently from if you are mine and I make it.  If we’re 
friends in a fight over my obligations to you, my utterance may count as one kind of 
move.  If we’re pledging eternal love, it may count as another.  Context and social 
position make a great deal of difference in what our utterances do.   
Further, even within a context, with social position of the conversers fixed, 
competent speakers sometimes disagree about the illocutionary force of an utterance.  
You and I might come away from a conversation in which I utter, ‘I will be at your beck 
and call’, with very different impressions of that utterance.  I may count my utterance as a 
joke – I may find subtle sarcasm particularly hilarious.  You may count me as having 
undertaken certain obligations.  We have two different impressions of what I’ve managed 
to do with my words.  We count this utterance as different conversational moves – as 
different illocutions.   
The category of illocutions includes such acts as commanding, promising, 
asserting, and refusing etc. (Austin, 1975).  These are acts that can, in many cases, be 
done by claiming that one is doing them.76  Illocutions, however, are not always as they 
appear.  Sometimes, ‘I promise…’ appears in an utterance that does not, properly 
speaking, have the force of a promise.  Take, for example, ‘I promise that I went to the 
store’.  In making this utterance I am undertaking no obligations for a specified future 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 This might be called the ‘performative test’, according to which asserting is an 
illocution while persuading is not – I can assert by saying, ‘I hereby assert…’ but cannot 
persuade you by saying, ‘I hereby persuade you…’ 
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action, as I am when I promise.  Utterances like this are likely counted as emphatic 
assertions rather than promises.  We cannot always tell an utterance’s illocutionary force 
by the words uttered. 
To complicate things further, a single string of meaningful sounds can be 
employed with many different forces.  ‘The door is open’ might count as an assertion, a 
conjecture, a command, or even, under the right circumstances, a promise or a refusal.  It 
is not always clear how to tell one illocution from another.  
One important clue as to the illocutionary force of an utterance is the changes that 
utterance makes.  In particular, different illocutions make different changes in the 
expectations and obligations of people relevant to the conversation.77  When I make a 
promise I undertake an obligation to perform a specified future action and generate the 
(defeasible) expectation that I will fulfill it.  And different illocutions generate different 
expectations and obligations.  Thus, I propose, the illocutionary force of a particular 
utterance is at least partly determined by the obligations and expectations that it 
generates.  
There is, as we’ve seen, a difficulty regarding expectations and obligations.  
Conversers do not always agree on which conversational move a speaker counts as 
making.  So, when I say, ‘I will be at your beck and call’, we might disagree about the 
force of that locution.  When these disagreements arise speakers will sometimes claim a 
particular illocutionary force for their locution. ‘I was joking!’ I might say.  And you 
might respond, ‘that was not a joke; you promised’.  We disagree about the illocutionary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The deontic statuses, as per Searle (Searle, 2009) 
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force of the same locution and, as a result, about the obligations and expectations that 
were generated.  How are we to decide the force of the locution, in this case? 
As we’ve seen in chapters 3 and 4, there are some hefty challenges for fixing an 
objective illocutionary force for each utterance.  Either the force is divorced from 
practice, the method for fixing the force is mysterious, there are intractable 
disagreements, or the purported objective force is counter-intuitive.  These challenges 
pushed us toward adopting Illocutionary Relativism.  This view is committed to the fact 
that no audience member is any more, or less, authoritative than a speaker with regard to 
illocutionary force itself.  Each party is equally well placed to form expectations, and all 
parties to the conversation seem likely to get something right, namely the effect the 
locution has on their own perceptions of the conversation.  And if, as I am arguing, those 
effects are the distinctive characteristics of illocutions, then these disagreements are 
faultless – both of us, assuming we are accurately reporting our own updated perceptions 
in the joke/promise case, can be right.  At least, we can both be right about the 
illocutionary facts. 
Certainly, in the case under consideration, there might be social, practical, or 
moral reasons to count one or the other of us as authoritative.  If I am your boss, you 
would do well not to hold me to the promise you count me as undertaking.  If you are 
mine, I had better be there when you beck or call.  These power dynamics are extremely 
important, and are tied up in how our conversations proceed (and, as will become clear, 
in how speakers’ locutions are counted).  But we can acknowledge this without claiming 
that such dynamics dictate illocutionary force in an objective way.  In the promise/joke 
case, it seems plausible that we are both getting something right about the conversation, 
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even if there are good practical reasons for one or the other of us to change our 
perceptions.   
Cases like this, and the cases discussed in the silencing literature, help motivate a 
perspective-relative account of illocutionary force.  This new account, detailed in the last 
chapter, has it that a locution has a particular illocutionary force in virtue of being 
perceived by some converser as such.  A locution has a particular illocutionary force, 
relative to some interlocutor’s perspective, when it changes the expectations of the 
interlocutor in particular ways.78  The specifics of these expectations and obligations 
depend on the state of the conversation in question.79  They also depend on the 
perceptions and dispositions of the conversers – as our perceptions differ, so too do our 
views of conversations.  These differing views mean that a single locution can have 
different effects on different interlocutors, so the changes that locutions make are 
perspective-relative.  Thus you and I can both be right in the joke/promise case.  
If we disagree but both get the illocutionary facts right, then being perceived as a 
particular illocution is sufficient for having that illocutionary force, relative to some 
perceiver’s perspective on the conversation.  There is no property of being an assertion 
simpliciter.  There is only the property of being an assertion relative to a perspective.  
This is Illocutionary Relativism.  Being a joke rather than a promise, relative to some 
perspective, depends on being perceived as a joke and not a promise.  And as long as 
someone does so perceive that locution, it has that force relative to that person’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Where ‘expectations’ is rather broad, encapsulating all of the perceived changes in 
deontic status. 
79 I am being fairly liberal with ‘conversation’ here.  Any exchange that involves 
locutions and counts can be, for our purposes, a conversation.   
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perspective.  A single locution, then, can be a promise relative to one perspective, and a 
joke relative to another.   
 According to Austin, some illocutionary forces rely critically on securing uptake.  
Uptake, according to Austin, is secured when, “[the locution’s] effect amounts to 
bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution” 
(Austin, 1975, p. 117).  This is what is crucially missing, in the paradigm case of 
silencing, as analyzed by Langton.  A speaker produces a locution, and a listener 
understands the locutions illocutionary force.  So, uptake of force and perceptions of 
force are clearly related.   
 Perceptions and uptake are different, however for two reasons.  For one, 
perceptions are more general – interlocutors perceive locutions as having illocutionary 
force, but also perceive those illocutions as credible or as rude.  As in the last chapter, the 
perception includes myriad different reactions that an interlocutor might have, including 
the perception of the force, but also the volume and propriety as measured in various 
ways.80  
 The second way in which perceptions differ from uptake is that uptake is usually 
taken to be the hearer’s contribution to a speech act’s status.  Austin says,  “I cannot be 
said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a 
certain way… the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake” 
(Austin, 1975, p. 117).   The uptake, then, on which illocutionary status is supposed to 
depend, is the uptake of the audience.  Perceptions of an utterance differ in two ways.  
First, the speaker of an utterance herself can perceive the utterance.  And second, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80  This will become key in the next chapter.   
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audience or hearers of an utterance can all differ in their perceptions.  So, where speech 
act theory locates uptake in the response of a single hearer (or the consensus of a group), 
Illocutionary Relativism allows for a perspective for each interlocutor – and the force-
determining perception of the speach can vary from perspective to perspective.  Unless 
uptake can differ across interlocutors, and yield different verdicts for a single locution, 
uptake and perceptions will differ.  Perceptions, after all can differ for a single locution, 
without affecting the perspective independent facts about the locution’s force.  So, 
perception and uptake are distinct in at least these two ways.   
Illocutionary Relativism may seem surprising.  After all, many conversations do 
not to result in misunderstandings or differences in the perceived force of the utterances 
therein.  We seem to be able to speak and be understood with a high degree of success, 
and so our perceptions are, for the most part, easy to coordinate.  If our utterances have 
illocutionary force only relative to some perspective, how can this success be explained?  
And similarly, what are we to say about idiosyncratic perceptions?  If an interlocutor 
counts my utterance ‘I promise to be at your beck an call’ as a christening, or a request 
etc., must we concede that my utterance so counts? 
We can answer both of these concerns by observing the motivations that 
conversers have for conversing.  We are social creatures who coordinate our behavior, at 
least in part, by communicating using our words.  Exclusion from this joint activity 
comes at a serious cost.  Conversers are highly motivated to read social cues and to check 
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their perception of the state of the conversation against the impressions they have of their 
interlocutors’ perceptions.81     
We are motivated by social pressures to align our perceptions with our 
interlocutors’.82  The motivations that move us to converse are often only fulfilled if our 
interlocutors perceive our locutions in (nearly) the same way we do.  Speakers do not 
want to incur obligations inadvertently, even relative to someone else’s perception.  
Violating the expectations of one’s interlocutors too often or too flagrantly can result in 
exclusion from the conversational community.83  Imagine someone who makes promises, 
for example, and never meets the obligations she counts as undertaking.  Eventually that 
person’s locutions will no longer be perceived as promises.  She will be excluded from at 
least that illocutionary activity.  Imagine, also, an interlocutor who consistently fails to 
align her perception with yours.  She consistently perceives you as promising, say, when 
you count yourself as asserting.  If that person acts on those perceptions then eventually 
she will, like the unreliable promisor, be excluded.  These excluded interlocutors will not 
enjoy the benefits of conversation.   
The kinds of pressures that explain our coordinated conversational perspectives 
bear on much of our behavior.  Conversation is not the only activity in which we must 
rely on our impressions of other participants’ perceptions of the state of the activity: in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Notice that this does not mean that all who converse are cooperative.  We’re familiar 
with those adept conversers who are, we find out, not cooperating (with us anyway).  
Nonetheless, artful manipulative conversation, perhaps most of all, requires checking 
one’s perceptions of the state of the conversation against one’s impressions of the 
perceptions of one’s interlocutors.   
82 Kukla observes this, calling speech a ‘fundamentally collaborative project’ (Rebecca 
Kukla, 2012, p. 16)  
83 Related work is being done in sociolinguistic accounts of politeness.  I have in mind 
work from Brown and Levinson (P. Brown & Levinson, 1987) and the subsequent 
literature. 
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improvisation, both musical and comedic, we see the same thing.  In any unscripted 
cooperative activity, we can coordinate without referring to objective measures.  And we 
do so because failure comes at a cost, and success brings a reward.  These costs and 
rewards are largely external to the practices in which they are engendered.  The important 
benefits are social, aesthetic, moral or legal.  And this will become key in what follows. 
 
§4. Failing to Count 
Section 3 was largely a review, to recall some important features of the general 
account of illocutionary force detailed in the last chapter.  We are now in a position to 
offer a precise analysis of illocutionary disablement and silencing in the terms of 
Illocutionary Relativism.  We can then support this analysis by demonstrating that it 
meets the requirements we laid out at the start.  Illocutionary disablement, in this new 
vocabulary, occurs when there is a mismatch in conversational perspectives that is due to 
the subordinated status of a speaker.84  In other words, when a speaker is a member of a 
subordinated group, that speaker may perceive her own locution differently from how her 
interlocutor perceives it.  If that difference is caused by the speaker’s social status, she 
has been illocutionarily disabled.85  It is a further question whether or not she has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 It has been pointed out that interlocutors might mistakenly perceive speakers as 
members of historically subordinated groups.  I might appear to be young, and so be 
perceived as a minor.  This perception might cause an interlocutor to misalign her count 
with mine.  This would, I think, be a case of silencing.  For simplicity I will leave this 
sort of case aside, though a full analysis of silencing would have to take it into 
consideration. 
85 A case can also be made for a related phenomenon of problematic illocutionary 
amplification that is due to the subordinated status of a speaker.  Imagine a case in which 
a speaker counts himself as asking a question while his interlocutor counts him as making 
a threat because the speaker is the member of a racially subordinated group.  This is a 
case of mismatched counts due to subordinated status, but it is not clear that it ought to be 
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silenced.  Silencing, in these new terms, occurs when a speaker is illocutionarily disabled 
because of pernicious social subordination. 
Here is an example: A female undergrad in a philosophy class develops an 
objection to the theory under discussion.  She raises her hand and voices the objection.  
Her professor does not recognize her contribution as an objection and the discussion 
moves on.  A few minutes later, when a male student utters the same locution, the 
professor recognizes the objection.  The female speaker’s membership in a subordinated 
group causes a difference between how she perceives her own locution and how other 
conversers perceive it.  She has been silenced.86   
In another example, one that initially motivated the silencing literature, a woman 
is silenced in the course of being raped.  In this case, a woman utters the locution ‘no’.  
She perceives her utterance as a refusal.  Her attacker does not.  By some accounts he 
might even perceive it as an invitation because of his experience with the glamorization 
of sexual assault in pornography (Wieland, 2007).  The mismatch between perspectives is 
due to her subordinated status assuming that if a man uttered that meaningful sound in the 
same way, the rapist would perceive his utterance as a refusal. 
For a third example of silencing consider an African American man attempting to 
testify about his own experience.  He perceives his locution as having the force of an 
assertion.  Imagine that, because of racial prejudice, a member of the audience – a police 
officer – does not perceive the man’s locution as an assertion, taking it to be a joke or a 
story instead.  In this case, the man and the police officer disagree over the illocutionary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
called ‘silencing’.  Perhaps a more general label should be adopted.  I leave that to future 
work. 
86 This is similar to an example from (Maitra, 2009) in which a student is silenced 
because of his subordinated racial position.   
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force of the utterance because of a history of racial subordination.  The man has been 
silenced.   
The analysis of illocutionary disablement and silencing from Illocutionary 
Relativism meets the requirements with which we began: first, the analysis of illocutions 
is uniform.  Every locution has an illocutionary force relative to a perspective, and that 
force is determined by the perception of an interlocutor.  This is the case for fully 
successful illocutions, partially successful illocutions, and silenced illocutions.  The 
objections that the standard accounts of silencing bifurcate illocutionary force, or fail to 
accommodate the illocutionary facts, do not arise here.  This analysis can speak to uptake 
and to the difference in illocutionary perceptions between interlocutors.   
Second, the account makes room for the range of wrongs done to speakers in all 
and only those cases of illocutionary disablement that are blameworthy.  These are cases 
of silencing.  The illocutionary force of an utterance is a descriptive matter, determined 
by the expectations of the interlocutors.  The discussion of Illocutionary Relativism in the 
last chapters highlighted the importance of moral, legal and practical factors for aligning 
counts.  By recognizing the importance of these factors, instead of idealizing them away, 
the new analysis of silencing can separate the illocutionary facts from normative claims, 
while still taking into consideration moral, legal, and practical norms.  I will say more 
about each of these in turn.   
First, Illocutionary Relativism offers a uniform analysis of illocutions.  Some 
object to the standard account claiming that, to accommodate cases of illocutionary 
disablement, the account must misdescribe other illocutions as always requiring uptake.  
Alexander Bird, for example, argues against the standard account of silencing on the 
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grounds it fails to offer a uniform analysis of illocutions (Bird, 2002).  To account for 
what goes wrong in cases of silencing, we must require uptake for successful illocutions.  
But, Bird argues, speakers can make successful illocutions without uptake.  If speakers 
can illocute without securing uptake, then the failure to secure uptake seems innocuous, 
even in rape cases – illocutions proceed without them, and the purportedly silenced 
parties’ speech-acts are unrestricted.  The rape victim, in other words, is not silenced 
because her locution is a refusal even if it fails to achieve uptake.   
Bird argues that locutions need not secure uptake using several examples.87  One 
example involves a judge who passes a sentence on an inattentive defendant. That the 
defendant pays no attention, Bird argues, has no effect on the success of the sentencing.  
‘The conditions for successful illocution’, he says, ‘do not include uptake’(Bird, 2002, p. 
8).  And if a speaker successfully illocutes, in what sense has she been illocutionarily 
disabled?   
One benefit of the new understanding of silencing is that it accommodates Bird’s 
observations but also explains why uptake is important.  According to this understanding, 
all illocutionary force is relative to a perspective, and speakers themselves perceive their 
utterances as having some force or other.  So, as long as a speaker – in Bird’s example 
the judge – perceives her own utterance as having some particular force, her utterance has 
that force, relative to her own perspective.  Bird is right that this is a case of illocutionary 
force without uptake if uptake is to be obtained from the hearer alone.  Bird is wrong, 
however, that uptake on the part of the hearer is the sole determiner of illocutionary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Examples that have their roots in (Strawson, 1964) 
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force.  Because the judge perceives her own utterance as sentence, it has that force 
relative to her perspective.  But this is only part of the story of a case like this. 
Speakers are rarely only interested in their own perspectives.  We want to 
influence our interlocutors’ perspectives as well.88  This is what the judge and rape victim 
are kept from doing.  Bird is quite right that the inattention of the defendant is largely 
immaterial – because of the relative social statuses of the judge and the defendant, the 
defendant’s attention makes no practical, or legal difference.  But, importantly, while 
Bird’s case might be one of illocutionary disablement, it is not one of silencing according 
to the current account – the mismatch is not due to the subordinated status of the speaker, 
but to the inattention of the defendant.  So, this understanding of illocutions gets the 
intuitions of the case right: the judge makes a successful illocution (relative to her own 
count) and the case is clearly one in which the defendant has good practical, moral, and 
legal reasons to change his perception of the utterance.  The understanding also offers a 
way to account for the failure of uptake in silencing cases: silenced speakers are kept 
from influencing (at least some of) their interlocutors’ perspectives.  The perceptions the 
speakers are most concerned with do not reflect the changes they intended to bring about.  
The speakers are kept from fulfilling the very goals that motivate them to speak in the 
first place.  So, my account offers a uniform analysis of illocutions, where the standard 
account does not. 
 Other objections have been raised to the standard account of silencing and its use 
of speech act theoretic tools. Daniel Jacobson and Nellie Wieland point out that silencers 
and those who are silenced seems to stand in similar positions relative to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 This point is emphasized in (M. K. Mcgowan et al., 2011).  There the authors discuss 
silencing in terms of communicative interference.   
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conversational facts – where one is illocutionarily disabled, the other is interpretively 
disabled (Jacobson, 1995), (Wieland, 2007).  It is not clear that speech act theory offers 
the right tools for appropriately describing the wrongs done in cases of silencing.  
According to the standard account, the silenced speaker’s utterance does not have the 
force she intends.  As Wieland puts it, ‘the problem the Langton-Hornsby view faces is 
that if they are correct that women are “silenced”, then the rapist’s claim to having 
obtained his victim’s consent must also be correct’ (Wieland, 2007, p. 453).  The woman 
did not refuse – the rapist counted her as consenting, and thereby kept her utterance from 
having the force of a refusal.  The standard account, therefore, seems to reduce how much 
and for what we can blame the rapist.   
The relativistic account of silencing from Illocutionary Relativism offers a 
different understanding of the paradigm case of silencing.  According to this new 
account, the speaker did refuse.  Her locution had the illocutionary force of a refusal as 
long as she perceives it as such.  Granted, it also may have counted as consent, relative to 
the rapist’s perspective, but it should not have.  He practically, legally, and morally 
should have aligned his perspective with hers.  
Perhaps point this is surprising.  After all, according to illocutionary relativism, 
interlocutors’ perceptions are on a par.  By what measure, then, should his perspective be 
different? Illocutionary Relativism cannot make use of any illocutionary or speech-act-
theoretic sense in which an interlocutor should perceive a locution as having a particular 
force.  I spent chapters 1 and 2 denying that these are useful.  All we can say about the 
illocutionary facts is that these facts are perspective-relative, so each interlocutor’s 
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perception (though not necessarily their report of their perception) determines a 
perspective relative force.   
But accuracy is not the only measure for the goodness of a perception.  Certainly 
two people could both get the facts of some case right, but not be acting, all things 
considered, equally properly.  Indeed, that measures we care about in cases of 
problematic silencing are not measures of illocutionary accuracy, but rather measures that 
go well beyond illocutions and perceptions.  The prescriptions for perceptions come from 
moral, practical or legal considerations.  And this is, in the end, not surprising.  These are 
the norms we’re concerned with in cases of problematic silencing.  
On the other hand, mismatches of perceptions, even those due to subordinated 
status, are not always problematic.  The standard view of silencing has been criticized for 
being unable to offer different diagnoses of problematic and unproblematic cases.  As 
Ishani Maitra points out, not all interlocutors who illocutionarily disable speakers are 
subject to blame (Maitra, 2009).  To see that, consider a case in which a military private 
utters, “drop and give me 50” to a general.  The private perceives his own utterance as 
having the force of an order.  The general, of course, does not perceive it as such.  In this 
case, there is a mismatch in perceptions due to the private’s status as a subordinate.  It is a 
case of illocutionary disablement, on our definition, but there is no intuition that it is 
problematic.  There is no sense in which the general should change her perception.89  In 
this case the disablement is unproblematic because the general has not violated any 
moral, practical or legal norms.  A difference in perception is merely a difference unless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 This is only true ceteris paribus.  If the general has good practical (etc.) reasons for 
treating the utterance as a command, then, of course, there is a sense in which she should 
change her perception.   
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it is a difference that implicates a converser in other kinds of violations.  These are the 
costs and rewards that motivate us to align perceptions and to converse.  They also 
explain the blame for mismatches, when mismatches are blameworthy.   
Notice that this means that illocutionary disablement, by itself, is not wrong.  As 
we’ve defined it, illocutionary disablement occurs when there is a mismatch in 
conversational perspectives due to subordination.  Some kinds of subordination are good 
– consider the subordination of a minor to her parents.  She might perceive some of her 
utterances as a marrying, or a promising or as entering her into a binding contract.  We 
would not perceive her utterances in these ways for goof moral, legal, and practical 
reasons.  Here, the silencing is well motivated and legally (also morally and practically) 
appropriate.  Subordinating a minor in this way is unproblematic, and so too is the 
associated illocutionary disablement.  Illocutionary disablement is only problematic, 
when it is a violation of moral, legal, or practical norms.  When these norms are violated 
the illocutionary disablement is a case of silencing.  And that seems exactly to capture 
our intuition.  We don’t care, in cases of problematic silencing, about whether or not the 
silencing party is a bad conversationalist.  We care, instead, about what other norms the 
silencer thereby violates.   
One final benefit of Illocutionary Relativism’s account of silencing is that allows 
us to clarify the extent to the wrongs experienced by silenced parties are distinctly 
speech-related.  When a speaker is silenced we want our analysis of the phenomenon to 
describe a problematic restriction of speech action.  Maitra has argued that the standard 
view of silencing fails to address the distinctly speech-related wrong inflicted on victims 
of problematic silencing.  The standard view, according to Maitra, struggles to ‘make 
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clear why a speaker who is silenced is thereby unfairly deprived of (some of) the benefits 
that lead us to place a special value on speech in the first place’ (Maitra, 2009, p. 310).   
Illocutionary Relativism’s account of silencing can explain why this restriction is 
particularly speech-related.  According to Illocutionary Relativism, legal, moral and 
practical considerations are influential and important to our experience as conversers.  
These are the considerations that motivate us to convers, and to align our conversational 
perspectives.  So, the legal, moral or practical wrong done to the silenced party is speech-
related – the silenced party is not able to do with her words what someone of the 
unsubordinated group could do, namely influence an interlocutor’s perspective.  If the 
subordination is problematic, so too is the silencing.  So, silencing is distinctively speech-
related, and, where problematic, is a wrong.  The action by which the silencing party 
violates some norm is an action that has distinctly to do with speech – thus the wrong is 
distinctly speech-related.   To see this clearly, we will have to look more closely at cases 
of silencing.   
In all cases of illocutionary disablement, there is a mismatch between the 
speaker’s perspective and that of the interlocutor who disables her.  And, in all cases of 
illocutionary disablement, this mismatch is due to the speaker’s membership in a 
subordinated group.  The speaker is thwarted in her attempt to influence her interlocutor’s 
perspective, and this influence may be of great import.  Her interlocutor fails to perceive 
her utterance as having the force she perceives it (and intends it) to have because she is a 
member of a subordinated group.  Silencing occurs in a subset of illocutionary 
disablement – in only those cases in which the disablement is a wrong.  If membership in 
such a group should, legally, morally, or practically, make no difference, the converser 
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who fails to perceive the speaker’s locution as the speaker does is failing to do what he or 
she ought.  And this failure is objective, as long as the norm it violates is objective.     
It might seem counter-intuitive that objective norms could govern our reactions to 
perspective-relative facts.  However, while being an illocution is perspective-relative, as 
long as there are objective moral, legal, or practical norms, the rightness or wrongness of 
a count can be objective.  Consider, for comparison, the following.  Taste in food is 
intuitively perspective-relative.  Broccoli may not be tasty relative to an infant’s tastes; 
nonetheless, there are good practical reasons for that infant to learn to enjoy broccoli – to 
change his tastes.  Hannibal Lecter finds human flesh tasty, but he ought not to for 
practical, moral, and legal reasons.  And as long as these reasons are perspective-
independent, so too are the norms on the perspective-relative perceptions of illocutionary 
force.   
The perspective-independent norms on perspective-relative perceptions help 
explain the problematic cases of illocutionary disablement.  The professor did not 
perceive the student’s speech as an objection, because the student is a woman.  Her 
utterance does not, relative to his perspective, have the force of an objection – but it does 
relative to hers.  If she’d been a male, their perceptions would have aligned.  Because 
there are moral and practical reasons to count student contributions alike regardless of 
gender, morally and practically, he ought not silence her.  She ought to be able to do the 
same things with her words that male students can do.   The professor’s perception, while 
correct with regard to the perspective-relative facts, ought to be different.   
Similarly, the rapist and his victim have mismatched perceptions because the 
rapist fails to behave as he morally ought with regard to her speech (in addition to his 
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other failings).  There are moral norms on how a person’s ‘no’ should be perceived, and, 
according to those norms, gender should not make a difference.  And this is true 
regardless of the pornographic glamorization of sexual violence that that rapist may have 
consumed.  The rapist fails to perceive as he morally ought and this failure constitutes a 
restriction on what the speaker is able to do with her words.  It is a moral and distinctly 
speech-related wrong.    
So, the wrong in the cases of silencing is objective if the silencing violates an 
objective norm.  The silencing is a failure, on the part of the silencer, to perceive the 
speaker’s speech as he morally, legally, or practically ought.  The speaker’s utterance 
should count as a refusal, but the silencer fails to perceive it appropriately. He is therefore 
guilty of irrationality, of a mistake, even though he gets the illocutionary facts right, 
relative to some perception.  The silencing is a failure because the subordinated status of 
the speaker should, by the relevant norm, make no difference in the illocutionary force of 
her utterances.   
From Illocutionary Relativism, then, emerges an account of illocutionary 
disablement that offers a uniform analysis of illocutions.  Illocutions perceived by 
conversers with matching perceptions, conversers with unproblematically mismatched 
perceptions, and in those case in which conversers problematically silence their 
interlocutors all get the same treatment.  Also, because extra-conversational 
considerations play an important role in the motivating alignment of perspectives, the 
account makes theoretical space for the range of wrongs done to problematically 
subordinated speakers.  Advocates of accounts of illocutionary silencing should, 
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therefore, adopt Illocutionary Relativism over accounts of illocution that require a single, 
objective, authoritative conversational scoreboard.   
 
§5.  Conclusion 
 The goal of this chapter was to demonstrate that there are advantages to adopting 
Illocutionary Relativism, if we want to account for restrictions on conversational moves 
faced by subordinated speakers.  One thing left almost entirely aside, though, were the 
epistemic considerations that have been so important in the previous chapters.  One 
among the many norms on assertion, I’ve argued, is an epistemic norm.  This chapter, 
concerned as it was with other illocutions (like refusals and commands) was not much 
concerned with epistemic norms.  We’ll turn, in the next chapter, to the intersection of 
concerns about silencing and concerns about epistemology: we’ll look at what happens 
when speakers are systematically silencing in their attempts to testify.     
 
  
	   179	  
Chapter 6: Communicative Injustice 
Abstract:  
 In the last chapter, I began to tackle questions of unjust restrictions on 
communication.  There, I was focused on restrictions on making conversational moves – 
illocutionary restrictions.  I’m again concerned with the restrictions that speakers face 
when they are members of socially subordinated groups; however in this chapter I will 
expand my focus to include other kinds of communicative injustices as well.  In 
particular, I engage with work from Miranda Fricker on testimonial injustice.  Fricker has 
contrasted her work on epistemic injustice with Langton’s work on illocutionary 
silencing.  According to Fricker, these two accounts are incompatible and competing 
candidates for the best analysis of communicative injustice.  Part of the project of this 
chapter is to demonstrate that these two projects are compatible.  To do so, however, will 
require the same kind of shift in traditional speech act theory that I recommended in the 
last chapter.  The other part of the project in this chapter, then, is to explain and argue for 
this shift.  
 Just as in the last chapter, issues of communicative justice are interesting and 
important in their own right.  They are also, however, of particular interest given the 
overall project of the dissertation.  If we’re to understand illocutionary force in the 
context of actual conversation, we should bear in mind the myriad ways that 
conversations go – including those that don’t go at all well.  And, given how important 
assertion is to testimony (as discussed in chapter 2), our understanding of assertion will 
need to make room for an analysis of testimonial injustice.   
 
§1. An Apparent Conflict 
I argued, in the last chapter, that Rae Langton’s account of illocutionary 
disablement could be improved by adopting Illocutionary Relativism.  If an interlocutor 
perceives a speaker’s utterance as having or failing to have a particular force because of a 
prejudiced belief about those who share the speaker’s social status, then that speaker has 
been unfairly restricted with regard to influencing that interlocutor’s perception.  I 
demonstrated that shifting our attention to the forces utterances are perceived to have 
allowed Langton’s account to escape and avoid a wide variety of criticisms leveed 
against that account.   
I’ve not yet addressed all of the criticisms a view like Langton’s faces.  Miranda 
Fricker has developed what she takes to be a competing and more empirically likely 
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analysis of restrictions on communication – in particular those restrictions that agents 
face when they attempt to communicate their knowledge.  Fricker calls this restriction 
testimonial injustice, and it occurs when a speaker is perceived to be insufficiently 
credible to add her knowledge to the epistemic economy.  Langton’s target cases, Fricker 
argues, are not importantly different – they are properly understood as extreme examples 
of this kind of injustice.  If Fricker is right, and if Fricker’s analysis is both broader and 
more empirically likely, then Langton’s analysis is in trouble. 
The concern, in Fricker’s own words, is as follows.   
 
“On [Langton’s] account, silencing occurs prior to the moment at which a 
speaker's credibility is at issue, for the silenced woman's problem is not 
that her interlocutor regards her word as so worthless that when she says 
‘No’ he doesn't hear her; rather, his stance towards her in the context is 
such that she is prevented from (fully successfully) performing the 
illocutionary act of refusal in the first place. His silencing her does not 
turn on any epistemic attitude he might have towards her, for the whole 
question of her credibility simply does not arise. On [this] account, then, 
silencing does not feature as a form of testimonial injustice. By contrast, 
on the construal I have put forward, according to which there might be 
social climates in which women lack credibility so drastically for certain 
subject matters that their word fails altogether to register in male hearers' 
testimonial sensibility, we can see how silencing might take the form of an 
extreme testimonial injustice.  Either conception of silencing presents a 
coherent social possibility, but … the epistemic model describes the more 
empirically likely possibility, simply because it requires less erosion of 
women's human status before the silencing effect kicks in.  (M. Fricker, 
2007, pp. 141-142) 
 
In this chapter I propose to resolve this concern by demonstrating that the choice between 
Fricker’s and Langton’s accounts is a false one.  The views only appear to be in conflict.  
The reason for this apparent conflict is that the accounts use very different vocabulary.  
By casting them both in speech act theoretic terms we will be able to dissolve this 
apparent conflict, and take advantage of the tools from each. 
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This is a worthwhile project in part because these tools can all be of use in 
developing a more accurate and nuanced account of the restrictions speakers face.  There 
is, however, a complication: recall in the last chapter, that to address the objections to 
Langton’s account we had to adjust our analysis to focus on perceptions of 
communication, rather than objective facts about communication.  In order to 
demonstrate that the views are compatible and that the shift is well motivated, I’ll have to 
also demonstrate that the shift is tenable and desirable for Fricker’s account.  I will, in the 
last section of this chapter, argue that there are benefits to be had from such a shift for 
Fricker’s account, and, more broadly, for a general account of the unjust restrictions 
faced by subordinated speakers.   
 
§2.  Rival Analyses 
It is not surprising that Fricker’s and Langton’s views differ, as their analyses of 
unjust restrictions on communication develop in the pursuit of different projects.  
Langton’s project is to use speech act theory to bring to light the pernicious subordinating 
effects of some kinds of pornography.  The relevant tools are the categories of things that 
speakers can do by speaking.  These are familiar from chapter 1, but to review, consider 
the various things speakers can do by speaking.  First, speakers can make meaningful 
utterances – this is the locution.  Second, a speaker can, by uttering meaningfully, also 
make some particular conversational move.  Making an utterance as a conversational 
move is making it with some illocutionary force.  Illocutionary force is what makes an 
utterance a question, or a promise, or a refusal. Third, a speaker can bring about certain 
distal effects.  These effects, called perlocutionary effects, are what speakers do by 
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making conversational moves.  I might, by saying “shut the door”, bring it about that you 
shut the door.  I might bring it about that you slam the door.  I might bring it about that 
you scoff in disgust.  These are all candidate perlocutionary effects of my speech.  
Langton’s focus is on illocutionary force, and how able various speakers are to speak 
with the force they intend.  Pornography that portrays women as unable to make certain 
conversational moves, she argues, contributes to a restriction on women’s ability to make 
those moves.  
 According to Langton’s original discussion, this restriction goes as follows: 
illocutionary disablement occurs when a speaker is kept from making the conversational 
move she intends because her interlocutor does not recognize it as such.  Langton’s 
standard case is one in which a woman intends to refuse sex with a man, and that man, 
because he has consumed objectifying or violent pornography, interprets her “no” as 
something other than a refusal.  Langton claims that this is because of a failure of uptake.  
Uptake is a feature that, according to Langton and Austin (Austin, 1975), is necessary for 
some illocutions to be “fully successful”.  The rapist fails to count her locution as a 
refusal because she is a member of a socially subordinated group. When social 
subordination causes a restriction in conversational moves in this way, illocutionary 
disablement has occurred – uptake fails, and the speaker’s locution does not count as 
having the illocutionary force she intends.   
Fricker, on the other hand, develops her account of unjust restrictions on 
communication as part of a different project.  Fricker’s project is to describe the moral 
and epistemic wrongs experienced by members of subordinated groups who are kept 
from (fully) participating in the epistemic economy.  She has in mind the wide variety of 
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restrictions subordinated group members face in their “capacity as knowers” (M. Fricker, 
2007, p. 1).  The most pertinent of these, for our purposes here, is testimonial injustice.  
This kind of injustice occurs when a speaker’s social status either keeps her from 
testifying at all, or makes it so her testimony isn’t taken seriously.  Fricker’s paradigm 
case of this is that of Tom Robinson in To Kill a Mockingbird.  Robinson attempts to 
testify in his own defense in a trial.  Because he is an African American in Alabama in 
the 1930’s, his membership in a socially subordinated group and the prejudice of the 
jurors keep him from effectively defending himself.  When social position affects 
testimony in this way, testimonial injustice has occurred. 
Putting this in speech act theoretic terms, Robinson is able to make a locution – he 
is able to make a meaningful utterance – and he is able to make an illocution – he intends 
his utterance to have assertoric force, and his audience uptakes the utterance as such – but 
he is not able to have the intended perlocutionary effects.  He intends, by asserting, to 
convince his audience of his innocence, or at least to let them know the truth.  Despite 
taking him to be asserting that he is innocent, the jurors do not take his assertions to be 
giving them evidence as to his innocence.  They do not believe him, because they do not 
take African Americans to be credible (at least with regard to their own innocence or 
guilt).  Because of this, his speech act does not have the perlocutionary effects he intends.   
It is much easier to see, with both accounts cast in the same vocabulary, that they 
are accounting for different restrictions.  There are three ways in which an agent’s 
attempted communication might be restricted.  First, she might not be able to make a 
meaningful utterance at all – she might be literally silenced, or unable to speak the 
relevant language.  She is not able to make a locution.  This would keep her from making 
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conversational moves and from having perlocutionary success.  Second, the agent might 
be able to make a meaningful utterance, but not be able to have it count as having the 
force she intends.  She can make a locution, but not one that has the intended 
illocutionary force.  Here, too she would not have perlocutionary success (except by very 
strange accident).  This is the kind of scenario Langton’s original account makes salient.  
Third, the agent might be able to make the conversational move she intends but 
nonetheless be perlocutionarily restricted.  She can make a locution that counts as having 
a particular illocutionary force, but not be able to enact the other effects she intends.  This 
is what’s happened in the Tom Robinson case.  And we can imagine a case like this 
involving rape: an assailant recognizes his victim as refusing, but rapes her anyway.   
Fricker claims that her account better captures the restrictions speakers face.  
However, these three restrictions on attempted communication are distinct, and Fricker 
would need to motivate any claim that our analysis should treat them the same.  To me, it 
seems that treating all of these cases alike would obscure important differences between 
the cases.  For example, the distinct restrictions may be enabled or reinforced by different 
systems of subordination.  Social systems can restrict perlocutionary effects without 
restricting either of the other kinds of speech action.  A situation in which a rape occurs 
after a recognized refusal is, at least conceptually, distinct from one in which a rape 
occurs after an utterance that is perceived to be a demurring invitation.90 Langton’s 
analysis makes this distinction available.   Analyses that ignore illocutionary disablement 
do not.  Fricker’s first criticism depends on her account covering the same phenomena 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 These situations are also practically distinct.  We could teach a rapist or a potential 
rapist that ‘no’ means “no” contrary to the pornographic depictions Langton specifies.  
This education would have little effect on someone who does or would rape a victim after 
recognizing a refusal.  
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that Langton’s covers, and this need not be the case. There can be multiple locations for 
unjust restrictions.  Some are aptly described by Fricker’s account.  Langton’s better 
captures others.  Both analyses can be right, but not to the exclusion of the other.  This is 
one way in which the choice between Fricker’s and Langton’s analyses is a false one – 
the accounts can each be used to describe different restrictions subordinated speakers 
face. 
The other claim, in Fricker’s criticism, is that her analysis of restricted speech is 
more likely than Langton’s.  She claims that her account, which locates the cause in a 
credibility deficit, is “more empirically likely” than Langton’s.  Admittedly, Langton’s 
account makes no mention of credibility, tracing the cause of the injustice to a failure of 
uptake.   Again, however, I think that this choice between the causes is a false one.  We 
need not decide between credibility deficit and failure of uptake because the two are not 
mutually exclusive – the one can cause the other.  I will return to this point in the next 
section, but it is important to notice that uptake might fail because of a credibility deficit.  
If the rapist, in Langton’s example, does not take the woman to be credible with regard to 
her own sexual desires, he might well take her to be insufficiently authoritative to make a 
refusal of his sexual advances.  There is no need for us to choose between Langton and 
Fricker’s accounts because there is no need to choose between failure to illocute and 
credibility deficits.   
 
§3. Perceptions, forces, and effects 
 In the last chapter, I argued that an account like Langton’s benefitted from from 
objective facts about illocutionary status, to facts about how attempts to communicate are 
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perceived.  Here, I will argue that the same is true for an account like Fricker’s.  There 
are, as I see it, two main benefits to shifting focus in this way.  First, this shift allows us 
to see even more clearly how much Fricker’s and Langton’s accounts have in common.  
Second, this shift will allow us to account for a spectrum of restrictions on speech in a 
way that is unavailable if we focus only on objective facts about communication.  Most 
of the literature on these topics assumes that our theories must crucially involve the 
objective facts about attempts at communication.  Fricker’s own account, like the other 
critiques of Langton discussed in the last chapter (Bird, 2002), (Jacobson, 1995), assumes 
this as well.  Assuming this, however, obscures important facts about cases of unjust 
restrictions of communication.   
To see the effects of this assumption, consider again the apparent disagreement 
over the rape case.  According to Fricker’s account, the woman refuses – after all, she 
says “no” to a sexual advance and this seems clearly to be a refusal.  She is not able to 
bring about the desired perlocutionary effects, though, because the rapist does not think 
she is credible.  Langton says that despite the woman’s making a meaningful utterance, 
that utterance fails to secure uptake from the rapist.  She is kept from fully successfully 
making the conversational move.  So, if Langton is right, the woman is restricted because 
she is kept from making a conversational move.  If Fricker is right, the woman made the 
conversational move, so the restriction must be at the level of the perlocutionary effects 
(caused by a credibility deficit).  Either her utterance had the force of a refusal or it did 
not.  
The assumption about the importance of the objective facts forces this choice on 
us.  If the woman refused, then that refusal is crucial to our analysis.  If she was thwarted 
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because of a failure of uptake, that fact must be crucial to our analysis.  I think it just 
isn’t.  
Instead of focusing on the objective facts about attempts to communicate, we 
should focus on the ways those attempts are perceived.  The perceptions interlocutors 
have of speech acts are crucial for our understanding of attempts to communicate.  I will 
argue that we can get a much more subtle and accurate account if, instead of focusing on 
objective facts about communication, we focus on perceptions of that communication.  In 
other words, shifting our focus from objective facts about communication to perceived 
facts about attempts to communicate promises theoretical pay offs.  In the case in 
question, the woman is both perceived to have refused (by her own lights) and perceived 
not to have (by the rapist’s).  Both of these perceptions are important and do important 
theoretical work.  
When a speaker speaks, her interlocutors form a perception of that speech.  Recall 
the discussion of perceptions in chapter 3: by perception I mean a complex intentional 
state involving the perceiver’s expectations, attitudes, and dispositions to respond to the 
speech they perceive.  Perceptions include impressions of content, volume, tone, 
trustworthiness, propriety and illocutionary force.  These perceptions are informed by the 
perceiver’s interpretation of meaning of the locution, but also by their beliefs (attitudes 
etc.) about the speaker. The jurors’ prejudices against Tom Robinson, as an African 
American, involve the belief that he is untrustworthy and violent, etc.  This affects how 
they perceive his testimony.  The assailant’s attitudes toward women involve the belief 
that they are sexually duplicitous, coy, etc.  This affects how he perceives the 
illocutionary force of her locution. 
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 Recall, too, that our perceptions of speech are largely automatic – when we 
engage in conversation we smoothly and mostly unconsciously perceive speech acts in a 
variety of ways.  If my experience with a speaker leads me to believe she is a liar, this 
belief automatically influences how I perceive her speech.  I might perceive her as 
promising but as making a false promise.  I don’t have to consciously bring my 
experiences to mind in order to have this perception.  My knowledge of children 
automatically influences how I perceive a toddler’s speech.  I might not perceive a 
toddler as able to make a promise, even if she utters the sounds “I promise”.  I don’t have 
to consciously remind myself of facts about toddlers in order to do this.  Perceptions of 
speech, like the attitudes and beliefs that affect them, are largely automatic and 
unconscious.   
Nonetheless, like our other habits of thought, our perceptions of speech can be 
influenced and changed.  If I join a new discursive community, I might learn a new joke.  
I might learn that when a member of a community says the word “chrysanthemum”, that 
member is (baring botanical coincidence) joking.  At first, when I’m told these jokes, I 
might perceive them as serious assertions, questions or commands.  I can train or teach 
myself, however, to perceive these utterances as jokes instead.  My perception is largely 
automatic, but is also subject to influence, and therefore, is not entirely out of our control.   
 Because our perceptions are influenced by our beliefs, the qualities of those 
perceptions will be affected by the qualities of those beliefs.  Some of our beliefs are 
justified – sometimes when I believe a speech act to be funny, or trustworthy, or 
insensitive, I have excellent reason to do so.  The perceptions that result from these 
beliefs are reasonable and probably just.  I would perceive similar speech made by any 
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similarly behaving agent just as I perceive the speech in question.  Say that I justly 
believe some speaker to be untrustworthy because they’ve behaved duplicitously in the 
past.  This justly formed belief of the speaker, then, makes me perceive their speech as 
less trustworthy.  I don’t take their testimony to offer evidence because I don’t expect 
them to tell the truth – I justly perceive their speech act as untrustworthy.   
Sometimes, however, our beliefs are not just.  The jurors are wrong to believe that 
Tom Robinson is untrustworthy (though they’re right to believe he is African American).  
A white person who behaved the way Tom Robinson behaves would not be regarded as 
untrustworthy.91  Because race makes no difference in trustworthiness, the attitudes and 
prejudices the jurors have toward Tom Robinson are unjust.92 This is a difference that 
should make no difference.  It does, and so the perception that results from their unjust 
beliefs is unjust as well. These unjust perceptions of his speech help explain their 
behavior in a way that the perspective-independent facts about his speech cannot.  And, 
because perceptions are, to some extent, in the perceivers’ voluntary control, those who 
perceive unjustly can be held (to some extent) responsible.93 
We can rephrase both Langton’s and Fricker’s target phenomena with a focus on 
perceptions.  As is now familiar from the last chapter, a speaker is illocutionarily disabled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 It doesn’t actually matter if Robinson has been entirely untrustworthy in the whole of 
his existence.  What matters, here, is the cause of the juror’s perceptions.  The 
counterfactual allows us to test for the cause. If they do not trust him because he is 
African American, then if he were white, they would trust him. And we can iterate this 
test for as many categories as we want.  If they do not trust him because he is a man, we 
should be able to run the counterfactual – they would trust him if he were a woman.  Etc.  
92 I have in mind a roughly Rawlsian account of justice, here.  That the perceptions are 
unfair renders them unjust.  This unfairness is illustrated by the counterfactual regarding 
the white testifier.  (Rawls, 1985) 
93 Fricker discusses the various ways in which someone might be more or less culpable 
for the epistemic injustices they perpetrate (M. Fricker, 2007).   
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to the extent that her locution is not perceived to have the illocutionary force she intends.  
It is a further question whether or not this is unjust.94  A speaker’s testimony is restricted 
to the extent that she is taken to be insufficiently credible, causing her testimony to be 
perceived as unreliable.  That restriction constitutes testimonial injustice to the extent that 
she is unjustly taken to have a credibility deficit and so her testimony is unjustly 
perceived as worthless in the epistemic economy.  And any particular case of 
communicative injustice might be one, or the other, or both of these.  Sometimes 
perceptions will make a difference at the illocutionary level and sometimes perceptions 
make a difference at the perlocutionary level.  
  So, take Langton’s version of the rape case.  Here the woman perceives her 
communication as a refusal.  The assailant, however, does not perceive her as refusing.  
He perceives her as demurring.  Perceptions like this could have a number of causes, 
including his consumption of objectifying pornography, or assigning her a credibility 
deficit, or some combination of both. 
 The assailant might fail to perceive her locuted “no” as a refusal because he 
believes she fails to have the requisite authority.  Speech act theory tells us that one way 
in which an illocution can fail is if the speaker doesn’t have the authority required to 
make the illocution in question.  I, for example, cannot successfully baptize a child into 
the Catholic Church.  And, if a priest’s position is not recognized (if, for example, he is 
not wearing his vestments, and is a stranger), we won’t take him to successfully baptize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 There are examples of perfectly just illocutionary disablements – perhaps the mistaken 
captain case is one.  Surely 12 year olds’ being unable to marry is another. See (Wieland, 
2007), and (Maitra, 2009)  
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either – we won’t perceive his locution as a baptism – we will perceive it to have 
misfired.   
 We can even imagine a case in which there are (perhaps pernicious – though this 
is not necessary) popular portrayals of laypeople dousing infants with water to cause 
them harm.  If these portrayals have affected our perceptions, then we might react quite 
strongly to the unrecognized priest’s behavior.  In a case like this, the priest’s acts won’t 
prompt any of the desired or intended perceptions in us.   
An analogous treatment is available for the rape case.  If the assailant thinks that 
the woman is epistemically ill-placed to make a happy refusal, then he will not perceive 
her speech as having that illocutionary force.  He will perceive her attempted refusal to 
have misfired.  And if this is systematic and not idiosyncratic, the woman may find 
herself unable to influence a wide variety of perceptions in the ways she’d like.  If 
anything is illocutionary disablement, this is.   
 Next, consider the Robinson case.  Fricker aptly describes this case as follows, 
“when it comes to the verdict, the jurors go along with the automatic distrust delivered by 
the prejudices that structure their perception of the speaker. They find him guilty” (M. 
Fricker, 2007, p. 25).95  They perceive his speech as untrustworthy.  They perceive his 
testimony as failing to add to the evidence at hand, because he is the member of a 
subordinated group.  This, by Fricker’s description, is despite perceiving him to be 
asserting – to be making the conversational move he attempts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Fricker also emphasizes perceptions in another discussion of testimonial injustice.  She 
says, “in a case of ‘stop and search’ by the police, where a racial prejudice affects the 
perception of the police officer so that a young black male driver receives a prejudicially 
deflated level of credibility when he declares that he is the rightful owner of the car” (M. 
Fricker, 2013, p. 1319) (emphasis added).   
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 The restrictions faced by Robinson and the raped woman are different – as 
discussed above, they face restrictions of different parts of their attempts to communicate.  
These two restrictions, however, are also importantly similar – they are both caused by 
unjust perceptions.  In both cases the speakers’ interlocutors have an unjust perception of 
their speech.  These restrict both speakers in being fully able to communicate, albeit in 
different ways.  Shifting to focus on perceptions allows us to capture this commonality. 
 The other benefit of shifting focus to perceptions is that doing so allows us to 
capture subtleties in the cases that might otherwise go unnoticed.  The jurors’ perceptions 
are not the only salient perceptions in the Robinson case.  The audience at the trial has a 
wide variety of responses to Robinson’s testimony.  Atticus Finch, defense lawyer, takes 
it to be a sincere and true assertion.  Scout, his young daughter, doesn’t know what to 
make of the testimony.  Her perceptions are mixed.  And some members of a prejudiced 
audience might perceive Robinson’s speech as failing to even meet the preparatory 
conditions for testifying.   He might be perceived as not even able to make such a 
conversational move.  Robinson’s case makes it clear that there can be a wide range of 
perceptions of a single communicative act.  By focusing on the perceptions interlocutors 
have of the communication rather than on the status of the communication itself, we can 
countenance the full range of reactions to Robinson’s attempt to testify.  And this, in turn, 
allows us to understand the full range of restrictions that speakers face.  
 If a speaker’s speech is perceived in a variety of ways, that speaker might face a 
number of related restrictions.  Each perceiver’s perceptions, together with their social 
position relative to the speaker and the other interlocutors, will affect the speaker’s ability 
to communicate.  Scout doesn’t have much power relative to the other perceivers, but if 
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she did, her ambivalent perception might be a powerful factor in Robinson’s situation.  
No one audience member’s perception outweighs the jury’s, but if enough people 
perceive Robinson’s utterance as trustworthy testimony, there might well be social or 
political consequences for the judge or jury.  These perceptions all matter, even if they 
don’t determine a unique objective fact about Robinson’s attempt to communicate. 
 With this understanding of perceptions in mind, we can trace distinctions between 
different kinds of restrictions on communication.  While the restrictions that Robinson 
and the raped woman face are clearly unjust, others are intuitively appropriate.  I might 
perceive some speech as untrustworthy for good reason.  I might form the relevant 
attitudes, beliefs, etc. about that speaker based on my experience with them.  Those 
experiences might make me form that opinion independent of my various attitudes and 
prejudices.  In this case, that speaker might face a restriction on communication, but that 
restriction would not be unjust.  It is because the jurors unjustly perceive Robinson, and 
the rapist unjustly perceives his victim, the restrictions these speakers face constitute 
communicative injustice. 
Further, I might unjustly restrict someone’s communication without anyone 
realizing.  I might form an unjust belief about some speaker, which colors my perception 
of their speech act.  This unjust perception of the speech act might go entirely unnoticed 
if I have very little power, or if the speaker also unjustly perceives herself.  Nonetheless, 
if I would not perceive a privileged but otherwise similar speaker in that restricted way, 
my perception is unjust.   
 Why is it important to capture the varied perceptions of audience members?  In 
part it is important because these perceptions are often the source or cause of the further 
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wrongs committed.  In both Langton’s and Fricker’s standard cases, interlocutors’ 
perceptions play a much heftier causal role than the other facts about the 
communication’s status.  And this makes a lot of sense.  A speaker need not be kept from 
doing an action at all to experience a restriction in her ability to perform that action.  
Speakers are restricted if it is more difficult for them to act with their speech than it 
would be for someone else.     
  Think of it this way: imagine a conversation in which one of your interlocutors 
perceives you as making a threatening remark, while you, and the other conversational 
participants perceive you merely complaining.  That one person’s perceptions of your 
communication will, in many cases, not make a lot of difference.  In most situations like 
this, you and your interlocutors will resolve or ignore this difference in perceptions 
without much difficulty.  Certain kinds of social relationships, however, can make that 
different perception very important.  Imagine that that interlocutor is your employer, or 
your commanding officer, or your child.  All of these social relationships can make a 
difference to how much a mis-matched perception matters.   
Now imagine that that interlocutor is actually in the majority – you are, let’s say, 
alone in perceiving your communication as a complaint.  Your interlocutors all take what 
you’ve said as a threat, and proceed with the conversation accordingly.  Perhaps they’re 
so incensed by what they perceive to be a threat that you cannot convince them you were 
merely complaining.  This would be more serious, especially if this group contains your 
bosses, commanding officers, or parents.  It is likely to have further reaching 
consequences than the initial case.  You might suffer socially.  You might have to take 
extra care in how you complain in this company.  You might even be restricted in terms 
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of your power to influence your interlocutors’ perceptions of your speech – they might 
not be disposed to converse with you in the ways they were before.   
Now imagine that it is not just your interlocutors in the conversation at hand, but 
also large proportions of your linguistic community.  Imagine your complaints are 
systematically perceived as threats.  Here the restriction on communication becomes even 
graver.  You are, in effect, disabled with regard to influencing the perceptions of those 
interlocutors in the ways you intend.  Perhaps this is incidental – perhaps it is a 
coincidence that your interlocutors systematically perceive your locutions differently 
from how you perceive them.   But perhaps something more insidious is at work – 
perhaps people like you, that is, members of a particular social group, aren’t allowed to 
make complaints like that.   
As the restrictions get more systematic and widespread, it becomes more difficult 
to imagine that they are accidental.  As in Robinson’s case, large numbers of similar 
perceptions probably have a similar cause.  The jurors’ prejudices cause them to perceive 
Robinson’s testimony as unreliable.  They all have those prejudices because they all 
inhabit the same unjust social system.  To the extent that the restriction on 
communication is caused by an unjust social system, or by the speaker’s membership in 
an unjustly subordinated social group, the restriction is unjust.   
To be clear, the injustice is not simply a matter of the numbers – imagine that a 
mostly sympathetic audience hears Robinson’s case, but that the jury, because of 
prejudice, finds him guilty.  The audience believes he is innocent, but because of the 
prejudiced jury, the verdict is the opposite.  The jury then acts on this prejudiced 
perception.  The cause of the perception is unjust, the perception is unjust, and, because 
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of their social position, the jurors are able to enact unjust effects.  It doesn’t matter that 
the jurors (in this variation of the case) hold a minority position.  Their perceptions are 
the ones that will matter going forward because they are in a position of social power. 
Similarly, the assailant in the rape case has some kind of power over the woman 
he rapes.  It is less institutionalized than the power the jurors have, but it still has real 
effects.  Either by physically overpowering her, or by some other threat, or misbalance of 
social power, his perception of her communication is privileged going forward.  It does 
not matter whether or not her communication has a particular status, what matters in this 
case is that he perceives her communication in a particular way, and then is able to act on 
that regardless of her perceptions. The rapist’s history with pornography causes him to 
perceive the woman’s “no” as an invitation.  If he didn’t have any power over her, that 
perception would be impotent.  Inhabiting the unjust social system of which his 
perception is a part might harm her; however, his particular perception would not cause 
her harm unless he is in a position to act on it.  He is in such a position, so his unjust 
perception, together with his unjust power over her, causes her grave harm.   
So, for both Fricker’s and Langton’s paradigm cases, the cause of the injustice is 
similar – the interlocutors who restrict their victims’ communicative capacities do so 
because of their perceptions of those communications.  Those perceptions, in turn, are 
caused by injustice.  That injustice might be a systematic credibility deficit, it might be 
problematic depictions of a subordinated social group, or it might be some combination 
of both.  But by casting both accounts in the same vocabulary and focusing on the 
important causal factor (the perceptions of interlocutors and particularly the perceptions 
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of powerful interlocutors), we can see just how much these accounts have in common, 
and how little conflict there is between them. 
 
§4. Conclusion 
 In the last two chapters, I’ve put my new account of illocutionary force, 
Illocutionary Relativism, to work.  By applying Illocutionary Relativism to debates over 
illocutionary silencing and testimonial injustice, some of the payoffs of the new position 
are coming to light.  One key feature of Illocutionary Relativism that has helped in these 
last two chapters is that the theory is very careful about the relationship between 
descriptive and normative facts.  Illocutionary force is a category created to capture some 
features of our conversational practice.  The category alone is not suited to saying how 
we ought to converse.  Illocutionary Relativism, however, keeps in mind that speakers are 
sensitive to a wide variety of norms.  This sensitivity is important if we’re to describe 
conversations and moves in conversations accurately.   
According to Illocutionary Relativism, one of the things that speakers do with 
words is create, control, and coordinate the expectations and obligations that they and 
their interlocutors have.  And, according to Illocutionary Relativism, we should expect 
there to be difficulties, problems, and misunderstandings when this kind of coordination 
fails.  Some of these failures are benign, and easily resolved.  Some are the pernicious 
effects of histories of subordination and violence.  In these last two chapters, I’ve 
attempted to demonstrate that Illocutionary Relativism can help us better understand 
these mismatches, and to tell the benign from the pernicious.   
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